

Research Article

## **Radicalism Vs Extremism: The Dilemma Of Islam And Politics In Indonesia**

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### ***Abstract***

*Despite its adherence to the principles of democracy, Indonesia is currently trapped in conditions and situations over the emergence of a new government system based on Islam. The notion of extremism dominates society, both the general public and the political elite, and has even infiltrated the youth via the education system. Community mobilization movements in the name of religion in the political sphere indicate that extremism has spread and is gaining strength. The main focus of this research is to make a clearer distinction between radicalism and extremism from both a political and religious perspective. To answer this problem, this paper clarifies the meaning of the terms “extreme” and “radical” in the context of religious politics from the point of view of democracy and distinguishes the signs for the two dimensions of extremism and radicalism. Not only that, in this study there are also explanations related to religious phenomena which basically have an indirect relationship with politics and extremism. This study approach uses a qualitative method taken from the study of Borum and Schmid. It argues that the difference between extremism and radicalism rests on the existence of an ideology. Radicalism is a form of process in which there is agreement or disagreement on violence in tactical and temporal considerations, while the concept of extremism is considered a motive.*

***Keywords:*** *Radicalism; Extremism; Transnational Movement; Identity Politics; Religion*

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## INTRODUCTION

The large-scale mobilization of the Muslim community by the former DKI Governor in 2016 is a historic moment in the rise of conservative Muslims in post-Reformation Indonesia (Lindsay, 2017). This incident made society aware of the revival of Islamic politics, with the emergence of debates, including on social media and within the academic world. Did these events represent a shift in the religious, social and political attitudes of the Indonesian people, or were they the result of a rare coincidence of political dynamics? In fact, this community mobilization also has the same narrative, namely the existence of systemic marginalization of Muslims by the government, both economically and politically in Indonesia since colonial times and also in the global world order. The demand to establish a government based on Islamic law is also a threat to a country based on the Pancasila ideology (Duile, 2017). Pancasila is enshrined in the Preamble of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution and comprises five abstract principles: (1) belief in one Almighty God; (2) just and civilized humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives; and (5) social justice. The role of Pancasila in Indonesian modern day of democracy is needed as a moral orientation for the nation.

In the last 4 years, Indonesia has experienced a decline in its democracy rating on a global scale (Tehusjarana, 2020). This is one of the consequences of the high rate of discrimination in different groups (e.g., people of different religions, social classes, and LGBTQIA+ people) and also political culture (Buehler, 2016; Buehler & Muhtada, 2016; Fossati, 2019; Hadiz, 2017). This is reflected in the increase in cases of religious violence, including banning the establishment of churches, and also violence between religious communities. In addition, in 2016 LIPI reported the results of research showing that 76.2% of teachers agreed to replace their lessons on Pancasila with ones on Islamic law. These findings are staggering. Teachers have the potential to spread teachings that lead to religious extremism in schools that should be the most neutral places for students. Meanwhile, research by the Wahid Institute in collaboration with LSI in 2016 on 1,520 students in 34 provinces shows that 7.7% of high school students are willing to take radical action (Mudzakkir, Ismail, Budi, Hafiz, & Aliah, 2018). Not only that, research from the Setara Institute shows the results of 7.2% of their respondents agree with and know about the understanding of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Setara Institute, 2019). The findings from several studies above indicate the fact that the layers of society are exposed to information from the viewpoint of religious extremism activities, including in matters of social and political interest. Meanwhile, research by the Wahid Institute in collaboration with LSI in 2016 on 1,520

students in 34 provinces shows that 7.7% of high school students are willing to take radical action (Mudzakkir, Ismail, Budi, Hafiz, & Aliah, 2018). A study from the Setara Institute demonstrated that 7.2% of respondents agree with and know about the understanding of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Setara Institute, 2019). The findings from several studies above indicate the fact that all layers of society are exposed to information from the viewpoint of religious extremism activities, including in matters of social and political interest. Meanwhile, research by the Wahid Institute in collaboration with LSI in 2016 on 1,520 students in 34 provinces shows that 7.7% of high school students are willing to take radical action (Mudzakkir, Ismail, Budi, Hafiz, & Aliah, 2018).

