Transmedia-organizing in preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) initiatives in Indonesia

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Article Info	Abstract
	Religiously motivated radical extremism has been a major source of concern around the world, including Indonesia. Governments, communities, and civil society organizations (CSOs) are launching a variety of initiatives to prevent and combat violent extremism (P/CVE), including the use of various media platforms. This study looks at how two CSOs in Indonesia, Kreasi Prasasti Perdamaian (KPP) and Peace Generation (PeaceGen), handle various media (transmedia organizing) in P/CVE initiatives. Data collection included (1) in-depth interviews with each CSO's team members, (2) observation of some of their activities, and (3) document analysis of various media products. The findings of this study show that the transmedia organizing of both CSOs has paved the way for increased participation from the movement base, thereby strengthening social movement identity. This research contributes to the view of the critical role and understanding of the media in preventing and counteracting violent extremism due to the increasingly strong influence of the media in everyday life and the fact that terrorist and radical organizations also use the media for propaganda and recruitment.

INTRODUCTION

The religious-based radical extremism has been a great concern around the world, including Indonesia. This phenomenon is not surprising, as there have been many violent extremist attacks in Indonesia, both large-scale, such as the Bali Bombings I and II, and other sporadic and small-scale attacks (Al Qurtuby, 2022). Splinter groups of Indonesian Muslims carried out these acts of terror. However, there are also concerns because, as some observers have noted, there is an Islamic "conservative turn" (Bagir, 2014; Van Bruinessen, 2014) in

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Indonesia, including among its young people (Azca, 2013; Fanani, 2013; Sirry, 2020; Suraya & Mulyana, 2020), which if not appropriately addressed could lead to radicalization that justifies violence. Furthermore, many radicals from Indonesia went abroad, including being involved in the war in Marawi, Southern Philippines, in 2017 and joining groups related to ISIS (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), 2017). It is estimated that 500-600 Indonesians joined ISIS in Iraq in 2017 (*Foreign Ministry Identifies Indonesians Who Regretted Joining ISIS*, 2017).

Governments in various countries, including the government of Indonesia, are trying to tackle extremism with various initiatives and programs, ranging from repressive measures to preventive actions. Efforts, often called preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE), are widely carried out by the states and civil society organizations (CSOs). Indeed, the role of CSOs in conducting P/CVE and promoting peace-building initiatives has been crucial in many countries (Islam, 2019), including Indonesia. Previous research on P/CVE in Indonesia has focused more on descriptions of programs carried out by states and CSOs, as well as their processes and implementation (Agastia et al., 2020; Chalmers, 2017; Ilyas & Athwal, 2021; Satria, 2022; Subagyo, 2021; Thaib, 2020; Wahyudi & Syauqillah, 2022; Wulandari, 2019).

Some Indonesian CSOs have deployed media strategies to disseminate narratives that challenge extremist ideologies and promote tolerance and moderation. An example of this media initiative is that of Nahdlatul Ulama, one of the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, which launched the documentary film *Rahmat Islam Nusantara* and formed 'cyber warrior' volunteers to conduct counter-narrative against extremism on social media (Schmidt, 2021). Meanwhile, Hakim et al. (2019) describe how CSO PeaceGeneration uses creative media and learning methods in their peace-building program, targeting mainly young people. Meanwhile, Ismail (2021) explained how the community website Ruangobrol.id became a forum for former radicals to engage in CVE counter-narrative efforts. These studies emphasize the media structure and discuss the deployment of several media platforms but look at these platforms separately.

Therefore, studies are needed to focus on creating diverse media platforms as a unified narrative and organizing even though it is distributed on multiple platforms—a perspective offered by the transmedia organizing concept. Costanza-Chock (2014) utilizes a conceptual approach he terms "transmedia organizing" to focus on how the multiplicity of media platforms is managed for the success of social movement activities. The emphasis on

audience involvement in creating and consuming media platforms is another feature of the transmedia organizational strategy. These platforms come in many forms, such as social media, online forums, traditional media, pamphlets, posters, in-person interactions, demonstrations, graffiti, street art, workshops, and more. Multi-platform media management allows social movements to provide audiences with enriched and varied experiences regarding P/CVE issues. This is important to do because, basically, P/CVE fights at a narrative level. Transmedia organizing is the process of managing and distributing content across multiple platforms, while transmedia storytelling is the practice of telling a story across multiple platforms. Therefore, the transmedia organizing approaches employed in this study in the P/CVE initiative offer novelty both for media studies and the study of radicalism and extremism.

