

doi [10.14710/jdep.9.1.19-28](https://doi.org/10.14710/jdep.9.1.19-28)**Incumbency and Electoral Competition: Evidence from the 2024 Indonesian Mayoral Elections**

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Abstract

Electoral competition is essential for democratic accountability. However, the presence of incumbent candidates may weaken electoral competition by discouraging challenger entry. This paper compares districts with and without incumbent candidates in terms of electoral competition during the 2024 Indonesian Mayoral Elections. This paper measures electoral competition using four indicators: the number of candidates, the winner's vote share, the winning margin, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Employing Welch's t-tests, the results show that districts with an incumbent candidate have fewer candidates, higher winner vote shares, larger winning margins, and more concentrated votes. These patterns are consistent with the scare-off hypothesis. Nevertheless, the descriptive design does not establish that causal relationship. The results offer a baseline for future research on how incumbency affects challenger entry.

Keywords: Accountability, Incumbent Advantage, Electoral Competition, Local Election, Indonesia

JEL Classification: D72, D73, H70

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Introduction

Indonesia embarked on democratic transition following the collapse of Suharto's New Order Regime in 1998. The subsequent institutional reforms implemented during regimes in transition aimed not only to promote democratic governance but also to dismantle the highly centralized authoritarian structures that characterized the New Order. Among the most consequential reforms was the implementation of decentralization policies in 2001, which devolved most of the administrative and fiscal authorities from the central to local governments¹. Decentralization progressed further with the introduction of direct local executive elections² for governors and mayors³, which were first held in 2005. This fundamental political reform sought to strengthen democracy at the sub-national level.

The emphasis on direct local elections reflects the central role of elections in democratic systems. Literature on political economy highlights that elections promote democratic accountability⁴ through two distinct mechanisms. First, elections serve a disciplinary role by creating incentives for incumbents to perform well in order to secure reelection (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986). Second,

¹ Indonesia has five levels of government: central, provincial, district (*kabupaten* and *kota*), sub-district (*kecamatan*), and village (*desa* and *kelurahan*). Decentralization primarily transfers authority from the central government to district governments.

² Pemilihan kepala daerah or Pilkada.

³ For simplicity, the term mayors refer to both *bupati*, who head kabupaten, and *walikota*, who head kota.

⁴ Accountability refers to the extent to which institutions allow the voters to hold elected officials responsible for their actions, primarily by rewarding or sanctioning them (Fearon 1999).

elections play a selection role by enabling voters to identify and select the most competent politicians (Besley, 2005). However, the capacity of elections to promote accountability crucially depends on the degree of electoral competition. When elections are insufficiently competitive, elections might fail to discipline bad politicians and to help voters to discriminate between good and bad candidates.

One prominent factor that may systematically undermine electoral competition is the advantages enjoyed by incumbents. A large body of empirical literature has studied the incumbency advantage and consistently found that incumbents have a disproportionately higher probability of winning elections (see, e.g., Bartnicki et al., 2022; Lee, 2008; Lewis et al., 2020). Beyond affecting electoral outcomes, incumbency may also deter high-quality challengers from entering the race (Cox & Katz, 1996; Hall & Snyder, 2015; Levitt & Wolfram, 1997), leading to weakened electoral competition. High probability of winning for the incumbent, weaker electoral competition, and challenger deterrence are distinct but related. The first describes an electoral outcome, the second describes the structure of the race, and the third describes a mechanism that may connect them. An incumbent can win often in a competitive race, so incumbency advantage alone does not imply weak competition. Competition weakens only if the advantage changes who enters the race. When strong challengers anticipate defeat and stay out, the field narrows, votes concentrate, and margins widen. Such a decline in electoral competition is particularly concerning for new democracies and decentralized systems, where competitive elections are expected to play a central role in sustaining democratic accountability and fostering responsive local governance. The concern is pressing in Indonesia, where 34 of 508 districts (7 percent) held single-candidate races in 2024, and incumbents ran in 15 of them. These considerations highlight the importance of understanding how incumbency shapes electoral competition.