Basically, the era of democracy opened up overall opportunities for aspirations, which, during the New Order era, were silenced, and the development of the media became a catalyst for these aspirations. So it is not surprising that post-New Order authoritarianism has opened the flow of openness to all groups. Aspirations and political expressions that were once restrained can now be freely voiced and contested. The return or revival of political Islam is a logical effect of this era of newly constructed and consolidated democracy. Several writings have explained that the democratic era encouraged political aspirations and expressions which later gave rise to Islamic politics. In this climate, radicalism can also flourish thanks to the freedom of speech. One of the characteristics of the rise of political Islam during the reform era is the proliferation of Islamic movements pushing for Islamic law, including the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), the Tarbiyah Movement with its PKS, and the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah Communication Forum with its Laskar Jihad (Mufid, 2011). In his book entitled "The Illusion of an Islamic State", Gusdur stated that fundamentalism in Islam has several theories (Wahid, 2009), namely, the first is the failure of Muslims to face the current of modernity which is considered to have seriously cornered Islam; the second is driven by a sense of solidarity with the fate that befell Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq;

The Momentum for the 2014 Election, the 2017 Jakarta Pilkada and the 2019 Election are proof that social media sites as a form of communication technology development allow for free speech; and it also encourages people to use the freedom to hate (Lim, 2017). While individuals often use the phrase "free speech" to defend their own right to voice opinions, they actively seek to silence others. The emergence of the concept of self-radicalization is none other than the impact of a new era of freedom that is not limited by time and place through the development of technology and information (Sulfikar, 2018). Campaign, political action is very different from

radicalism. If an individual is exposed to a radical group and then joins that group, his or her love for friends and colleagues in the group tends to increase further due to the common goals and common threats that increase group cohesion. This can be seen from the rejection and resistance to the dissolution of two Islamic community organizations that are growing fast and big in Indonesia, namely HTI and also FPI.

Radicalism is popularly defined as an attitude that leads to thought extremism in various forms or attempts to change the socio-political situation drastically and in an extreme. If HTI is called a nonviolent radical organization, then FPI is an Islamic organization that is not opposed to acts of terror and violence (Huda, 2019) such as pro-ISIS groups (for example Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid). Both these organizations and groups constitute certain segments of Muslim society that emphasize religious conservatism and a desire to demonstrate their Islamic identity by means of extreme or radical action. However, what needs to be emphasized is that nonviolent and violent extremism movements are two sides of the same coin (Schmid, 2014). Both still have the same goal, have the same ideological roots, namely a) Islam should be the basis of the state; b) *sharia* laws must be accepted as the basis of the official state constitution; c) political sovereignty is in God's hands; d) the notion of a nation-state contradicts the concept of the *ummah* in an Islamic perspective which does not recognize political or regional (regional) boundaries (referring to the concept of the *Khilafah*); and e) the principles of *syûra* (deliberation) are different from the ideas and principles of democracy (Sukayat, 2018). The first objective of this study is to identify and map the locus of radicalism and extremism in Indonesia that are still not well defined. The second is the extent to which the tendency and character of the extremist movement that has developed in Indonesia are in terms of political objectives.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS**

### **A. Understanding Radicalism and Extremism**

Most of the relevant differences between radicalism and extremism can be represented by the social psychological differences between levels of belief, feeling, and behavior. The use of the two terms is sometimes reversed or even mixed in meaning. Radicalization takes place at an early “stage” because it is a form of process. Extremism is more the result of the radicalization process. Radicalization that develops into extremism, both violent extremism (VE) and nonviolent (Non-VE); is one of the most serious threats in the world today and can cause untold

physical and psychological suffering for millions of people, especially because of the rise of technology in this digital age, such as social media.

The meaning of radicalization is derived from the Latin word *radix*, which means “root.” Radicalization occurs when a person's thinking and behavior becomes very different from the way most members of society and their community view certain issues, usually socio-political ones. People who become radicalized can come from any ethnic, national, political or religious groups and any level of society. Radical individuals may have hateful or anti-social ideas that may be considered offensive to at least some elements of the majority of society, but if those ideas do not include the use of violence or support the use of violence, they should not be considered adherents of extremism. In this study, what needs to be emphasized is that being radical does not automatically mean that someone is or will be involved in violent or dangerous behavior such as terrorism. A radical individual may want change that is substantial but not harmful or detrimental to others. A good example of a radical individual who wants positive change is American congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (popularly known as AOC), who champions very high taxation of the rich, greatly expanded public assistance, and a “Green New Deal” designed to dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions while creating jobs (Marx, 2018). . Her policies and platform are solidly left of center but no farther, which make her radical within the US’ current political atmosphere, but when compared to global lawmakers in places like Europe or Japan, her place on the ideological spectrum is unremarkable. A more accurate example is Martin Luther King, Jr., whose legacy has been sanitized somewhat but who was, in fact, much closer to the definition of a radical within this article.


Radicalization is best viewed as a process of change, of personal and political transformation from one condition to another. Many academics argue that radical individuals go through a gradual process: progress occurs in stages and it happens neither quickly nor easily (Crone, 2016; Ranstrop, 2016). One does not become radical overnight; however, if an individual experiences an incident that has a “catalytic effect” (such as the stabbing of a police officer at the Brimob Office by a student (Sohuturon, 2018a)) or a “moral crisis” (such as the death of a loved one), that can accelerate the process. Al-lami, 2009 notes that the majority of female suicide bombers in Iraq are radicalized after they suffer the loss of family members killed by opposing forces.