This research aims to find out how two CSOs, namely Peace Generation (Bandung) and Kreasi Prasasti Perdamaian (KPP) (Jakarta, Yogyakarta), and their multi-platform media initiatives in the perspective of transmedia organizing. These two CSOs exemplify best practices in media-based P/CVE initiatives undertaken by Indonesian CSOs. Their efforts have garnered international recognition, as demonstrated by the various awards each organization has received (khub, n.d.; Theiss, 2021). Peace Generation has carried out many transmedia organizing activities such as training, workshops, book publishing, making board games and video games, peace music festivals, etc. Meanwhile, KPP focuses on how to disseminate narratives from former radicals and terrorism convicts (who are referred to as "credible voices") using various platforms, especially audiovisual by producing documentary films and managing community websites Ruangobrol.id, which serves as the main landing page of all its initiatives (Ismail, 2021). After describing the various forms of media utilized by the two CSOs, this study analyzes how the use of transmedia organizing contributes, as shown also by Costanza-Chock's (2014) study, to solidifying the movement's identity and provides a platform for greater stakeholder participation.

Therefore, this study is significant for at least two reasons. First, despite established research on transmedia organizing in domains such as marketing and entertainment, its application within the Indonesian P/CVE context, exemplified by PeaceGen and KPP, presents a distinctive synthesis of theoretical and empirical analysis. Secondly, this study generates valuable empirical insights that open opportunities for novel approaches in academic research and inform the development of effective policies in P/CVE and radicalism mitigation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

CSO and Preventing Violent Extremism (P/CVE) in Indonesia

On October 12, 2022, Indonesia was shocked by the Bali Bombing, which resulted in more than 500 victims (Satria, 2022). Even though the challenge of religious radicalism has been part of Indonesia's history, the Bali Bombing shows that the threat of violent extremism is very real and close. The government and the authorities are making efforts, including involving civil society, to carry out various measures to prevent the development of violent extremism (Al Qurtuby, 2022; Riyanta et al., 2021). After more than two decades, the threat of large-scale terrorist attacks has diminished (Agastia et al., 2020; Satria, 2022).

Handling anti-terrorism in Indonesia can be divided into four periods (Satria, 2022). The first period (pre-2002) was when there were no substantial efforts to prevent radicalism. The second period (2002-2009) was characterized by an emphasis on repressive measures, namely arrests and the development of state intelligence capabilities. The third period (2010-2017) is to develop preventive efforts with programs to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism (better known as Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism, P/CVE). More civil society organizations (CSOs) began to get involved in this period. The fourth period (2018-2021) is characterized by the development of state capacity with several regulations and legislation. Furthermore, the government has formulated a National Plan of Action to improve strategic efforts to counter violent extremism by involving all relevant stakeholders (Wulandari, 2019).

In general, P/CVE interventions can be categorized into three stages, namely primary, secondary, and tertiary stages of intervention (Tio & Kruber, 2022). Primary CVE interventions are directed at the general public and focus on programs that increase social cohesion and resilience to reduce conditions that encourage the rise of violent extremism. Interventions for secondary CVE are typically directed at people and organizations who are deemed to be in immediate danger of becoming involved in political violence by being enlisted or lured into extremist networks or groups. Interventions in tertiary CVE are focused on rehabilitating people who are already engaged in violent extremism or who have become victims of a plot that needed police action. Many tertiary interventions begin when someone is in jail or after being released from prison.

Like many other countries, civil society (CSO) plays a significant role in these P/CVE initiatives in Indonesia. Compared to the state, these CSOs initiatives are more bottom-up and have a grassroots basis (Barton & Vergani, 2022; Hwang, 2018; Satria, 2022;

Sila & Fealy, 2022; Sumpter, 2017). Compared to CSOs in other Southeast Asian nations, CSOs in Indonesia often operate in more favorable conditions. They typically have greater resources, are larger, have more experience, and have stronger ties to the public sector and other stakeholders (Goodhart et al., 2022). However, some areas could be improved, including the need to find more independent and long-term funding sources (rather than relying on grants), the need to establish a more equal relationship between CSOs and the government by fostering trust and transparency, the need to strengthen secondary and tertiary interventions (rehabilitation and reintegration), and the need to develop an evaluation framework that will enable a common success measure for P/CVE initiatives.

Previous research on P/CVE in Indonesia has focused more on explaining programs carried out by the state, CSOs, and other non-state actor, as well as their processes and implementation. Wahyudi and Syauqilah (2022) emphasize the importance of harmonizing cooperation between state institutions, especially the intelligence agencies, to improve the country's capabilities. Sukabdi (2021) found that there are fifteen aspects where the state and academics can work together, despite the similarities and differences of contributions by both in each of these fifteen aspects of counter-terrorism. One of the university-based initiatives is the effort of mainstreaming moderation in some *pesantrens* in Central Java (Wildan & Muttaqin, 2022), with another initiative is to strengthen the teaching of the state ideology Pancasila in *madrasahs-pesantrens* (Ihsan & Fatah, 2021). Studies were also conducted on the relatively ineffective process of deradicalization of former jihadists (Ilyas & Athwal, 2021) and deportees returning from Syria (Anindya, 2019) due to a lack of understanding of the critical issues of radicalism and weak inter-agency coordination. Indeed, former terrorism convicts and jihadists who have changed their loyalty are also involved by both states and CSOs in their P/CVE initiatives (Aditya et al., 2019; Chalmers, 2017; Ismail, 2021; Wildan, 2022).

