The “Migration” of Terrorist Actors in Indonesia: From Male-Dominated Terrorist to the Emergence of Female Terrorist Migrant Domestic Workers

ABSTRACT

The ISIS group’s declaration in 2014, has inspired female extremists from various countries to join the terrorist group. At the end of 2016, two women were arrested by the Indonesian police for planning terror attacks in two different places. Both are former migrant domestic workers who returned from Hong Kong. This article investigates why women join terrorist groups, why male-dominated terrorist groups recruit women and what makes female migrant domestic workers who return to Indonesia as extremists willing to make a significant contribution to the terrorism movement in Indonesia. This research’s data collection technique is qualitative data collection, and document-based research through literature studies. This article utilizes Quintan Wiktorowicz’s three radicalisation concept phases: cognitive opening, religious seeking and socialisation. This study found that at least four reasons women become extremists, namely personal complaints, influence from family, relatives or lovers, ideological perceptions, and media use, facilitate the radicalisation process. Furthermore, strategic interests seem to be the answer to why terror groups involve women to achieve their goals. The acceptance of terrorist groups to involve women can be the reason why women migrant domestic workers are willing to make an immense contribution to terrorist groups. Their enthusiasm, financial capacity and international experience are expected to strengthen the terror movement in Indonesia. Both create a “mutually reinforcing” relationship that benefits both parties. Further research is needed with a sample of ordinary female extremists outside migrant domestic workers as a comparison to examine women’s motivations and group decisions to include these women in terrorist activities.

Keywords: Terrorism, ISIS, Female Extremist, Migrant Domestic Workers, Social Media


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Corresponding Author: msub0002@student.monash.edu (Muhammad Subhan)
INTRODUCTION

During this time, the world constructs women as general subjects of violence victims rather than perpetrators. The existence of women in politics is still underestimated, especially by the mass media that attaches an exclusive image toward women (Nacos, 2005). Many people still underestimate the role of women in political violence because by physically and naturally, they are considered to have a myth of motherhood that places women as life-giving, not life-taking. Moreover, the existence of social norms in society, such as the sexual harassment issue makes surveillance or security checks against women, was not optimal. For example, a woman could pretend on pregnant uses the vacant womb, even though she is carrying a bomb package inside her womb (Åhäll, 2012).

Previously, there were several studies discuss about how the radicalization process against women, the role of women in terrorist groups, and only a few discussed specifically about the role of female migrant domestic workers as a terror actor. According to Windsor (2018), since a long time ago, women’s role in the world of war has only been positioned as passive participants; compared to men who are active in combat. Even though, when women are directly involved to become human bombs, they will act not only in the name of their country, religion, a leader but also on behalf of their gender. Subsequently, there are a series of push and pull factors that influence women’s radicalisation process. The driving factors include feelings of social or cultural isolation or lack of belonging, and alternatives to resolve the frustration are feeling suffering from Muslims’ persecution around the world. Then supported by the pull factors, including a sense of religious obligation, sisterhood, and testimonials romanticizing experiences told by women who first joined (Windsor, 2018).

Furthermore, Pearson (2018) and Nasir (2018) both focus on the emergence of social media in the radicalisation process among women. According to Pearson (2018), women can be more likely to be recruited through online networks than offline or face-to-face meetings. The fast and independent radicalisation of women is possible in cyberspace because of restrictions on women’s activities in public spaces such as mosques or meeting rooms dominated by men. Therefore, online media is truly exploited by women who previously did not have enough opportunities in the public sphere—they connect online with other women who have the same goals (Pearson, 2018).

Therefore, according to Nasir (2018), virtual space becomes a way for women to expand their organisations’ participation without physically leaving home. As a result, the spread of
propaganda, such as Hijrah (emigration) has caused women to plan trips to Iraq and Syria. Finally, social media such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp or Telegram as the main tools for recruitment, significantly increased radicalisation of women. It led to the decentralisation process of radicalisation (Nasir, 2018).

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorist group declared by Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi on June 19, 2014, has attracted the attention of Muslims. Since its emergence, ISIS has built a reputation as an adaptive organisation using the latest online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, or Telegram (Pearson, 2018). Through the Al Hayat Media Center owned by ISIS, social media activists supporting ISIS spread propaganda in various formats such as video, photos or documents, intending to recruit sympathisers as well as online forms of terror (Awan, 2017).