The definition of radicalization has two distinct focuses: the first on violent radicalization, where emphasis is placed on accepting the use of force to achieve a desired goal; the second on a broader sense of radicalization, where emphasis is placed on accepting changes that extend far into the fabric of society. These changes may allow harm to democracy or involve the threat or use of force to achieve stated goals. Radicalism, which is literally interpreted as a belief that one wants social and political change by means of violent or drastic measures, is also interpreted as a struggle to make changes using violent means (Mahfud, Prasetyawati, Wahyuddin, Agustin, & Sukmawati, 2018).

To define radicalism contextually, this study takes definitions and criteria from various countries, one of which is Indonesia, which has a Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT). According to BNPT, there are at least 4 of these criteria in accordance with Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning the Crime of Terrorism, namely a) anti-Pancasila; b) anti-diversity; c) anti-NKRI; and d) anti-Constitution 45 (Rizky, 2019). Meanwhile, according to the Danish Intelligence Service (PET), violent radicalization is seen as a process in which a person accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to achieve certain politics or ideology. In defining nonviolent radicalization, The Dutch Intelligence Service (AIVD) adopts a broader definition of radicalization and defines it as support for far-reaching changes in society that could pose a danger to the survival of the democratic legal order and objectives, which may involve the use of undemocratic methods that could be detrimental to the functioning of the democratic legal order. So, when referring to this contextual meaning, radicalism, whether violent or not, focuses on the undemocratic views or opinions of radicals, which may or may not be pursued with violence.

When associated with religion, this radical attitude is characterized by the emergence of an intolerant attitude, disrespect for the opinions or beliefs of others, and a revolutionary attitude that tends to advocate violence to achieve goals. Radicalism exists in every religion, but in Islam there is a teaching to carry out *jihad* (holy war), which for most academics is understood as one of the “roots” of extremism (Borum, 2011a). This attitude arises because of a narrow religious perspective (closed, textual, fanatical) accompanied by an attitude of feeling the truest form in their believing of norms and law, and condemnation of other groups, which is accompanied by the belief that those outside their group can be fought with violence (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). This can be seen from the calls of FPI officials to carry out massacres against the Ahmadiyya community (Al-banna, 2021).

Radicalization can occur at many levels. A number of studies suggest that the radicalization process consists of distinct and identifiable phases. One model is “The Prevent Pyramid” (Christmann, 2012). Figure 1 illustrates that radicalization is a gradient that differentiates active terrorists from a broader base of sympathizers. This is the same as the definition from Stevens and Neuman in (Borum, 2011a), which describes radicalization as a process (or process) in which individuals or groups can agree and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political purposes. This definition is also reinforced by McCauley & Moskaleiko (2008), who posit that that radicalism is a process of increasing the extremity of belief and feeling.



**Figure 1.** The Process of Stages of Radicalism - Prevent Pyramid

*Source: Christmann (2012: 11)*

Individuals are radicalized by personal complaints and group-identity complaints such as those conveyed by the mass media, rumors, or other people’s testimonies. Individuals are also radicalized as members of small, face-to-face groups. Political groups and society are radicalized in conflicts with the state and with other political groups. Each of these levels merit attention. According to McCauley & Moskaleiko (2008), there are many causes of radicalization at the individual and group level, namely: a) individual radicalization caused by one’s own sacrifice; b) political complaints; c) radicalization due to joining a radical group accidentally; d) joining radical groups because one agrees or sympathize with the ideology and the activities carried out; e) because one is oppressed, isolated, and/or threatened (e.g., the Palestinian community or victims of conflict and war).




Radicalism and extremism cannot be separated by definition because even though the concepts are different, they are interrelated. Extremism itself refers to political ideology and the methods by which political actors try to achieve their goals (Fleming, 2014). Extremism comes from the Latin word *extremus*, which means “at the end, tip, or edge.” However, in the elaboration of this study, the definition of extremism cannot be separated from the perspective of terrorism. Extremism is socially dangerous because of criminal behavior that is motivated by political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or hostility; who are also motivated by hatred or hostility toward certain social groups (Baisagatova, Kemelbekov, Smagulova, & Kozhamberdiyeva, 2016).

*In the Resolution of the UN General Assembly on 09.12.1994 №49 / 60, which states that "... the General Assembly is deeply concerned by the fact that in many regions of the world are increasingly committed acts of terrorism, which are based on intolerance or extremism..." (GA of UN, 1994).*

*The UN General Assembly Resolution on 22.12.2003 №58 / 174 determine extremism as a threat to the international rule of law (GA of UN, 2003)*

In this study, extremism is considered the motive, and therefore the driving force of terrorism. Extremism is an act aimed at a seizure of power by force or forced retention of power, as well as changes in the violence of a country's constitutional system and normative violations of violence against public security, including the possession of illegal weapons. Extremist political ideology opposes the fundamental values of society, the principles of democracy, and universal human rights by supporting racial, political, social, economic and religious supremacy. This demonstrates disrespect for other people's lives, freedoms and human rights. Thus, extremism is a behavior and belief that runs very deep and deviates sharply from social norms or social values. The emotional state of an extremist individual and his or her behavior can be expressed both in the pressure of nonviolence and coercion and in actions that deviate from the norm and represent contempt for life, liberty, and human rights. A recent example is the attack by former US president Donald Trump's supporters at the Capitol Building (which houses the American Congress), which caused riots, destruction of public facilities, and also other acts of terror that hurt the democratic principles that have long been adhered to by the United States (Farivar, 2021).