Meanwhile, some researchers argue the importance of cooperation between the state and CSOs. As the state's top-down and centralized approach is often ineffective (Sumpter, 2017) or even counter-productive, the Indonesian government must partner with CSOs to increase the success of efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism. CSOs have several strengths that the state lacks, such as a unique and creative approach, being closer to the community, and being more accepted by society (Agastia et al., 2020). In this regard, CSOs and non-state individuals also often do not have to coordinate with the state when

implementing P/CVE programs, as shown by Sila & Fealy (2022) in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara.

Transmedia Organizing for P/CVE Initiatives

Media has become a battleground for organizations promoting violent extremism, where they can launch propaganda, hate campaigns, and even recruitment. ISIS, for example, has been using several media platforms—such as magazines (Novenario, 2016), Telegram (Krona, 2020), Twitter (Badawy & Ferrara, 2018), and other platforms—to achieve its goals. The ISIS campaign has successfully influenced and recruited extremists in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, to join them (Moir, 2017). Meanwhile, Huda et al. (2021) show that online media has also become an incubator for youth extremism in Indonesia. There have been some cases of self-radicalization through online media, which then led to a lone-wolf act of terrorism in Indonesia (Riyanta, 2022). It is, therefore, not surprising that countries and CSOs are also managing their P/CVE initiatives by utilizing media and communication technologies. Media-based PCV/E programs run in both developed countries such as the Netherlands (Van Eerten et al., 2017) to developing countries in East Africa (Avis, 2016)**,** India (Nizaruddin, 2023) and Bangladesh (Amit et al., 2021).


Figure 1. P/CVE Communication Approaches
Source: Tio & Kruber (2022, p. 241)

Tio and Kruber (2022) offer a useful framework for such initiatives based on the reactive-proactive axis and the unidirectional and dialog communication axis (see Figure 1) to examine the communication tactics used by both parties in implementing P/CVE activities. The x-axis posits a distinction between methods aimed at lessening the impact of VE groups (counter-narratives and remedial interventions) and approaches aimed at

fostering resilience (positive alternatives and critical thinking). The y-axis also distinguishes between communication tactics that can be accomplished by one-way message broadcasting and those that require more in-depth two-way interaction. The framework also specifies the amount of intervention for each communication choice in each quadrant (individual, communal, or national). With the development of the latest communication technology environment, the formed communication space also provides diverse access points. Kraidy (2017) refers to this new space as hypermedia space, in which the space and flow of communication become wider between various media, both old media such as newspapers, magazines, and even the human body, as well as new media such as blogs, social media, online video, and others. With this hypermedia space framework, Kraidy analyzes the growth and rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) organization.

The complexity of communication presented by the various media technologies also led Madianaou and Miller (Madianou & Miller, 2013) to propose the concept of polymedia. By researching how diaspora families use the media, they argue that there is a new way of communicating in the contemporary media environment. One of the characteristics of this new way is multimodality, in which people and groups communicate using a range of media formats, including text, photos, audio, and video. Depending on their requirements and tastes, people and groups switch between various media channels with ease (fluidity). Moreover, to accomplish their communication objectives, people and organizations take advantage of the distinctive affordances offered by various media platforms. Lastly, individuals and groups use polymedia to express and manage their emotions.

While Kraidy's (2017) idea of hypermedia refers more to the space created by the diversity of media technologies, and Madianaou and Miller's (2013) polymedia emphasizes interpersonal relationships and group communication, Constaza-Chock (Costanza-Chock, 2014) focuses on how the diversity of media platforms is managed for the success of social movement initiatives with a conceptual approach that he calls transmedia organizing. The transmedia organizing approach also emphasizes audience participation in the production and consumption of media platforms. These platforms are varied: social media, online communities, conventional media, brochures, posters, face-to-face communication, demonstrations, graffiti, street art, workshops, and others. Multi-platform use is necessary because audiences consume information and interact with their environment using various media.

Furthermore, multi-platform allows the distribution of various stories within the same narrative universe, which Jenkins (2006) terms transmedia storytelling. In this perspective, each platform has or adds layers to the story. As a result, audiences will be exposed to and involved in rich and varied narratives but in one unified narrative. Hollywood producers use this strategy to manage narratives in films such as *The Matrix* and the Marvel universe (Jenkins, 2009), webtoons, and Korean television programs (Park et al., 2020). The transmedia strategy has been implemented even by an extremist organization such as ISIS to disseminate its propaganda (Awan, 2017; Monaci, 2017, 2020).