This paper examines the relationship between incumbency and electoral competition in the 2024 Indonesian mayoral elections. In particular, it compares whether mayoral elections involving incumbents exhibit systematically different competitive structures relative to those without incumbents. We measure political competition using four indicators, namely: the number of candidates, the vote share of the winning candidate, the winning margin, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of electoral competition (HHI). Using descriptive and comparative analysis, the results show that mayoral elections with incumbent candidates generally have fewer candidates, higher winner vote shares, larger winning margins, and greater vote concentration. The results are consistent with the scare-off hypothesis. Nevertheless, the nature of our descriptive comparison cannot separate challenger deterrence from other explanations, such as incumbents' underlying popularity or their choice to run where they expect to win. We therefore interpret the results as associations only. This study contributes to the broader literature on incumbency advantage in developing democracies. Evidence from these countries is still limited (e.g., Dettman et al., 2017; Lewis et al., 2020; Salas, 2016; Uppal, 2009), especially regarding how the presence of incumbents relates to the degree of electoral competition. In particular, existing studies in Indonesia focused on incumbent reelection outcomes (Lewis et al., 2020), but they do not examine candidate entry, vote concentration, or winning margins. We address this gap with data from 508 districts and four indicators of competition: the number of candidates, the winner's vote share, the winning margin, and the HHI. Together, these indicators capture entry, dominance, and concentration, which win-loss outcomes cannot show. These results offer a baseline for future research on how incumbency affects challenger entry. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on incumbency advantage and the mechanisms through which it may deter potential challengers. Section 3 outlines the empirical methods and the data. Section 4 presents and discusses the findings. Section 5 concludes.

Literature Review

Within the principal-agent framework, an essential element to understanding the behavior of politicians and voters is that incumbent politicians behave in ways that increase their probability of re-election. Compared to their challengers, incumbents enjoy systematic advantages of holding office. These advantages raise the incumbent's probability of winning and may also affect who enters the race and how competitive the race is.

Incumbency advantages arise from direct and indirect benefits of holding office (Cox & Katz, 1996; Levitt & Wolfram, 1997). Directly, incumbents have access to public resources and budgetary instruments, allowing them to manipulate spending prior to elections in order to increase electoral support (Alesina & Roubini, 1992; Brender & Drazen, 2005; Hodler et al., 2010; Philips, 2016; Rogoff,

1990). Furthermore, incumbents benefit from relatively greater public visibility and name recognition (Gentzkow et al., 2011; Kawai & Sunada, 2025) and from stronger political networks (Cruz et al., 2017; Fafchamps & Labonne, 2020).

Indirectly, the mere presence of incumbents often deters potential challengers from entering the race. When incumbents are perceived as difficult to defeat, high-quality challengers may be discouraged from contesting the election (Cox & Katz, 1996; Hall & Snyder, 2015; Levitt & Wolfram, 1997). This leads to fewer candidates, more concentrated vote shares, and larger winning margins. This phenomenon, sometimes referred to as “scare-off”, reflects a rational calculation by potential candidates who weigh the costs of running against the slim prospects of defeating a well-advantaged incumbent. In this sense, incumbency advantage may undermine the quality of political competition by shaping not only who wins but also who chooses to run in the first place.

A primary driver of incumbency advantages lies in the informational edge incumbents hold over challengers. Incumbents have a disposition advantage because voters can assess an incumbent’s reputation from observing the incumbent’s performance while in office. When an incumbent’s actions are consistent with his or her reputation, voters perceive the incumbent as less risky than unknown challengers and, therefore, are more likely to re-elect the incumbent (Bernhardt & Ingberman, 1985). Furthermore, if elections serve as a mechanism for selecting more capable candidates into office, past electoral success may itself signal desirable candidate characteristics. Having already won an election, incumbents have demonstrated attributes valued by voters, such as competence, charisma, and valence. This makes incumbents more attractive to the voters (Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2008). This informational advantage helps explain why incumbents rarely lose elections and why some potential challengers might refrain from entering the race and wait until the seat is open.

Campaign costs also discourage higher-quality candidates from competing (Levitt & Wolfram, 1997). Higher campaign costs demand greater time and effort in fundraising, thereby increasing the opportunity cost for high-quality potential challengers (such as successful lawyers or business executives) who must forgo lucrative careers to run for office. Consequently, such candidates are less likely to enter the race, particularly when facing a high-quality incumbent who is perceived as difficult to defeat.

Empirically, identifying incumbency effects is difficult because incumbents differ from challengers in ways that also affect their electoral prospects. Regression discontinuity designs address this by comparing narrow winners and losers (Lee, 2008). Salas (2016) finds that incumbency provides an electoral advantage in Chilean congressional elections, while Uppal (2009) finds that incumbents face an electoral disadvantage in Indian state legislative elections.