**Figure 2.** The Four Stages Model of the Terrorism Process Mindset

*Source: Borum (2011b: 39)*

Borum (2011) states:

*“The conceptual model attempts to explain how grievances and vulnerabilities are transformed into hatred of a target group, and how hatred is transformed for some into a justification or impetus for violence. Fundamentally, the four-stage process begins by framing some unsatisfying event, condition, or grievance (It's not right) as being unjust (It's not fair). The injustice is blamed on a target policy, person, or nation (It's your fault). The responsible party is then vilified — often demonized— (You're Evil), which facilitates justification or impetus for aggression. The model was developed originally as a training heuristic for law enforcement, not as a formal social science theory ”.*

The emergence of a transformation of thoughts and feelings from ordinary complaints into more complex formations such as feelings of hatred and dissatisfaction with certain conditions, and also injustice can easily propel an individual into the vortex of radicalism and create a detonator momentum for acts of terror. Borum's concept of extremism, especially violent extremism (VE), is a series of transformative stages that starts with grievances and becomes radicalization of violence and involvement in terrorism. It is best viewed as a dynamic psychosocial process that involves at least three phases: (1) involved, (2) involved - identical by engaging in overt terrorist activity, and (3) breaking away (which may or may not result in subsequent deradicalization). Furthermore, involvement consists of various potential roles and functions, which are very often transferred by individuals between and within, sometimes playing multiple roles simultaneously as in Figure 2. Extremism and terrorism are the same link in which extremism is a “theory” and terrorism is a “practice.” Extremism is a commitment to an extreme form of resolving social conflicts, thereby enabling and justifying the need to use violent means including terrorism and its various manifestations.

VE occurs when “a person or group decides that fear, terror and violence are justified in achieving ideological, political or social change, and other appropriate actions.” VE is an extension of radicalization from the point of view of relatively “soft” expression to the use of violence to achieve goals. certain. Extremism, radicalism and fundamentalism as defined above share at least some similarities, including in terms of individual or group perspectives on certain single-minded (closed-thinking) beliefs by only recognizing a single truth in their exclusive beliefs and accompanied by misguidance or support for blasphemy oward those who hold different beliefs. When it reaches a certain level, extremism, accompanied by an attitude of misdirection and justification for persecution or various other forms of violence, has the potential to become an expression of radicalism and fundamentalism in belief.


According to the Moghaddam model (Schackmuth, 2018), people start with a desire to reduce their difficulties and improve their situation. Unsuccessful attempts, however, lead to frustration, producing feelings of aggression which are then perceived as enemies. As their anger toward their enemies grows, some became increasingly sympathetic to extremist ideologies, violence, and the terrorist groups using these tactics. Some of these sympathizers eventually join extremist groups, organizations, or movements that advocate for, and may be involved in, terrorist violence. At the “top” or final level among those who have joined are those who overcome any obstacle to action and actually commit acts of terrorism.

A person can easily pass through all four degrees of the radicalization process if s/he finds a focal goal or motivation (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Often these goals are honor, revenge, loyalty to the leader (fanaticism), retribution in the afterlife (religious elements) and even feminism. The series of Surabaya bombs that occurred in 2018 on May 13-14 is an example of religious terrorism. The main perpetrators of these attacks were from middle- and upper-class backgrounds and worked as academics and businesspeople (Wibowo & Farmita, 2018). Motivation for retaliation in the hereafter (religious elements), loyalty to leaders, and revenge were behind from the attacks by two female students at Brimob.

## **B. Extremism and Politics**

Politics is a “public competition to acquire, maintain and expand state power, understood as the capacity to allocate values or to make decisions and act on those values” (Fleming, 2014). In general, the meaning of political extremism that can be used is an ideology that embraces and or advocates the use of violence in achieving a social, racial/ethnic, religious (religious) and/or political goal (Bartlet & Miller, 2012).

Ideology is abstract thought, theory and existence expressed in the form of a particular concept or idea. Ideology can have both negative and positive aspects, just like the ideology of extremism. For terrorists, violence is not just an end, but a means and method to achieve a specific goal. Terrorism is a way to achieve goals that are presented in the form of ideas, including certain political goals, while radicalism, especially in a political context, is associated with extreme views and a desire for rapid social change. The exact definition usually varies from country to country, depending on the existing social structure and political climate. Expressions of this ideology can take the form of opinions, attitudes, or concrete actions, ranging from statements or words of a provocative nature to violent acts of terror. Expressions of extremism are radical in opinion, especially on political matters, with the main aspect of intolerance toward opposing interests and against differences of opinion (Vermonte, 2019). This factor can be the result of social, religious, or political strife that unites all three sides of a triangle that fuels VE.