By examining the media strategies employed by immigrant rights activists, Constanza-Chock (2014) draws some important lessons on how other social movements can adopt transmedia organizing. First, transmedia organizers should use new information and communication technology to share stories across platforms, engage their audience in participatory media practices, and link attention to action. In this media-making process, social movement activists strengthen their movement identity formation. Along with this process, non-participants will become more aware of the issues raised because they get exposure from the cross-platform distribution of the social movement. As awareness of social movements with apparent identity formations increases, the likelihood of non-participants identifying with the movement increases. This results in the social movement enlarging its base because of the newly-joining supporters, increasing its resources, or forming potential new alliances.

As transmedia organizers become bigger and more influential in social movements, some have shifted from speaking for the movement (as "the voice of the voiceless") to compiling, highlighting, and amplifying the voices of its participants—from spokespeople to amplifiers (Costanza-Chock, 2014). In other words, instead of focusing on content production and deploying top-down communication from the leaders of the social movement, the activists move toward aggregation, remix, curation, and amplification of messages and framing generated by its base. The movement shifted to be more decentralized, which in turn could pose some challenges to the solidity of the identity movement. At the same time, transmedia planning has become increasingly more sophisticated and must be more professionally managed. Professionalization brings great potential power, high production values, and extra resources, but it also makes accountability structures necessary for practical and normative reasons. Otherwise, the voices of the movement's social base would soon become marginalized in the public discourse (Costanza-Chock, 2014).

METHODS

This descriptive qualitative research approach is the instrumental multiple case study. It is an instrumental case study because it aims to gain an in-depth understanding of a specific issue, problem, or concern, and the cases are selected to understand the problem best (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Moreover, it is a multiple case study because we select two CSOs as the cases—Kreasi Prasasti Perdamaian (KPP, based in Jakarta and Yogyakarta) and Peace Generation (PeaceGen, based in Bandung, West Java)—to illustrate the issue of transmedia organizing in P/CVE in Indonesia. Although generally qualitative researchers are reluctant to generalize from one case to another because the contexts of cases might differ, the multiple case study approach might increase the generalizability of research findings. Findings and evidence from research will also be more robust because they do not depend on just one case. The data and evidence analysis can be carried out cross-case to discuss similarities and differences among the cases (Creswell & Poth, 2018).

We selected PeaceGen and KPP as case studies because both CSOs represent best practices in media-based P/CVE initiatives in Indonesia. Both organizations employ integrated, multi-platform media strategies to disseminate peace narratives, thereby contributing significant innovations to the national P/CVE ecosystem. For instance, PeaceGen's K-Hub wesbite fosters inter-organizational collaboration, knowledge dissemination, and resource efficiency among over fifty P/CVE entities in Indonesia. Similarly, KPP's ruangobrol.id, recognized internationally and supported by Facebook's global initiatives, redirects hate and violence-related online searches to its counter-narrative content. Furthermore, both CSOs emphasize stakeholder engagement; PeaceGen mobilizes thousands of Indonesian youths as Agents of Peace, while KPP leverages the authentic perspectives of credible voices, including former terrorists, returnees, and deportees, in its counter-narrative campaigns.

Furthermore, in order to accomplish an in-depth understanding of the case, researchers need to collect many forms of qualitative data (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Therefore, we conducted in-depth interviews and observations and gathered documents and archives (including audiovisual material) for this purpose. We conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with the leaders and activists of both organizations, using the protocol formulated from previous literature and theory reviews. However, this protocol still provides opportunities for the emergence of new data and perspectives that develop in the research process and outside the previous theoretical framework. To find out more about both CSO's

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transmedia program from PeaceGen we interviewed Irfan Amalee (Co-Founder and Executive Director), Adriana Anjani (Senior Project & Partnership Officer), Hayati (Project Community Officer), and Lindawati Sumpena (Learning and Product Development Manager), while for KPP we interviewed Noor Huda Ismail (Founder and Director) and Ani Ema Susanti (Program Manager).

Observations were carried out by being involved in events and programs organized by both CSOs to give us a direct experience of how transmedia organizing is carried out, providing more detailed data, reducing bias from informants, and therefore ensuring the validity of the study. We participated in PeaceGen's Agents of Peace Summit in Bandung (9 October 2023) and KPP's Roundtable Discussion on Facilitating P/CVE Training for Migrant Workers (25 September 2023). We were also present in several meetings and discussions in PeaceGen and KPP. In addition, we also actively observe the CSO's official social media account as well as its leaders' social media activities to analyze our data better. At the same time, one of the researchers holds an insider status, which came from being connected with KPP. This dual position added intimate knowledge to the data and enabled a more detailed investigation of the context. Throughout the research process, the insider remained reflexive to address any biases, considering the impact of his insider's positionality on data collection and analysis. This method, which acknowledges the benefits and difficulties of being both an insider and a participant observer, adds to the study's authenticity and depth.

