The Politics of Modernity: the Discourse of the Westphalian System toward the Native in Indonesia

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Abstract

Modernity is a large concept that can be found in many disciplines, such as philosophy, history, sociology, anthropology, political economy, and International Relations (IR). One of many significant infrastructures of modernity is the concept of nation-states, the definition of which can also be found in the aforesaid disciplines. This article will elaborate on the concept of modernity concerning relations between nation-states and non-nation-states such as native local communities in which rooted in those multi-disciplined courses. This article argues that imagined nation-states of the Westphalian system impose, imprison, and marginalize native communities from within. The birth of nation-states in the European Western discourse has created marginalization of native communities around the world. Using some examples of Indonesian natives, this article shows that modernity is political. The politics of modernity either instrumentalized or marginalized and forced the Indonesian natives to obey the standardization of the Indonesian Westphalian system. As a result, since the Dutch colonization up to now, the Indonesian natives have not yet embraced full citizenship rights because they are marginalized, subjugated, and discriminated against politically, economically, and socially.

Keywords: modernity; Westphalia; marginalization; native communities
Introduction

Modernity has been shaping International Relations (IR), a subject matter which is relatively new compared to philosophy, history, sociology, anthropology, and political economy. Waever (1998) argued that the IR is an American hegemony of social science and it is a political and ideological discipline due to its support to the winner of the World War II. It is similar to Kalpagam’s insight (2000) about anthropology which was said to be created as a tool to support colonialization. Essentially, the IR mainstream narratives are courses aimed to make sense of politics among nations or nation-states’ relationships in all aspects of modern life. The IR mainstream narratives are also based on the modern teaching of philosophy, history, sociology, anthropology, and the political economy of the Western discourse (Buzan, 2016).

During the colonialization era, the Dutch Indies (now Indonesia) were introduced to modernity and the politics of nation-states. At the end of the World War II, Indonesia proclaimed its independence and adopted the Westphalian system of nation-states and since then, it has been struggling to fulfill the requirement of modern nation-states narratives to become a European model of secular and rational institution. Up to now, the form of Indonesian ideology is however still in debate between the secular and the religious axis.

Indonesia’s existence follows the format of the Westphalian system which is based on the principles of European discourse: secular, rational, and materialistic. Even though, at the beginning of its nation-building process, its founding fathers attempted hard to conserve the authenticity of Indonesia by instrumentalizing the natives’ cultural identity. Patching the natives’ cultural identity into a colonial (Westphalian) system creatively, Indonesia embraced the Europeanized management of nation-states, its bureaucracy system, and its spirit of nationalism blended with the previous ‘native’ local ethnicities and its culture.

Indonesian nationalism emerged during the early 20th century as a response to Dutch colonial rule. It was marked by a strong desire for independence, freedom, and a sense of unity among the diverse ethnic and cultural groups that make up the Indonesian population. Then, many natives were injected by modernity from the European enlightenment; whereas those who resisted the new idea were marginalized and framed as rebels and should be tamed. Following the Indonesian independence in 1945, the new design of the political system of the Indonesian Westphalian system sought to promote national unity and identity through various policies and
initiatives. Indonesia could not escape from the European discourse and therefore, its natives should be disciplined according to the given standards. By adopting the Westphalian system, in terms of state administration, Indonesia is a republic with a presidential system of government. The country is divided into provinces, districts, and sub-districts, each with its own government officials and administrative structure. Local communities within these administrative divisions are generally entitled to the same treatment under the law and government policies.

However, the Westphalian system is not perfect. Under this system, there have been instances in Europe where certain groups have been marginalized or discriminated against by the Westphalian system or other dominant societal groups. For example, the Islamic communities living in Europe. They already live in European for over three generations, but they are still not European; they are still foreigners in their homes (Kumar & Holub, 2002; Fekete, 2004; Ramadan, 2013). The domination of the Westphalian system toward Muslim communities can be attributed to a variety of factors, including historical and cultural tensions, economic disparities, and political power dynamics. So far, the identity of Europeans is still exclusive in which Muslim communities cannot be included from within though they are living generation to generation in European territory and culture.

The discourse of European modernity of the Westphalian system already expands to the world including in Indonesia. Throughout the history of colonialization, by adopting the Westphalian system, the Indonesian government is also subjugating small narratives. Small narratives that have been treated unequally and oppressed by the Indonesian government and the dominant societal groups including religious groups are usually called minorities (Suaedy, Dja’far, Rumadi, 2012). Minority in this term is associated with minority culture (including any kind of religion) and identity (Burhani, 2019). They are a small group of people who are being marginalized, forgotten, distorted, deviant, and not deemed important or contributing anything to Indonesia’s independence based on the mainstream narrative –the Indonesian government and dominant societal groups. This term is relative; it depends on the context and from which side we define minority.