**Figure 3.** The Theoretical Model of Extremism Drivers

*Source: Schmid, 2004*

In the study of extremism, academics strongly suggest that the factors causing extremist behavior cannot be detected or predicted from just one variable (Allan, Glazzard, Jespersen, Reddy-Tumu, & Winterbotham, 2015). Theoretically, the causal factors are divided into 3 levels of the spectrum: micro, meso and macro, which can be seen in Figure 3. Micro is an attractive factor from an individual perspective, namely psychosocial factors and also individual weaknesses. Meanwhile, the meso level is an attractive factor at the social and cultural level of society. Driving factors at the macro level are conditional and situational in nature, such as government failure or political disillusionment.

At the meso level, social and cultural factors influence individuals on the ideology of extremism. Much literature shows that the strongest social and cultural factors are those related to identity: religion, ethnicity, or other groups. One of the strongest findings of psychological research in this area is that appeals to identity are critical in motivating, legitimizing and sustaining involvement in extremist groups. At this level, however, these factors are not sufficient, although the factors driving a person to become extremist need to be studied further. Individual vulnerability at the cognitive level, such as accepting violent attitudes in thinking and acting or agreeing to extreme violence to achieve political goals, also has a strong enough domain. Thus, the three spectrums in Figure 3 become an inseparable hierarchy. The model in Figure 3 is a simplification as a way of incorporating a stronger hypothesis into a multi-factor analysis of the causes of extremist behavior. In this model, every factor is necessary, but perhaps not sufficient for an individual to join an extremist movement only on a certain level.

The Indonesian government has issued PerPres No. 7 2021, which includes a Presidential Regulation (Perpres) on the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Combating of Extremism (RAN PE) based on violence that leads to terrorism. It involves efforts to prevent and combat VE that leads to terrorism. A comprehensive strategy is needed to ensure systematic, planned and integrated steps involving the active role of all stakeholders (Farisa, 2021). The reasons for someone becoming an extremist or joining an extremist movement is like a puzzle that is difficult to solve, because it is personal. However, there are some things that unite extremists: they have a clear understanding of what to absolutely reject, namely (1) pluralism (they have a preference for decision-making only by dominant individuals or groups); (2) there is no orientation toward the common good; (3) legal rules made to be obeyed by all levels of society, including the authorities; and (4) self-determination or self-determination.

Roger Eatwell and Matthew J. Goodwin state in Wintrobe (2006) that “extremism” has two dimensions - one based on action and the other based on values. Furthermore, there are differentiations of extremism, namely (1) extremes by method but not with purpose; (2) extremes according to goals and methods; and (3) extremes with goals but not methods. Political extremism movements such as the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) movement by Darul Islam (DI/TII), FPI, JAD and ISIS sympathizers are extremist movements in purpose and method. Meanwhile, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) is an extremist movement that methodically does not explicitly embody extremism, but has a very extreme goal, namely that they both want to establish a state based on the concept or system of the *Khilafah*.

### **C. Infiltration of Religious Extremism in Politics in Indonesia**

Indonesia has many religions and beliefs and thousands of tribes and languages that are united under one flag. However, religion in Indonesia is dominated by Islam. Because of the majority religion, post-reform political contestation both in party elections, the President and even the Pilkada, are always looking for ways to win over the most voters. The period before reform, namely in the New Order regime (the New Order); The Suharto government controlled religious beliefs as well as the Muslim community by forcing Islamic parties to join together under the umbrella of the United Development Party (PPP), while Nationalist, Catholic and Protestant parties were grouped together in the Indonesian Democratic Party (Duile, 2018).

The emergence of the reform era as a marker of democracy in Indonesia entering a new era has empowered groups that have been silent and marginalized and also given them the opportunity to demonstrate certain political identities and narratives that can build their own transcendental markers in the symbolic order of the State. From the reformation period until now, democracy in Indonesia in the Islamic movement has grown not only in response to national issues, but has developed further into the Islamic Trans-nationalism Movement (Global Islamic Movement). Movement and religious understanding provide a new phenomenon for religious life in the midst of society.

If we trace the development of Islam and politics in geopolitics, the most important Muslim power in the earliest modern period was the Ottoman Empire (c. 1300–1922) (Zulfikar, 2018). The Ottomans were the first Muslim rulers to interact with European powers following the formation of the modern state system in the seventeenth century, and were well integrated into global political structures and processes. At the end of the nineteenth century an anti-colonial movement known as Pan-Islam emerged (Nurtina, 2019). Pan-Islamists argued that Muslims faced similar conditions of imperial slavery at the hands of European colonial powers. Pan-Islamism itself is an understanding that aims to unite all Muslims in the world who have differences in ethnicity, race, culture, ethnicity and nation. Pan-Islamism developed as a response to the hegemony of Western influence in the Islamic world until now, with the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) or OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation).