Furthermore, to diversify data triangulation, we collected documents and archives from both CSOs in various forms, i.e., books, card games, photographs of activities, documentary films, and others. In the data analysis process, the first thing the researcher did was to re-read the interview transcripts and observation field notes repeatedly and examine the documents and archives collected.

We employed deductive coding based on the transmedia organizing perspective proposed by Costanza-Chock (2014), which examines how transmedia organizing strengthens movement identity, facilitates stakeholder participation, transforms participants into more active agents, amplifies movement reach, and fosters network formation. The immersive process of data analysis, involving iterative coding and comparative analysis of interview transcripts, observational field notes, and documents evidence, reinforces the validity of this qualitative inquiry. This approach ensures that the interpretations derived from observations and documents are both valid and reliable.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Kreasi Prasasti Perdamaian (KPP): Pathway to Participation for the Credible Voices

Before founding KPP in 2018, Noor Huda Ismail founded Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP, Institute for International Peace Building) in 2008. He was a former special correspondent for the Washington Post Southeast Asia Bureau, based in Jakarta. He finished his master's program on international security at St. Andrews University in 2005 and completed his Ph.D. on gender and terrorism at Monash University in 2018. Ismail has given public talks and written about Islamic radicalism for national and international media outlets. Besides assuming the executive director position at KPP, he is currently the visiting fellow at The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.


Figure 2. KPP Transmedia Products Examples
(a) *Internetistan* book, (b) *Narasi Mematikan* book, (c) Cartoon by Nailah.
(d) *Seeking the Imam* documentary film promoted in Ruangobrol.id, (e) Front page

KPP emphasizes two essential things in P/CVE activities. First, it emphasizes the use of multi-platform media, especially the community website Ruangobrol.id, audiovisual film production (primarily documentary films), and book publications to be used in training, workshops, and public discussions (see Figure 2). Second, it provides space for so-called "credible voices" - namely ex-convicts of terrorism, former members of radical organizations, returnees, and deportees - to participate in spreading counter-narrative and

counter-violent extremism messages. These credible voices write books and provide article content for Ruangobrol.id. Some credible voices are subjects in documentary films produced by KPP. At workshops, trainings, or public discussions organized by KPP, these credible voices can become resource persons using the book or documentary to spark discussion. As a part of KPP's agenda-building efforts, Ismail himself often writes opinion articles in Indonesian national newspapers such as Kompas and The Jakarta Post to respond to the latest issues on terrorism, radicalism, and P/CVE.

The participation of credible voices in deradicalization and preventative measures within P/CVE initiatives has witnessed a notable increase over the past decade (Tapley & Clubb, 2019). Given their direct experience with extremist ideologies and activities, frequently involving periods of incarceration, and their subsequent disengagement, these individuals possess a distinctive and highly informative perspective on the operational dynamics and manifestations of extremism and terrorism (Hwang, 2018). Despite the recognized value of this perspective, ethical considerations (Papatheodorou, 2023), credibility concerns, and public perception challenges persist regarding their involvement in P/CVE programs (Schewe & Koehler, 2021). However, academic research increasingly underscores the indispensable role of former extremists in enriching academic and policy discussions on terrorism and extremism (Scrivens et al., 2020), contributing to a more nuanced understanding of radicalization, disengagement, and the formulation of effective counter-extremism strategies.

Since 2019, KPP has published three books on counter-narrative radicalism and terrorism funding in which credible voices are authors or co-researchers. As for films, KPP produced eight documentaries with the subjects of credible voices with various perspectives (gender, family, masculinity, youth, etc.). Meanwhile, Ruangobrol.id, as KPP's flagship and landing page containing information, news, and articles related to P/CVE, has hosted more than two thousand contents. Most of the content was the contributions of credible voices. Ruangobrol.id is also part of The Redirect Initiatives program organized by Facebook, which redirects search queries pertaining to hate and violence to the Ruangobrol.id website. In 2021, Ruangobrol.id won the Austrian government's prestigious International Intercultural Award in the media category (Theiss, 2021).

With the slogan "Dare to Share," Ruangobrol.id opened avenues of participation for credible voices such as Arif Budi Setyawan and Munir Kartono (both former terrorism convicts for involvement in Jemaah Islamiyah and ISIS-related terror financing,

respectively), as well as Nurshadrina Dhania and Syarafina Nailah (returnees who go back from Iraq after living in ISIS territory for several months). Setyawan, Kartono, and Dhania wrote their experiences and "insider perspective" essays, while Nailah drew cartoons to create counter-narrative content about radicalism and extremism. In addition to other credible voices, they have also been the subject of KPP documentaries. These documentaries have been screened in several locations and cities in Indonesia, followed by an audience discussion with credible voices or representatives from Ruangobrol.id. Likewise, for the publication of KPP books, credible voices play an important role: Setyawan wrote the book *Internetistan: Jihad Zaman Now (Internetistan: Nowadays Jihad)* (Setyawan, 2020), and together with Kartono became a co-researcher for Noor Huda Ismail for the book *Narasi Mematikan: Pendanaan Teror di Indonesia (The Deadly Narrative: Terrorism Financing in Indonesia)* (Ismail, 2023).