Evidence from Indonesia points to a strong incumbency advantage in local elections. Dettman et al. (2017) test for incumbency advantages in the 2015 district head and mayoral elections, and Lewis et al. (2020) apply a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of incumbency on mayoral election outcomes. Both studies center on incumbent success. Neither examines how incumbency relates to candidate entry, vote concentration, or winning margins. Our descriptive comparison does not address the identification problem discussed above. It asks a different question: how the structure of competition differs when incumbents run. Each indicator corresponds to a channel in the scare-off argument. The number of candidates measures entry, the winner’s vote share and winning margin measure dominance, and the HHI measures vote concentration.

Methods

The main objective of this study is to conduct a descriptive comparative analysis by comparing the level of electoral competition between districts with and without an incumbent during the 2024 Indonesian mayoral elections. Indonesian voters choose between head-deputy tickets, not individuals, so we define incumbency at the ticket level. An incumbent candidate is the mayor and vice mayor who won in 2017, 2018, or 2020 and jointly seek re-election as the same pair in 2024. We do not classify a ticket as incumbent when only one member returns or when either member runs with a new partner.

We conducted the descriptive comparative analysis by comparing the mean of electoral competition indicators between districts with and without an incumbent candidate using Welch’s two-sample *t*-test. The test evaluates whether or not the means of the two groups differ without assuming that the two groups have equal variances. We then calculated the confidence interval to show whether or not the difference is statistically significant.

We hypothesized that the electoral competition differs between districts with and without incumbent candidates. In particular, the presence of an incumbent is associated with lower electoral competition. Let μ_1 denote the mean of the electoral competition indicator among districts with an incumbent candidate, and μ_0 denote the mean of the electoral competition indicator among districts without an incumbent candidate. The null and the alternative hypotheses are thus:

$$H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_0; \quad H_A: \mu_1 \neq \mu_0 \quad (1)$$

Welch's two-sample *t*-test calculates the standard error as follows.

$$SE(\hat{\Delta}) = \sqrt{\frac{s_1^2}{n_1} + \frac{s_0^2}{n_0}} \quad (2)$$

where $\hat{\Delta} = \bar{Y}_1 - \bar{Y}_0$ is the mean difference in the indicator of electoral competition between groups of districts with and without an incumbent candidate; $SE(\hat{\Delta})$ is the standard error of the mean difference; s_1^2 and s_0^2 are the sample variances for districts with and without an incumbent candidate, respectively; and n_1 and n_0 are the corresponding sample sizes.

The associated 95% confidence interval is calculated as follows.

$$[\hat{\Delta} - t^*SE(\hat{\Delta}); \hat{\Delta} + t^*SE(\hat{\Delta})], \quad (3)$$

where t^* is the critical value.⁵ We employed four indicators of electoral competition, namely: (1) number of candidates, (2) the vote share of the winning candidate, (3) the winning margin, and (4) the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).

The HHI is a standard measure to calculate concentration and competition, calculated as $HHI = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2$, where p_i denotes the vote share of candidate i . The HHI ranges from 0 to 1. Lower values indicate that votes are spread more evenly among candidates, implying higher electoral competition; higher values indicate that votes are concentrated among fewer candidates, implying lower electoral competition.

Since the HHI is sensitive to the number of candidates, we also calculated the normalized HHI. This adjustment is necessary because districts with more candidates mechanically have lower HHI than those with fewer candidates, even when the degree of electoral competition is identical. This makes the direct comparison of HHI across districts with varying numbers of candidates potentially misleading. The normalized HHI adjusts for differences in the number of candidates, making comparison across districts more meaningful. The normalized HHI is defined as $\frac{HHI - \frac{1}{n}}{1 - \frac{1}{n}}$, where n is the number of candidates.

Finally, we also calculated the effective number of candidates (ENC), defined as the inverse of HHI, $\frac{1}{HHI}$. Unlike the raw number of candidates, the ENC adjusts for differences in candidates' vote shares, providing a more informative measure of electoral competition.

To facilitate comparison across different indicators of electoral competition, we also conducted a Welch *t*-test using the standardized indicators. We performed standardization by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation. Accordingly, the estimated differences represent standardized mean differences measured in standard deviation units.