The impact of the ISIS propaganda on social media and messaging platforms was significant on the joining of more than 4000 foreigners, whom 550 were women from around the world (Windsor, 2018). Since 2014, approximately 145 British women have crossed into Iraq and Syria to join ISIS. Moreover, about 200 French women have joined the fake state. Some figures of women who were quite influential among ISIS sympathisers include Nisreen Assad Ibrahim Bahar who was appointed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as an advisor to ISIS’s senior leaders. The following names were Zehra Duman and Shadi Jabar, who came from the same country, Australia. Both Duman and Shadi Jabar were known for their aggressive movement on promoting the Islamic State on social media to recruit foreign fighters as well as providing suicide bombing threats to their home country (Khalil, 2019).

The presence of women fighters from around the world who joined ISIS inspires Indonesian women to follow the same pathway. Previously, Indonesian extremist association had established the Jama’ah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) which became the supporting centre of ISIS in Indonesia and suppliers of Indonesian citizens who departed to Syria and Iraq (Nuruzzaman, 2018). Afterwards, a shocking incident occurred on December 10, 2016, when former female domestic migrant worker named Dian Yulia Novi was arrested by police for allegedly preparing a terrorist attack on the Indonesia State Palace (TEMPO, 2017). Following that, on December 15, 2016, the Indonesian National Police seized another former domestic migrant worker named Ika Puspitasari who planned a terror attack on the New Year’s Eve 2017 in Bali (Mediatama, 2016).
There are two pre-existing literature that investigates Indonesian women involvement in extremism. The first was by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) (2017), “The Radicalization of Indonesian Women Workers in Hong Kong,” which focused on the radicalisation of Indonesian migrant workers in Hong Kong. The second was by Nuraniyah (2018), “Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indonesian Female Supporters of the Islamic State,” which examines the motivation and process of radicalising women into the ISIS group.

Therefore, to differentiate with the previous research, this article focuses on several questions: the radicalisation process of female migrant workers; the motivation of former female migrant workers who returned to Indonesia as extremists to contribute significantly to the terror movement; and the motivation of male-dominated terror group to recruit women and involve them in terror activities in Indonesia.

This article adopts Quintan Wiktorowicz’s (2005) research on the UK’s ISIS supports group, Al-Muhajiroun. The concept of al-Muhajiroun’s Salafi jihadism is suitable for analysing jihadism activities in Indonesia. Therefore, the definition of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism is also adopted from the UK government’s 2011 counter-terrorism policy, Prevent Strategy.

Radicalisation defined as the process of a person tends to support terrorism and other forms of extremism that lead to terrorism. Meanwhile, extremism defined as a group of vocal or active resistance to Britain’s fundamental values, including individual freedom, the rule of law, democracy and mutual respect and tolerance of various religions and beliefs (Home Department, 2011). In this case, it is not only applicable to the UK but also to all countries.

Subsequently, terrorism is defined as, firstly, an act that endangers or causes serious violence against a person; causes severe property damage; seriously interfere or disrupt electronic systems. Secondly, terrorism is the use of threats to influence governments or intimidate people into advancing their politics, religion, or ideology (Home Department, 2011).

The term domestic workers in this article adopted from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention for the Domestic Workers, 2011 No. 189 (2015), which defines domestic workers as any person who is involved in domestic work in an employment relationship. Meanwhile, migrant domestic workers are international migrants or someone who migrates from one country to another intending to be employed as a domestic worker. Domestic work refers to
the duties and obligations such as cooking, cleaning the house, washing, or caring for children or elderly.

To limit the scope, the migrant domestic workers in this paper refers to Indonesian female migrant domestic workers who work in Hong Kong based on three reasons. First, the first woman who became the main actors of terrorism acts in Indonesia is a former migrant domestic worker. Second, migrant domestic workers raise a high income. It means that they are not motivated by the economic problem to join terrorist groups. Conversely, the financial capacity of female migrant workers might be the reason why terrorist groups recruit them.