*Peace Generation (PeaceGen): Pathway to Participation among the Indonesian Youth*

Figure 3. PeaceGen Transmedia Examples
(a) Posters for children, (b) Peace game card, (c) *12 Nilai Dasar Perdamaian* books,
(d) Twelve basic values of peace snake and ladders board game, (e) PeaceGen website
front page, (f) Agent of Peace Summit.
Source: Researchers' documentation and PeaceGen wesbite

PeaceGen was founded in 2007 by two friends, Eric Lincoln and Irfan Amalee. Lincoln is an American teacher at an international school in Bandung. Amalee earned his master's degree in Peace Studies from Brandeis University, Boston, USA, in 2012. Previously, Amalee was one of the CEOs of Mizan Groups, one of Indonesia's most prominent

publishing groups. His skills and creativity in using various media platforms were honed when he developed multimedia products at Mizan Groups.

PeaceGen formulated *12 Nilai Dasar Perdamaian* (*12 Basic Values of Peace*), which is derived from Islamic teachings to serve as its platform for any their peace-building initiatives. It then published twelve module books to be used in training what they call "agents of peace" (AoP). This concept is then developed for other PeaceGen media-based programs, such as podcasts, children's books, videos, board games, and posters (see Figure 3). PeaceGen designs its media products with young people in mind, so the visual design, language, and narrative style are specifically crafted and suited for young people. In conjunction with its training and workshop activities, PeaceGen organizes events that involve sizeable crowds, namely peace music concerts (Rock the Peace), festivals (Walk the Peace, Peacetival (2015, 2017), and PeaceZone (2017)), and youth camps. The participants of these events are youth from across Indonesia and some from foreign countries such as the United States and South Korea. Besides disseminating their peace messages, these programs provide examples or insights for AoPs to conduct similar or modified programs in their respective environments, if necessary.

Meanwhile, the pathway to participation provided by PeaceGen is broader than that of KPP. New participants in PeaceGen's P/CVE initiatives come from two areas: (1) the general public of Indonesian youth and (2) other CSOs. The spearhead of the PeaceGen program for young people is to invite them to become Agents of Peace (AoP). These youths were trained in face-to-face workshops (or through Zoom meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic) for three months on the 12 basic values of peace formulated by PeaceGen. In the workshops, various PeaceGen media products were used: books, comics, board games, card games, posters, videos, and others. Many of these AoPs initiated peace initiatives in their immediate communities and used the media introduced in the PeaceGen workshops. According to Hayati, Project Coordinator of Agents of Peace, the program has been running for sixteen years, and around one hundred thousand students have participated in more than one hundred cities in Indonesia. PeaceGen has broadened this program by designing workshops for teachers and educators who will teach their students the 12 basic values of peace. In October 2023, PeaceGen organized the "Agents of Peace Summit," which was attended by around one hundred AoPs from all over Indonesia who have been trained and involved in previous activities. The experience using media such as fun board games, film screenings, role plays, and other media is shared in teaching and spreading peace messages in their community.

Secondly, PeaceGen's media and communication technology adepts paved the way for next-level participation and collaboration by initiating K-Hub (Khub.id, knowledge hub) in 2021. K-Hub is a website platform for communities, CSOs, and government agencies involved in P/CVE initiatives. K-Hub's database contains information on these institutions and their programs so that they can exchange experiences, lessons learned, and best practices in K-Hub. CSOs can also collaborate and form alliances so that their P/CVE initiatives are optimized and there are no overlapping programs. Currently, more than 60 organizations are included in the K-Hub database. For its members, K-Hub also provides many features, such as data visualization, statistical reports, real-time reports, and program management tools. K-Hub even provides a content activation tool where K-Hub helps members by producing social media content to attract a wider audience. Lindawati Sumpena, the Learning and Product Development Manager of PeaceGen, said, "KHub aims to be a hub for sharing knowledge products as well as a data aggregator to a landscape of trends and developments in the P/CVE sector can be created."