Subsequently, a social movement that embodied a new vision of Islam in politics was founded in Egypt by a school teacher named Hassan al-Banna. In 1928, he founded a group known as the Muslim Brotherhood. The group seeks to ensure the continued role of religion in society and sees itself as an antidote to the Westernization and secularization of the right (liberalism-secularism) and left (socialism-communism) political elites. Many Islamist leaders

also argue that the doctrine of modern nationalism is incompatible with Islamic teachings and the ideals of the *ummah*. Although not a political party, The Muslim Brotherhood was involved in the Egyptian political landscape that developed in the 1930s and 1940s until Banna gave birth to the seeds of thought about the politicization of Islam and the fusion of its teachings in the constitution of a modern country. However, he tended to reject nationalism. The shadow is the unity of Muslims around the world as one nation intertwined across countries. In Indonesia, Al-Banna's teachings have spread rapidly through the LDK (Campus Da'wah Institution) to the sphere of government known as PKS (Prosperous Justice Party). In 1979, Iran underwent an Islamic Revolution led by religious scholars (among them Ayatollah Agung Khomeini) but carried out by a combination of religious and secular social forces, including socialists and urban merchants. As a result, the *ulama's* radical wing purged all non-religious political elites to establish a new Islamic Republic of Iran and imposed a conservative and literalist interpretation of Islamic law (*shari'ah*) on a largely unsuspecting population. Thus Iran joined the ranks of the world's Islamic states, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

In Indonesia, one of the emerging movements is HTI, which is the same movement for Hizbut Tahrir that emerged in the Middle East (Lebanon). It was founded by Taqiyuddin An Nabhani (Aswar, 2004). The mission of Islamic political groups is fighting for the application of Islamic law in the life of the nation and state (Mufid, 2011) and in the leadership of the Islamic caliphate, rejecting the Pancasila ideology and democratic principles. The appeal of HT's ideology to Indonesian Muslims lies in its emphasis on the urgency to engage the Muslim community to internalize the Islamic way of life, as opposed to focusing solely on Islamicizing the state. The growth of Islamic organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, the Indonesian branch of the Islamic Transnational Party), The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), or the Islamic Defenders Front, for example, shows that conservatism plays an important role in social development in Indonesia. HTI has been officially banned as an organization since 2017, but its activists and followers maintain their ideology of promoting the *Khilafah* (Islamic government). Therefore, banning HTI does not mean that its activists cannot continue to promote its ideology. Adherents do so on the grounds that they are simply sharing religious teachings with fellow Muslims (Kresna, 2017).

Extreme Transnational movements other than HT in Indonesia include Islamic movement groups in Indonesia, which state that they support ISIS's actions to form an Islamic State, such as (1) Jemaah Islamiyah, the Islamic State of Indonesia and Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir; (2) Islamic Shariat Activist Forum (FAKSI) and (3) Daulah Islamiyah Support

Forum (FKDI) (Lucky & Kushindarti, 2017). The hardline infiltration against Indonesian Islam is thought to have revived the ideas and ideals of the formalization of Islam, which were buried deep by the Indonesian people after agreeing on Pancasila as the State Foundation and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) as the final consensus in the life of the nation and state.

The momentum of the Presidential Election in 2014 and the DKI Regional Election in 2017 strongly reflect the war of religious ideology in the political realm in the form of identity politics. The most prominent thing is the politics of religious identity on social media, which is in the form of spreading *ulama's fatwas*, hoaxes, and *haram* and *halal* slander in choosing a candidate for governor. All of this has become a public conversation on social media (Santoso, 2019). The issue of the term “identity politics” is simply used to describe a situation characterized by the rise of identity groups in response to repression and marginalization in the past. Identity turns into identity politics when it becomes the basis for the aspirations of marginalized groups.

There is potential for the growing threat of VE that is latent in every apparent behavior of society, groups and individuals. This is partly due to the fact that the symptoms of VE are mostly at the motives and attitudes that are not publicly unobservable (Vermonte, 2019). An example of extremism that drains public and media attention is the case of AHOK's defamation in the 2017 Jakarta Pilgub (Permadi, 2018). It would be nearly impossible to mobilize about 500,000 people for a rally if those people were not driven by emotion. These emotions, especially anger, are real assets for many political movements around the world. However, it can be used for agitational attitudes toward democracy and pluralism. In the self-perception of groups using emotions for their own ends, the struggle is usually based less on the claim that their own group is superior to others and more on the perception that their own group is suppressed or threatened by certain groups or elites who are also elements in society. As such, these groups develop their own narratives, which often lead to ethnic identity and approaches and often end in violence. Narratives like this, continue until now, where the demonstration over the announcement of the vote recapitulation for the 2019 Presidential Election was won by Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin, which ended in violence and death.