This research’s data collection technique is qualitative data collection and document-based research through literature studies. In general, this paper explores the existing literature investigating the reasons women join terrorist groups before turning to why male-dominated terrorist groups recruit women. Moreover, those two concepts sequentially correlate with the concept of what makes female migrant domestic workers willing to contribute considerably to terrorist groups.

Based on some works of literature, there are at least four reasons why women become extremists and join terrorist groups: first, personal grievances; second, drawn by family, friends or lovers; third, ideological perceptions, and; fourth, the use of media that facilitates the radicalisation process.

The question of how the process of women entered into a radical circle and the fact that the women who committed bombings in Indonesia were former migrant workers is interesting for further investigation. This article will discuss how Indonesian female migrant workers attracted into the radical milieu, the impact of the female existence amid the male extremists and on the continuing terror operation in Indonesia.

DISCUSSION

Radicalisation Pathways of Female Migrant Workers

Personal grievances are a fundamental part of the female radicalisation process. All these three following studies confirm the personal grievances factor. O’rourke (2009) revealed that scholars are more likely to think that men who undertake suicide missions tend to be motivated by religious or nationalist fanaticism. In contrast, women appear more often for very personal
reasons. Similarly, Jacques and Taylor (2009) describe five predominant motivations for female terrorists: social conflict, personal reasons such as depression and social isolation, idealism such as demands for equal rights, notable events such as the loss of a loved one, and revenge. Subsequently, Bloom (2011) indicates that the reality of women’s motivation to join violent groups is a complicated combination of personal, political and religious factors triggered at different times by different stimulus. Therefore, Bloom summarises that women are motivated by the 4 R’s: Revenge, Redemption, Relationship and Respect.

However, according to Cragin and Daly (2009), the personal grievances experienced by women do not seem strong enough to make them decide to become terrorists without being drawn by the second category, which is their relationships with family, friends, or lovers that had already been an extremist. Pearson and Winterbotham (2017) support this argument, that radicalisation is a collective effort, facilitated by kinship and friendship groups such as the lure of marriage and the desire to achieve high social status through a relationship with a male jihadi. Therefore, this second factor plays a significant role in changing someone’s perspective.

Shapiro and Maras (2018) explained the third category, the perception that the Muslim community is being persecuted and blaming the community for the lack of international action to protect them. Therefore, they have a desire to fulfil their religious obligation and promote the utopia of life under the Islamic country through jihad calls. One of the well-known calls of modern jihad was by Abdullah Azzam in 1979 that women should be allowed to participates in combat under certain circumstances. When a piece of Muslim land is under threat, jihad becomes an individual obligation, including children and women (Khalil, 2019).

Based on the above explanation, there is no single catalyst that causes a woman to become radicalised and join the terrorist groups. Therefore, to analyse those issues, this article using Wiktorowicz’s (2005) three radicalisation pathways as the primary analytical tool. Mainly, it is based on extensive research on Al-Muhajiroun in Britain, the former radical wing of Hizb ut-Tahrir who support ISIS. From his in-depth research on Al-Muhajiroun, Wiktorowicz (2005) identified that the process of radicalisation in Islam occurs through three phases, including the opening of individual cognitive, the process of religious seeking, and the process of socialisation. When people experience a personal crisis such as discrimination, social and economic crisis, divorce, death of a family member, or due to political repression, it can lead to a “cognitive opening” phase that can change the personal beliefs. A person is likely to doubt previous beliefs and look for alternative views and perspectives. The opening process like that does not just happen
overnight. Apart from a combination of several crises experienced, the cognitive opening occurs due to the reach of religious propaganda (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

For some people, the cognitive opening might trigger the process of finding answers to problems faced through religious meaning. However, not everyone who becomes a spiritual seeker explores radical Islamic groups. Extreme exposure is usually the result of movement outreach that binds religious seekers through socialisation. The radicalism movement seeks to promote the meaning of togetherness by creating a community with true believers who are bound together through the same interpretation and understanding of Islam. For someone who accepts a radical ideology, through the process of socialisation, they are convinced to engage in extreme activities to fulfil divine commands (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

Furthermore, in a study conducted by Nuraniyah (2018), which explored twenty-five female migrant workers from Indonesia, she discovered twenty-five Indonesian women migrant workers who were supporters of ISIS, fifteen women were married (either before or when they joined ISIS), five were single, and five were divorced. From this study, only four out of 25 respondents came from families or schools with a radical Islamic education record. In other words, most of them became radical when they work as domestic workers abroad. Personal crises experienced by migrant workers such as divorce, alienation and the redemption of past mistakes seem to have triggered cognitive opening. These personal problems are exacerbated by socioeconomic grievances which previously motivated the women to work abroad to break the poverty chain. For this reason, it seems that religious seeking is more than just a leisure activity (Nuraniyah, 2018).