Strengthening the Social Movement Identity

In PeaceGen and KPP's media-based P/CVE initiatives that have just been described above, we can see what Costanza-Chok (2014) saw in the immigrant rights movement in the United States, which is how transmedia organizing paves the way for the broader participation of the targeted stakeholders. The pathway to participation provided by both CSOs enables them to attract new participants, get broader support, or form alliances between members or other CSOs. Participants share experiences and develop a sense of belonging to the movement's aspirations in the involvement process. Higher levels of participation manifested in their collaboration and co-creation will allow participants to take their roles and daily actions to realize the social movement's goals. Therefore, this will also strengthen the social movement identity of the CSOs—a phenomenon also evident in the transmedia organizing conducted by KPP and PeaceGen.

Using the concept of social movement identity proposed by Castells (2011), the type of identity manifested in transmedia organizing KPP and PeaceGen is project identity. In project identity, social movement participants build a new identity to redefine their role and position in society and, in turn, transform society towards the goals of the social movement they are involved in. The Agents of Peace from PeaceGen transformed from ordinary teenagers to teenagers who are active in peace-building initiatives. Through writing and involvement in transmedia production, the credible voices at KPP transformed their

"resistance identity," which is when they are in a position to fight against the social structure they consider oppressive, into a new identity (project identity) that plays a role in realizing a peaceful society.

Another similarity between KPP and PeaceGen regarding project identity is the role of leaders in the social movement. As Castells' research (Castells, 2011) shows, leaders become the embodiment of the project identities of the social movement. Leaders provide direction, motivation, a sense of shared purpose, and solidarity in the collective action. In addition to this internal cohesion, leaders become the symbol of the movement and interact and negotiate with external actors. The role of such leaders can be seen in Noor Huda Ismail at KPP and Irfan Amalee at PeaceGen.


Figure 4. Instagram post of K-Hub's curation and remediation results for a program managed by another CSO on Javanese values-based peace-building in high school.
Source: K-Hub Instagram account

When viewed through the framework proposed by Tio and Kraber (Tio & Kruber, 2022), the initiatives undertaken by PeaceGen and KPP are primary interventions, wherein their programs are aimed at the general public and focus on enhancing resilience and social cohesion to counter violent extremism. Within the P/CVE communication approach framework (see Figure 1), PeaceGen emphasizes the 'positive alternative' quadrant, which involves uniting individuals around a positive vision of a cohesive society. Furthermore, primarily through its Agents of Peace (AoP) program, PeaceGen underscores the importance of critical thinking, promoting dialogue and discussion to enhance complex thought processes. Meanwhile, KPP also offers initiatives within the realm of positive alternatives,

reinforced by counter-narratives that channel insights and experiences from credible voices, both through films and articles on ruangobrol.id. Nonetheless, KPP also encourages critical thinking, particularly through public discussions during screenings of their documentary films.

Amplifying the Movement's Base Voices

In transmedia organizing research on immigrant rights activists in the United States, Costanza-Chock (2014) also found a shift in the role of media makers in the movement from spokespersons to amplifiers as the social movement base became more widespread and active. The movement base is increasingly producing its own media, some with limited skills, resulting in a different production value from the production of official media makers in the movement, some of whom are savvy media professionals. In strengthening the movement base's voices, the media makers are urged to curate, aggregate, remix, and circulate the message on various platforms. The media makers feel the challenge of losing creative control and message framing on media content, which was previously their control. Indeed, there is a creative dynamic between being a spoke person and being an amplifier of the movement.

In the PeaceGen movement, the shift from spokesperson to amplifier could be seen in the AoP program, although it is still not dominant yet. At the annual summit meeting, selected AoPs are invited to share their experiences and peace-building initiatives that they have carried out in their communities. PeaceGen amplifies the diverse base voices by curating and redistributing best practices from these initiatives that start from the bottom up. Furthermore, PeaceGen's amplifier role is visible in the K-Hub initiatives. CSOs, government agencies, university research bodies, and peace communities enter programs, publications, event reports, and research in the K-Hub database. The K-Hub team then aggregates, remixes, or curates the data and information and produces and distributes content to amplify the messages of these stakeholders to a broader audience, especially youth (Figure 4). In addition, K-Hub also provides technological affordances concerning data visualization that make it easier for stakeholders to process their data and information into attractive presentations that are easily understood by a wider audience.

On the other hand, the shift from spoke person to amplifier is not apparent enough in KPP and its P/CVE initiatives. Unlike PeaceGen, which has a broader potential base, namely Indonesian youth, KPP's potential base is a much more limited number of credible voices. These credible voices are mostly the subjects of KPP's documentary films but are less

involved in co-creation. They did not produce media or video content for their own agenda. The credible voices are the content creators under the management of Ruangobrol.id. As stated by Ani Ema, "... the content of Ruangobrol.id is determined in a board meeting, ... therefore the content, including that made by credible voices, is in house production". In other words, the credible voices act more as spokespersons of KPP than amplifiers in its social movement.