Sentiment about religious identity does not only occur in Jakarta but also at the international level. There have been debates, comments and even attacks on people who believe or disbelieve in *Khilafah* on social media. It is feared that some parties will damage the relatively well-maintained spirit of diversity in Indonesia. The presence of various discourses on religion



has attracted the attention of various parties who claimed the truest religion among other religions and the spread of hatred on social media is a symptom of structural hatred (Sabani, 2018). Intolerance is the most visible symptom on social media, which is used as a means of mixing the opinions of potential winners but also affects the spread of hate speech, triggers provocation, and poses serious threats that will be faced in the course of Indonesian democracy.

In relation to conflicts such as the one above, the mobilization of identity politics is becoming an increasingly striking and effective political tool. Identity politics is very different from interest politics. According to Castells, there are three origins of identity: a) legitimizing identity as a legitimate identity that can be exemplified by domination and authority; b) resistance identity, which is identical to identity politics; and c) project identity, an identity with examples of gender group orientation such as feminism (Castells, 2010).

.... Define identity politics as a concept and political movement that focuses on their difference as the main political category. This thing appeared because of the failure of the grand narrative, like the idea of freedom and tolerance. Therefore, differential politics became a new name from identity politics; racism, bio-feminism and ethnic conflict (Romli, 2019).

Identity politics based on ethnic or religious identification, cultural customs, or nationality, are becoming increasingly important in terms of mobilization of movements, voters, e-mail protests, transnational cooperation, and migrant networks. Countries are promised spiritual and political "cures" by religious candidates for president, and then the president is elected because of his or her ethnic lineage or religious beliefs. The politicization of religion or religious instruments for political purposes is often used in legislative or presidential elections. The politicization of religion arises from a combination of religion and politics. One form of politicization of religion is related to the election of a regent or president who is not Muslim. Some scholars, for example, argue that corrupt leaders can be repaired, whereas unbelieving leaders are difficult to fix because they are related to God. They believe that non-Muslim leaders will always harm and hinder the development of Islam. This is reflected in the political situation of the Jakarta Pilgub some time ago (Arsyad & B, 2019). It cannot be disregarded that during the election period, the social media battle on religious identity also builds national solidarity including public pressure on Jakarta voters to agree to vote for leaders on the basis of the same identity solidarity, "I am Muslim I have to elect a Muslim governor, let's Muslim be united" (Arsyad & B, 2019).

Personal religiosity and political religiosity are different attributes of a political candidate. Personal religiosity reflects the level of the candidate's personal religious commitment, and political religiosity reflects the candidate's policy of separation versus mixing religion and politics. The paradoxical religiosity hypothesis predicts that, in a democracy, personal religiosity will increase voter support for a candidate, whereas political religiosity will decrease it. At the same time, acts of religious intolerance, including terrorist violence aimed at religious minorities, have undermined Indonesia's public-diplomacy efforts to demonstrate that Islamic values and practices contribute to the consolidation of democracy and the preservation of tolerant pluralism.

In the United Kingdom, a study was conducted in 2015 by NSW Parliamentary Research Service that distinguished right-wing extremism from the Islamism movement. Right-wing individuals or groups tend to aggressively defend national culture and history, even freedom and democracy. They have the concept of an authoritative state, in which the state and people, who are all ethnically homogeneous, must join together as one unit. Islamism, on the other hand, is the desire to impose certain interpretations of Islam on society and it is seen by its adherents as a comprehensive ideology. "Its supporters believe that Islam should be placed at the center of individual identity, either as the primary or primary source of that identity. The view of Islamism is a view that basically divides the world into two distinct spheres: 'Muslim' and 'the rest'(Angus, 2016).

One good effort to counter this is to identify religious-based community organizations by seeing whether the teachings or calls of the organization are based on the more moderate Pancasila values . Joshua Muravchik suggests six criteria for identifying moderate Islam:

Does it both espouse democracy and practice democracy within its own structures? Does it eschew violence in pursuit of its goals; does it condemn terrorism? Does it advocate equal rights for minorities? Does it advocate equal rights for women? Does it accept a pluralism of interpretations within Islam? (Muravchik, 2008)

However, labeling groups or individuals as extremists easily without the correct benchmarks is often misleading. The label has a narrow derogatory meaning that all too often associates extremism with terrorism (for example, the Bali bombings – the first event occurred in 12/10/2002, the second bombing occurred in 1/10/2005, or the Paris attacks in November 13<sup>th</sup>, 2015). A more accurate difference between extremism and radicalism is from the point of view that extremists tend to be closed-minded supremacists and radicals tend to be egalitarian and open-minded. Understanding the multidimensionality of religion in the context of religious extremism is divided into four dimensions: political, theological, ritual, and social, as can be seen in Table 1 (Bélanger, Hameiri, Wibisono, Louis, & Jetten, 2019).