Subsequently, the Institute of Conflict Policy Analysis (IPAC) 2017 published a report estimating approximately fifty domestic workers were suspected of being Islamic extremists; forty-three were in Hong Kong, four in Singapore, and three in Taiwan. Previously, the number of Indonesian migrant workers, mostly female, was estimated around 500,000 spread across Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, working as maids, nannies or elderly caregiver. In Hong Kong, especially since 1990, the number of Indonesia migrant workers increased significantly every year until it reached 153,000 in 2016. However, the increasing numbers of migrant workers, followed by radical Islam's proliferation (IPAC, 2017).

The third phase of Wicktorowicz’s process of radicalisation, the socialisation towards overseas migrant workers, is replaced by social interaction through online networks. Based on a study by Pearson (2018), women are considered more likely to be recruited online than an offline
or face-to-face meeting. The fast and independent radicalisation of women is possible in cyber-space because of restrictions or prohibitions on women’s activities in public spaces such as mosques or meeting rooms that are dominated by men. Consequently, the virtual space becomes a way for women to expand their participation in organisations without physically leaving home. Therefore, the availability of online media is explored by women who previously did not have enough opportunities in the public sphere—connecting online with other women who have the same goals (Pearson, 2018).

**How ISIS Uses Social Media and Messaging Platform to Recruit and Shape the Ideology of Female Migrant Workers as a Militant Sympathiser**

The euphoria of ISIS emergence coincided with a massive increase in internet access due to the popularity of Android-based smartphones. The advancement of communication technology has become a game-changer for the ISIS radicalisation movement, which has accelerated the dissemination of propaganda. The process of radicalisation occurs due to individual, social and political dynamics, which are facilitated by the existence of computer-mediated communication (CMC), in this case, the availability of social media and messaging platforms. Functioned as a long-distance link, CMC facilitates the building of trust between individuals and lead to the improvement of intimate relationships. Moreover, the level of participation of netizens, usually starting from “liking” or “following” individuals, groups and organisations, then actively participating in chat rooms or forums, to creating and managing their online networks (Windsor, 2018, pp. 519).

There were many Facebook accounts and fan-pages that explicitly support ISIS, such as the *Khilafah Dawla Islamiyah, Khabar Dunia Islam, Kita Semua Negara Islam, Para Pendukung Khilafah*, and others. Most of the fan-pages managed by ISIS’s supporting media wing in Indonesia, one of the administrators is an Indonesian woman named Siti Khadijah alias Ummu Sabrina. Khadijah who settled in Harariyah, Aleppo, began widely known after in 2014 she posted her *hijrah* (migration) to Syria with her husband and four children in two chapters titled “The Trip of Hijrah of Ummah Sabrina” and “The Story of Ummu Sabrina on the Khilafah Earth”. Both of them talked about their luxurious lives in Syria, which were facilitated by the Islamic State such as apartments, monthly wages, free schools, and health services. She also wrote interesting simple stories about ISIS soldiers who helped her family in a motorcycle accident and covered all the damage and hospital bills. No wonder that their Facebook page filled with comments from Indonesians who want to know how the way they can go to Syria (IPAC, 2015).
Since social media developers blocked accounts that spread radicalism, ISIS and its sympathisers switched to the messaging platform. Telegram considered as a platform that promises better security and encryption than others. Telegram security features include: links are temporary if distributed through other platforms such as Facebook, Instagram or Twitter, or if the sender manages them; when one party deletes a two-way message, the other party’s message will also automatically be removed; the user can set a “self-destruct” timer to a secret chat that erases the notes after the intended recipient has seen it. (Bloom et al., 2017, pp. 1243).