We obtained the data on the candidates and their vote share in the 2024 Indonesian mayoral elections from the National Election Commission (KPU). To construct the incumbency dataset, we additionally collected the results of the 2017, 2018, and 2020 mayoral elections from the same source. Specifically, we classify a ticket as incumbent if the same mayor-vice mayor pair won the 2017, 2018, or 2020 election and competed again in 2024. We then cross-reference these records against Wikidata to confirm that the pair completed their first term and was eligible to stand again in 2024. Under this rule, 69 districts have an incumbent candidate.

Indonesian law allows a single ticket to run against an empty box, and the ticket wins only if it receives more than 50 percent of valid votes. Of the 508 districts, 34 held such elections, including 15 of the 69 districts with an incumbent candidate. We treat the empty box as a ballot option in all vote-based indicators; that is, the vote shares, the HHI, the normalized HHI, the effective number of candidates, and the winning margin. We do so for three reasons. First, the empty box is a legal choice that gives voters a way to reject the sole ticket, and a ticket that fails to win a majority of valid votes loses. Dropping it

⁵ $t^* \approx 1.98$

would discard votes that decide the outcome. Second, without it, the sole ticket receives all votes, so the HHI equals one and the winning margin has no runner-up, regardless of how many voters rejected the ticket. Including the empty box lets these indicators reflect variation in support. Third, it keeps the normalized HHI defined, because the number of ballot options is two. In contrast, the number of candidates counts tickets only. The empty box fields no challenger, so excluding it keeps this indicator on entry, the margin the scare-off argument concerns. These districts therefore have one candidate. Votes for the empty box express rejection of the sole ticket, not support for an organized challenger, so we read the vote-based indicators in these districts with this difference in mind.

Results and Discussion

We begin this section by first providing a brief overview of the institutional context underlying decentralization in Indonesia. We then discuss our main results. Following the democratic transition in 1998, Indonesia implemented radical decentralization reforms in 2001⁶, shifting the country from one of the most centralized to one of the most decentralized. The reforms devolved substantial administrative and fiscal authority from the central government to district governments⁷. The districts have since held autonomy over almost all sectors, with the exception of foreign policy, defense and security, the judiciary, monetary and fiscal policy, and religion.

Extending the decentralization reforms, Indonesia enacted political decentralization in 2004.⁸ This reform introduced direct local executive elections for governors and mayors. Prior to this reform, local legislatures elected governors and mayors. This change gave effect to the mandate of the 1945 Constitution⁹ particularly by strengthening popular sovereignty and democratic governance at the local level.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Electoral Competition in the 2024 Mayoral Elections

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Electoral Competition</i>					
No. Candidates	508	2.87	1.09	1.00	6.00
Effective No. Candidates	508	2.45	0.73	1.06	4.97
Avg. Votes	508	102,414.44	126,177.35	4,362.40	1,079,390.50
Avg. Vote Share	508	37.72	11.38	16.66	50.00
Winner's Share	508	52.70	13.41	26.13	96.97
Win Margin	508	18.60	17.87	0.08	93.94
Win Advantage	508	14.98	9.27	0.06	46.97
HHI	508	0.44	0.13	0.20	0.94
HHI (norm)	508	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.88
<i>Incumbency</i>					
Incumbent	508	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00
Incumbent Win	69	0.72	0.45	0.00	1.00
Incumbent Vote	69	155,349.28	179,553.89	8,457.00	980,380.00
Incumbent Vote Share	69	57.05	18.98	11.95	94.08

The first wave of direct local executive elections was held between 2005 and 2009, while the second wave took place between 2010 and 2014, with election timing determined by the expiration of incumbent mayors' terms. These elections were conducted under a majoritarian electoral system with a winning threshold.¹⁰ In practice, runoffs were uncommon, as only a small number of districts failed to produce a winner in the first round. In 2015, a subsequent reform fundamentally altered the electoral framework. The timing of direct local executive elections was gradually synchronized across jurisdictions, culminating in the first nationwide local elections held simultaneously in 2024.¹¹ The

⁶ Law 22 of 1999 and Law 23 of 1999

⁷ Districts refer to both *kabupaten* and *kota*

⁸ Law 32 of 2004 Article 24(5)

⁹ Article 18(4): "*Gubernur, Bupati, dan Walikota masing-masing sebagai kepala pemerintah daerah provinsi, kabupaten, dan kota dipilih secara demokratis.*" (Governors, Regents, and Mayors, each serving as head of the provincial, regency, and municipal governments, are elected in a democratic manner.).