**Table 1.** Mapping the Four Dimensions in Religion

<b>Dimensions</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Extreme</b>
Theology	<p>Key characteristic: friendly theology</p> <p>In a Muslim context:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Emphasis on God as a God of love</li> <li>2. Flexible interpretation of jihad with connotations for</li> </ol>	<p>Main feature: authoritarian theology</p> <p>In a Muslim context:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Emphasis on God as an angry God</li> <li>2. Jihad only refers to holy war</li> </ol>
Ritual	<p>Main feature: diversity tolerance</p> <p>In a Muslim context:</p> <p>The ritual integration of Islam with local traditions is viewed as a positive cultural practice</p>	<p>Main characteristic: intolerance to diversity</p> <p>In a Muslim context:</p> <p>Actively rejecting local traditions and judging the actors involved in them as sinful</p>
Social	<p>Main feature: acceptance of complexity</p> <p>In a Muslim context:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Associating problems within the group with anti-intellectual bias, geopolitical instability, and corruption</li> <li>2. Respect for people who</li> </ol>	<p>Main characteristic: avoidance of complexity</p> <p>In a Muslim context:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Linking problems within the group with conspiracies outside the group and</li> <li>2. Judging other people with specific norms in the group.</li> </ol>
Political	<p>Main characteristic: maintenance agenda</p> <p>In a Muslim context:</p> <p>Integrating Islamic values with modern political concepts.</p>	<p>Main feature: radical agenda</p> <p>In a Muslim context:</p> <p>Advocating for the revival of the Islamic empire.</p>

*Source: Wibisono et al. (2019: 5)*

In the book *The Illusion of an Islamic State: Expansion of the Transnational Islamic Movement in Indonesia*, the late KH Abdurrahman Wahid, former President of Indonesia writes:

Hardline activists are fighting to change Islam from a religion to an ideology. In turn, Islam becomes a pretext and political weapon to discredit and attack anyone whose political views and religious understanding differ from theirs. The jargon of fighting for Islam is actually fighting for a certain political agenda by making Islam a package and a weapon. This move was very effective, because anyone who opposed them would be accused of fighting Islam. Whereas it is clear that this is not the case. (Wahid, 2009)

Kimball identified that there are five warning signs of religious extremism that apply not only to individuals, but also sometimes to entire groups or theocratic regimes: 1) claims of absolute truth; 2) blind obedience; 3) set the “ideal” time; 4) justifying all means (in achieving goals); and 5) declaring a holy war (Kimball, 2008). In Kimball’s book *When Religion Becomes Evil* (2008), he writes:

Individual and corporate manifestations of evil and destructive behavior will be obvious in many examples below. But our concern is neither with the source of evil as a problem for theological or philosophical reflection nor with the social or psychological understanding of evil behavior. Rather, we are concerned with understanding the present and future reality of religiously motivated behavior that is harmful or malevolent. We are concerned with identifying those recurring attitudes and actions that lead to violence and suffering in the world. Whether or not one is personally religious, it is imperative that we all try to understand and address those patterns of behavior in religion that threaten the future for everyone.

Justification for support in the establishment of a state within a state is an contrary to the values of nationalism. In other words, loyalty, commitment, emotions, and feelings of belonging a state and a nation (in this case, Indonesia) are still being questioned by those disbelief in Pancasila. The Indonesian nation was formed because Indonesian youth agreed to become a community that established themselves as the same nationality. Commitment to unity toward the National Nation (nation-state) raises the highest loyalty so that many citizens of a nation-state are willing to sacrifice body and soul to defend their nation and country. This is known as *le désir de'être ensemble*, the desire to unite.

## CONCLUSION

One of the causes of both violent and nonviolent extremism is grievances toward the political system or political treatment of the state and/or its leaders. Deep disillusionment has also long been identified as a factor that can lead to extremism. Islam and the Trans-Nationalism Movement impact each other aided by the media as a producer of propaganda. Examples of disappointments that can be easily recognized and identified are political discrimination, political marginalization, heightened anger due to the perception that fellow Muslims are being injured or

oppressed, as in Palestine, human rights violations, and interference with a foreign power in a place or country.

It is easy to mobilize the masses through religion, and political extremism cannot be avoided. Because it is considered profitable, extremism is exploited by irresponsible political actors as a "religion fetish" behavior in any political situation, such as political competition and playing identity politics (e.g., the 2019 presidential election). Freedom after reform, which was originally dreamed of as a good freedom with the guarantee of laws in the state and in society, has become a freedom that generates hatred between others so that the concept of diversity is increasingly opaque and there are only interests of certain groups with the use of religious dogma as one-sided justification. This study reinforces that politics and religion are strong assumptions of extremism regarding their relationship to politics.

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