Telegram has played an essential role in ISIS’s efforts to utilise it for propaganda dissemination, recruitment, coordination, and action preparation. No wonder because the reach of Telegram usually consists of four layers: Public or semi-public Channels used for propagation; Private Groups where senior members mentor new sympathetic supporters; Exclusive Groups where selected members specifically discuss virtual planning and training; and Secret Chat or Private Messaging. Although they have never met face-to-face, some private groups can bond like a virtual family where members can discuss each other’s personal problems intimately because they feel bound by one pledge to ISIS (Nuraniyah, 2019).

The use of online media such as Facebook and Telegram platform as the primary tool for recruitment significantly increased the radicalisation of women. It led to the decentralisation of the process of radicalisation (Nasir, 2018). ISIS propaganda invites women to join by framing the journey to the caliphate in Iraq and Syria as a religious duty that offers them reasons to oppose their husbands, families, for the sake of Islam. ISIS frames the role of women in an Islamic state not only as a wife or mother, but further presents varied choices as a means of empowering women. Despite the many documented atrocities, ISIS was able to attract a large number of women to join. Since its establishment, 15 per cent of volunteers from overseas who enter the ISIS territories were women (Khalil, 2019).

Furthermore, in the case for women who have a little understanding of Islam and just begin to access the Internet, they are most vulnerable of extremism outreach due to lack of knowledge and skills to screen or evaluate messages critically. The Internet offers women an inclusive virtual social environment for freely accessible religious exploration. Through online platforms, ISIS creates a dynamic online forum that mutually shares and cares for each other, enabling women to enjoy sisterhood in friendship and support in the gender community (Shapiro & Maras, 2019). Therefore, Nuraniyah (2018) explains that today’s traditional recruitment with a
A top-down scheme that requires charismatic leaders' role is less effective than online radicalisation because the Internet blurs physical and time boundaries to accelerate the radicalisation process.

In a study conducted by Johnston et al., (2020), “The Lure of (Violent) Extremism: Gender Constructs in Online Recruitment and Messaging in Indonesia,” states that as one of the most populous countries, cyberspace is increasing in Indonesia. Their study on 670,000 searches for extremism content through the Internet in four different countries (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines), 80 per cent is dominated by Indonesian. Furthermore, they find that women are interested in extremism content; they access 33 per cent of the extremism content total searches. This figure shows that women enjoy their online existence since the internet can equal their position with men. Through the internet, women can contribute to the Islamic State as supporters, recruiters, propagators, or action planners.

**Why Male-dominated Terror Groups Engage Woman**

The strategic interest seems to be the answer for the second concept, why terror groups leaders engage women to achieve their goals. Government pressure makes terrorist organisations innovate by including new actors. Cunningham (2003) argues that women are usually considered not credible to be perpetrators of violence or terrorism. The nature and physical sensitivity of women who are “non-threatening” prevent security officers to strictly checks. In most cases, many groups take advantage of women’s ability to pretend to be pregnant to concealing weapons and bombs using empty womb (Cunningham, 2003, pp. 171). Similarly, Åhäll (2012), indicates that the role of women in political violence is not taken into account as physically and naturally are impossible to commit violence. Moreover, women possess a myth of motherhood, posit women as life-giving, not life-taking.

Basically, there is no evidence that male and female terrorists differ in terms of motivation, ideological or level of brutality. Nacos (2005) articulates that the media’s treatment of female terrorists that is always consistent with gender-stereotypical patterns. Significantly, the press often places women as supporting actors for their husband, father or brother, not for their political reasons. Nevertheless, Vogel et al., (2013) formulated a statistically derived model of women’s participation in political violence consisting of four thematic roles: active, representing fighting and leadership activities; caring, representing traditional feminine duties; support, representing logistics-based tasks, and; ideological, representing activities that spread group ideology. Furthermore, Cragin and Daly (2009) also classified women's roles in terrorist groups into five; women as logisticians, women as recruiters, women as suicide bombers, women as operational
leaders and fighters, and women as political vanguards.