Both PeaceGen and KPP, however, face several challenges in maintaining, let alone scaling up, their movement base. Limited funding, according to Sumpena and Ismail, is a primary concern—a common issue faced by CSOs operating in the public sphere (see also Goodhart et al., 2022). For PeaceGen, the expansion of the Agents of Peace network to recruit new members in other regions has been hindered. Furthermore, PeaceGen encounters obstacles in fulfilling the main objective of K-Hub, which is to serve as a 'clearing house' and live database for CSOs in Indonesia working on counter-terrorism and P/CVE issues. Not all CSOs input their activity data, let alone update it. These coordination difficulties, both among CSOs and with the state, have been persistent problems, as demonstrated in previous research (Sukabdi, 2021; Sumpter, 2024; Wahyudi & Syauqillah, 2022). For KPP, funding limitations prevent, among other things, the dissemination of credible voice messages through film screenings followed by audience discussions to foster conversation about the issue. Additionally, former extremists are often reluctant to become credible voices and share their experiences publicly for various reasons. (see also Aditya et al., 2019; Asrori et al., 2020).

CONCLUSION

To combat violent extremism (CVE), governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) have implemented various strategies, including preventive and repressive ones. However, rather than concentrating on the underlying narratives that fuel radicalization, prior research on CVE has mainly described programs and how they are implemented.

Therefore, this research was conducted to see how transmedia organizing is used by CSOs in Indonesia, in this case, KPP and PeaceGen, to carry out their P/CVE initiatives. After providing an overview of the various media platforms used by the two CSOs, the researcher focused on how transmedia organizing provided avenues for stakeholder participation and strengthened their social movement identity. Although they both use various media in their programs, there are important differences between KPP and PeaceGen

regarding the movement base. KPP recruits credible voices to be involved in content creation, both in Ruangobrol.id and documentary films, so the pool of potential participants is limited. On the other hand, PeaceGen opens up avenues of participation for Indonesian youth in general to get involved in peace-building efforts. Through transmedia organizing, however, both CSOs paved the way for their movement base to participate in P/CVE initiatives. Furthermore, this participation has also strengthened the social movement project identity that redefines their place and role in society, which will help move society closer to the objectives of the social movement they are a part of. The important role of the leaders of both CSOs in forming and strengthening this social movement identity is also evident.

In addition, this research also explores whether the activist media teams in these CSOs shifted from the role of spokesperson to the role of amplifier due to the growing participation and media production of their movement base. This shift allows activists in transmedia organizing to curate, remix, and distribute media products from the base, thus fostering diversity of voices as well. It has begun to be seen in PeaceGen with the Agent of Peace network spread across many cities in Indonesia and with K-Hub, a hub for more than sixty institutions. As for KPP, this shift is less visible as credible voices are more spokespersons for the movement and do not produce their own content.

Further research in media-based P/CVE initiatives could be directed towards transmedia storytelling research, where research focuses more on the narrative content on the various media platforms used. Transmedia storytelling is a narrative technique that involves telling a coherent message across multiple media platforms and formats (such as films, television shows, books, comic books, video games, and social media platforms) to expand and enhance the message universe. Transmedia storytelling seeks to draw the audience in by engrossing them in a complex web of interconnected stories on multiple levels. Each platform offers different viewpoints, characters, and storylines, enabling non-linear or interactive storytelling and audience exploration (Jenkins, 2009). The audience is compelled to actively seek out and piece together the various elements of the narrative across various media, which fosters active participation and collaboration. The transmedia storytelling narrative strategy has previously been commonly practiced in popular culture and entertainment, such as *The Matrix,* Marvel universe, and Harry Potter. However, this narrative strategy has been increasingly adopted in various fields, such as marketing (Scolari, 2016; Scozzese & Cavallini, 2023), journalism (Gambarato & Tárcia, 2017; Garcia-Ortega & Garcia-Aviles, 2018), and social movements (Hancox, 2018; Nos-Aldás, 2015).

Furthermore, this research has generated key findings with direct implications for P/CVE public policy, highlighting the necessity for strategic resource enhancement. The state should encourage the proliferation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) engaged in media-based P/CVE initiatives and enhance their capacity in transmedia organizing. With their respective unique characteristics, these CSOs will convey potentially diverse narratives, yet within a unified message. This diversity enables vulnerable audiences to access a variety of narrative options, ultimately mitigating their risk of exposure to extremist and violent content.

We live in a world where digital media—including social media and artificial intelligence—is increasingly pervasive. Even terrorist and radical organizations have savvily used various media platforms to achieve their goals. Indeed, the process of radicalization is complex and frequently takes place on a variety of media platforms. Their power must be defeated and countered on this playing field. Therefore, transmedia organizing approach provides a comprehensive strategy to P/CVE interventions in order to recognize this complexity. Media-based initiatives are increasingly important for all parties—government, CSOs, and communities—to improve the ability to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicalism.

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