¹⁰ The threshold was set at 25% before 2008 and increased to 30% thereafter. A runoff election was required if no candidate achieved the threshold.

¹¹ Law 10 of 2016 Article 201

reform also replaced a plurality-majoritarian system with a plurality rule, under which the candidate receiving the largest number of votes is elected. Consequently, the 2024 local executive elections, which took place on 27 November 2024, marked the first time that all 508 autonomous districts and 37 provinces in Indonesia simultaneously conducted local executive elections.

Among the 508 districts, incumbent candidates competed in 69 districts (14 percent), indicating that incumbent participation in the 2024 mayoral elections is relatively limited in the sample. In these districts, incumbents performed relatively strongly: they won in 50 districts (72 percent) with an average vote share of 57.05 percent. In 15 districts, the incumbent was the sole candidate and secured a majority of the vote.




Figure 1. Distribution of Electoral Competition Measures by Incumbency Status

Figure 1 provides boxplots of each indicator by incumbency status. The distributions reveal that mayoral elections involving an incumbent candidate substantially differ from those without an incumbent. Specifically, incumbent races generally have fewer candidates (Figure 1a and 1b), higher winner vote shares (Figure 1c), larger winning margins (Figure 1d), and greater vote concentration as measured by the HHI (Figure 1e and 1f).

Figure 2 plots the mean differences between districts with and without an incumbent with 95% confidence intervals from Welch's *t*-tests. Given the substantial disparity between the two groups (69 incumbent districts versus 439 non-incumbent districts), this test is justified since it does not assume equal variances and sample sizes. Figure 2 comprises two panels: Panel 2a presents the raw estimates, whereas Panel 2b presents the standardized estimates. Further details, including the number of observations, means, differences, and the lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals, are provided in the appendix.

Figure 2 shows that all indicators of electoral competition consistently point to significant differences between districts with and without an incumbent candidate. Figure 2a shows that districts with an incumbent running feature notably fewer candidates on average (2.13 versus 2.99). The difference narrows slightly when weighted by vote shares (1.97 versus 2.52). The differences are statistically significant, with 95% confidence intervals of $[-1.09, -0.63]$ and $[-0.70, -0.41]$, respectively.

Electoral outcomes also confirm the dominance of incumbents. Descriptive statistics in Table 1 already suggest that incumbents performed strongly in the election, winning in 72 percent of the

districts they contested (50 of 69 districts). Figure 2a shows that winning candidates received a substantially larger share of the vote in incumbent districts than in non-incumbent districts (62.48 vs. 51.16 percent). This difference of 11.33 percentage points is statistically significant, with a 95% confidence interval of [7.50, 15.15]. They also won by a larger margin (29.56 versus 16.88 percentage points), corresponding to a statistically significant difference of 12.68 percentage points with a 95% confidence interval of [6.33, 19.04].




Figure 2: Mean Difference between Incumbent and Non-incumbent Districts
Notes: 95% confidence interval

Similarly, Figure 2a shows the HHI is higher in incumbent districts, as reflected in both the raw HHI (0.54 versus 0.43) and the normalized HHI (0.17 versus 0.10). The estimated differences of 0.12 and 0.08, respectively, are statistically significant, with 95% confidence intervals of [0.08, 0.15] and [0.03, 0.13]. This implies that electoral support is more concentrated in districts with incumbent candidates.

Figure 2b reports the differences in standard deviation units, which allows comparison across indicators. All differences exceed half a standard deviation in absolute value. The largest are for the HHI (about 0.90) and the winner's vote share (0.84), followed by the number of candidates (-0.79) and the effective number of candidates (-0.76). The winning margin (0.71) and the normalized HHI (0.61) show somewhat smaller differences. The indicators are mechanically related, so they do not provide independent tests. Fewer candidates raise the HHI, and a more concentrated vote usually comes with a higher winner's share and a larger margin. We therefore group them by what they measure. The number of candidates measures entry. The HHI, normalized HHI, and effective number of candidates measure how concentrated votes are. The winner's vote share and winning margin describe the outcome, and they reflect the incumbent's own performance as well as the competitiveness of the race. Together, the indicators show one pattern, not four separate findings; namely, races with an incumbent have fewer candidates and more concentrated votes.