So far, from De Leede (2018) investigation, women who have been recruited by ISIS group have been involved in various roles, from logistic, administrative, social, medical, and strategic roles. Therefore, the acceptance of terrorist groups to engage women may be the answer to the third concept of why women migrant domestic workers are willing to contribute to terrorist groups hugely. ISIS willingness to actively involving women, combined with women migrant workers’ financial capability, international experience, and their enthusiasm is expected to strengthen the terror movement in Indonesia. Furthermore, the online marriage between female migrant workers and male terrorists could be the additional answer in bridging the third concept. Starting from online connection, the relationship between ISIS’s male sympathiser and female migrant workers resulting in “mutually reinforcing” relationships that beneficial for both sides (Nuraniyah, 2018, pp. 902).

What Makes Female Migrant Domestic Workers Contribute to Terrorist Groups

Establishing a close relationship with ISIS supporters and joining the terrorist group which partly lead to e-dating or online marriage, were often become the best trigger for women to internalised jihad ideology. Once the jihad ideology internalised within the women, most of them tried to accelerate according to their own free will (Nuraniyah, 2018). Were they going to be a supporter, or actively contribute to the organisation?

Online Marriages

Previously, in 2015 IPAC researched online activism and social media usage among Indonesian extremists. One practice that often found among radical female migrant workers is online marriage. In this practice, social media and messaging platforms strengthen its function as a media that binds couples. The first step usually starts from Facebook, getting to know each other and proceeded to online matrimony through the private platform, Telegram. ISIS male jihadists often expose their daily activities in the Islamic State on social media to attract the female, whom they can exploit financially. On the other hand, a female extremist is also drawn to the male jihadists because they are considered Islamic warriors who can enhance their religious knowledge. Several online marriages have committed between radical migrant workers and ISIS soldiers in Syria, hoping that their marriages will also facilitate their acceptance in Syria (IPAC, 2015).
IPAC (2015) found that online marriage was increasingly popular and widely practised with different motives. For example, Dian Yulia Novi married with Solikin to secure a suicide bombing plan; Ika Puspitasari married to Zaenal Akbar to expand her ISIS supporting network; and there was Najma who married Abu Arianto because she wanted to move to Syria.

**Fundraising**

Nuraniyah (2018) also found that working abroad with a stable income does not necessarily make the women migrant workers respected among extremists. They were often being mocked by fellow ISIS supporters who label them as “servants of unbelievers” whose loyalty lies more in their Chinese masters than in their caliph. Such criticism encourages them to prove that they can contribute more than other supporters. Therefore, many female migrant workers undertake *jihad bil mal* (financial jihad), by donated part or all of their income to bought tickets for Indonesian fighters departed to Syria and made regular contributions to jihadist groups based in Indonesia (Nuraniyah, 2018).

Furthermore, in her study “The Evolution of Online Violent Extremism in Indonesia and the Philippines” Nuraniyah (2019) also found that there was a donation project among ISIS supporters in Indonesia called Gerakan Sehari Seribu (a thousand rupiahs a day movement) or Gashibu (based on Facebook and Telegram) and Aseer Crue Center (Telegram). Both fundraising projects were organised in assisting the families of imprisoned jihadists. They try to ensure the high ideological commitment of terrorism convicts and their families to extremist groups by creating a moral debt. Furthermore, sometimes there was an independent fundraiser to finance terror operations to build a bomb-making laboratory. On both kinds of fund collection programs, women migrant workers often make significant financial contributions.

The substantial financial contribution by female migrant workers, plus foreign language skills and international experience, makes them become targeted to be exploited by male jihadists. For migrant workers, their existence in the ISIS extremist network broadens their opportunity to strengthen their religious knowledge and prove their loyalty to the caliph. Such commitment could explain why female migrant workers are more vulnerable to be exploited in various roles such as funders, liaison officers and potential suicide bombers (Nuraniyah, 2018).
Ika Puspitasari, 36 years old, spent her career as a housemaid for seventeen years in Malaysia from 1997-1999, 2000-2003 and in Hong Kong from 2004 to mid-2016. Ika’s religious transformation began in 2012 when she decided to abandon her bad habits like getting drunk, dressed like a man, and sometimes dating women. Ika, an introvert, became a fanatical reader of jihadist sites such as arrahmah.com and used a niqab. She gradually connected to ISIS sympathisers via Facebook and swore allegiance to the ISIS caliph through Telegram group (Nuraniyah, 2018). From her online activities, Ika tied the knot through online marriage in July 2015 with an ISIS supporter named Zaenal Akbar (Setiawan & Nurul, 2019).

Subsequently, Ika changed to become more independent and built her own ISIS sympathiser online network. Because of her high income as a migrant worker, Ika was respected among extremist and has a high bargaining position both as a recruiter and funder. Ika began building her network by creating hundreds of Facebook accounts to spread ISIS propaganda. With so many accounts she has, Ika could maintain her existence when Facebook blocked some of her accounts because of radicalism contents. Through Facebook, many men and women commented on her posts and interested in joining her network. Following that, Ika directed all member, mostly men, to join her Telegram forum to discuss terror attack with all costs funded by her (Nasir, 2018). Finally, the police set her as a fugitive, and she deported from Hong Kong. On her return to Indonesia, she decided to register herself as a suicide bomber candidate due to running out of money (Bahar et al., 2019).

Furthermore, there was Ayu, a female migrant worker who has contributed significantly as a Liaison Officer. Behind her main job as a housemaid in Hong Kong, Ayu has played an essential role in helping Indonesians who want to join ISIS in Syria. From applying for passports and visas, reserving tickets, arranging transit and departure routes, all organised and financed by Ayu. Ayu, who once grieved because of divorcement, began to be connected the radical milieu since aggressively accessed Facebook to explore Islam and the Syrian War. Ayu was finally married for the second time to a jihadi from West Java named Abu whom she knew through Facebook. From her marriage, Ayu further expanded her network into some private telegram groups supporting ISIS in Indonesia. Moreover, Ayu built an international connection through social media, with jihadis from Europe, the Philippines, South Korea, and Africa (IPAC, 2017).
From the research findings above, it can be concluded that there are at least four reasons why women become extremists and join terrorist groups; personal grievances, the influence of family or relative, ideological perceptions, and social media use. Subsequently, the entry of these women into an extremism which is usually dominated by men is also not accidental. Terrorist groups also have a reason why they recruit and involve women into their terrorism movement. They use woman as part of strategic consideration because of the government counterterrorism operation has put pressure on the terrorist groups that causing a shortage of human resources. Therefore, they involve new actors for the sake of tactics and strategies.

However, the group decision to recruit woman and use them as a suicide bomber is contradict to what Koehler-Derrick and James Milton (2017) said, the group power and goal, determining the type of weapon used as an instrument of terror. Small groups tend to use explosives to avoid face-to-face battle with more vigorous opponents because the availability of personnel is crucial for group survival. Meanwhile, large groups tend to ignore the number of victims and often use firearms to increase lethality. In this case, the ISIS supporting group in Indonesia in terms of human resources is relatively much smaller than the Jemaah Islamiyah group in the early 2000s. However, they entrusted the terror operation to be organised and executed directly by women such as Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari.

The relationship between male-dominated terror groups and extremist women migrant domestic workers forms a mutually beneficial interdependence relationship. Terror groups benefit from large financial contributions, international experience, and a strong desire of these extremist women to contribute to the organisation. On the women’s side, their entry into terror organisation is a big proof for them to contribute to the jihad movement and their caliph.

CONCLUSION

As a terrorist organisation that grew and developed in an era of advances in communications technology, ISIS utilised social media and online messaging platforms to recruit potential followers. Among the many who were attracted by ISIS-style online propaganda were Indonesian female migrant workers. Having a dark past, far from religion, living abroad with a free lifestyle, migrant workers want to accomplished redemption by swearing allegiance to the ISIS caliphate. The process of radicalisation started from Facebook continued to connect, partly leading to online marriages, with fellow extremist supporters of ISIS through the encrypted messaging platform, Telegram.
The impact of the women existence had a positive influence on the implementation of terror acts and the jihadist migration to the ISIS regions. The female migrant workers who have stable incomes, foreign language skills, and overseas life experience, make them unhesitatingly in providing financial assistance, recruiting, becoming a liaison, even willing to become suicide bombers. The persistence of male jihadists in supporting ISIS combined with significant contributions from female migrant workers has resulted in a symbiosis of mutualism that has made the ISIS terrorism movement increase significantly in Indonesia.

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