The results show an association between incumbent participation and a less competitive race structure. These patterns are consistent with the scare-off argument in Section 2. When potential challengers expect an incumbent to win, high-quality candidates may stay out (Cox & Katz, 1996; Levitt & Wolfram, 1997), and the informational and campaign-cost advantages of incumbents may reinforce that expectation (Bernhardt & Ingberman, 1985; Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2008). They also fit the strong incumbency advantage that earlier studies document in Indonesian local elections (Dettman et al., 2017; Lewis et al., 2020).

Nevertheless, two important caveats regarding these results should be noted. First, the *t*-test only demonstrates that incumbent and non-incumbent districts differ significantly; it does not establish causality. Districts where incumbents run may systematically differ from those where they do not in ways that independently affect electoral competition, such as district size, economic conditions, or party strength. Second, our analysis does not distinguish between incumbents who win and those who lose, which may mask important heterogeneity in incumbency effects.

Conclusion

This paper examines the relationship between incumbency and electoral competition in the 2024 Indonesian mayoral elections. We compared mayoral elections with and without an incumbent candidate across four indicators of electoral competition: the number of candidates, winner's vote share, winning margin, and the HHI. The results show that districts with an incumbent have fewer candidates, more concentrated votes, higher winner's shares, and larger winning margins, and all differences are statistically significant. These patterns are consistent with the scare-off argument and with the strong incumbency advantage that earlier studies document in Indonesia (Dettman et al., 2017; Lewis et al., 2020), but they do not show that incumbents cause these differences. The findings have important implications for Indonesian local democracy. The fact that incumbents face fewer challengers and win by larger margins raises concerns about the quality of electoral competition at the local level. If incumbents discourage challengers, voters have fewer choices, and the disciplining effect of electoral competition on politicians' behavior weakens. This is particularly concerning in the Indonesian context, where districts have larger authorities over public service delivery.

Several limitations of this study should be noted. Most importantly, our analysis is descriptive and does not establish a causal relationship between incumbency and electoral competition. Incumbents may choose to run where they expect to win, and we do not control district characteristics such as size, economic conditions, or party strength. Our incumbency measure is also strict: it counts only the same mayor-vice mayor pair seeking re-election. Future research should address this by employing quasi-experimental methods such as regression discontinuity design, exploiting close elections to identify the causal effect of incumbency on electoral competition.

CRedit Author Statement

Gianti Nawangsari: Formal analysis, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing, Data curation, Visualization, and Funding acquisition. **Alfa Farah:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation, Writing - review & editing, Supervision, Project administration, and Funding acquisition.

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Generative AI Disclosure

The authors designed the study, collected and coded the data, conducted the analysis, and wrote the manuscript. Subsequently, the authors used Claude (Sonnet 5.5, Anthropic) to check the analysis and debug the code, to improve the language and structure of the draft, and to draft revised paragraphs and replies in response to the reviewers' comments. The authors reviewed and edited all AI-assisted content, verified the references and results, and took full responsibility for the work.

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Appendix

Tabel A1: Welch's t-test

Variable	Incumbent (N=69)			Non-Incumbent (N=439)			Mean difference			Std. Mean Difference				Welch's t-test		
	Mean	Var.	SD	Mean	Var.	SD	Diff.	CI Low	CI High	SD (all)	Diff.	CI Low	CI High	t	df	p
No. Candidates	2.13	0.76	0.87	2.99	1.15	1.07	-0.86	-1.09	-0.63	1.09	-0.79	-1.00	-0.58	-7.36	103.20	0.00
Effective No. Candidates	1.97	0.30	0.55	2.52	0.53	0.73	-0.56	-0.70	-0.41	0.73	-0.76	-0.97	-0.56	-7.53	110.20	0.00
Winner's Share	62.48	231.33	15.21	51.16	154.69	12.44	11.33	7.50	15.15	13.41	0.84	0.56	1.13	5.88	82.90	0.00
Win Margin	29.56	663.71	25.76	16.88	244.80	15.65	12.68	6.33	19.04	17.87	0.71	0.35	1.07	3.98	76.10	0.00
HHI	0.54	0.02	0.14	0.43	0.01	0.10	0.12	0.08	0.15	0.13	0.90	0.62	1.17	6.54	84.70	0.00
HHI (norm.)	0.17	0.04	0.20	0.10	0.01	0.10	0.08	0.03	0.13	0.13	0.58	0.21	0.96	3.10	74.90	0.00