The term minority in this article will be closely associated with the native communities and native belief systems like the Badui (Banten), the Samin community (Pati, Kudus, Blora and Bojonegoro), Agama Djawa Sunda, Aluk Todolo, Kejawen / Kebatinan, Parmalim, Kaharingan, Wetu Telu, Marapu, Buhun, Tolottang, Tonaas Walian, Pahkampetan, Aliran
In our analysis, we will use the term ‘native’ instead of ‘minority’ because it is more general, easy to be understood, and by definition, it is more or less similar to the term ‘minority’. The term ‘native’ is contingent on the term ‘modernity’. In other words, in this article, the term ‘native’ cannot be essentially defined as a pure community in a region, but as a community that defends its cultural identity and belief system and contingently survived in the frame of modernity.

This paper problematizes the discipline of IR and the Westphalian system that imposes on the native community in Indonesia. We argue that the discipline of IR is imperialistic because it ignores discussion about the native community and silences the native community in the IR theoretical framework of the IR discipline and its practices, especially in Indonesia. In the Indonesian IR community, writing about a native community is not accepted as a part of the IR field study. This fact further enhances the marginalization of the native community by the Westphalian system. There is no room for the natives’ voices in the IR disciplines. The IR is dominated by the metanarrative of the modern Western discourse stemmed from European enlightenment, such as (Neo) Realism, (Neo) Liberalism, (Neo) Marxism, Constructivism (Western Sociology), English School, Copenhagen School, German School (Critical International Theory), France School (Postmodernism/Post-structuralism) and others. Most importantly, the IR is still dominated by the American school of social science where the US still holds the hegemony that dictates the anarchical system of world order (Smith, 2000; Maliniak, Peterson, Powers & Tierney, 2018). The IR is the story of great power politics. It is difficult for the native local community to speak their voices. Perhaps, this article is relevant to Spivak’s idea, “Can subaltern speak?” (Spivak, 2003).

The goal of this article is to attach and voice the native local community such as the religious local community, ethnic community, and ethnoreligious community to the IR field of study, especially in Indonesia. In Indonesia, the IR discipline is still dominated by Western IR theories. What Indonesian IR scholars write on IR issues and not IR issues are decided by academic power based on Western knowledge/discourse (Umar, 2023). This article further aims to set free IR scholars, especially Indonesian IR scholars who are still entranced by the siren song of the Western IR discipline. Most Indonesian IR scholars consistently undervalue the life
energy that they put into consuming the Western discourse of IR theories. We should be selective in dealing with the IR discipline and its theories. Therefore, we need to embrace both relations between Western modernity and the rest/non-Western discourse and give space to the native people to speak. We could not assume that we are living in the liberal order, but we believe that we are living in the post-colonial era. Therefore, we urge to create the IR for everyone to speak as the expression of emancipation in the IR field. Moreover, the IR discipline that was born in Wales in 1919 and was sponsored by a capitalist, David Davies, tried to establish a new world order of the Western version; it was not merely for peace and security for all, but also for the objective of neo-imperialistic agenda of the West to manage their influence in the IR discipline discourse in post-colonial countries. Further, we need to criticize the imperialistic side of the Westphalian system which forces local communities to follow its discourse because it is driven by the ideological IR theories of realism (Maliki & Saraswati, 2022).

This paper will be displayed by using qualitative methods. The data will be obtained from ethnography and previous historical, anthropological, and sociological research. This paradigm required ethnographic field research which was conducted on the Samin community in Pati and Kudus of Central Java in 2017. The data will be directly analyzed throughout the interpretative method in the sense of self-reflection (Mortari, 2015), especially rethinking the role of nation-states as the Westphalian system originated from European thought. In detail, we will use Foucauldian discourse analysis to see the relations power/knowledge between the Westphalian system and the Samin community as the local community (Khan & MacEachen, 2021).

Discourse analysis is closely associated with the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault, who was interested in how power operates through discourse. Foucault argued that power is not just exercised through formal institutions such as the state, but also operates at the level of language and knowledge. Foucault’s approach to discourse analysis involves examining how language is used to produce knowledge, establish social norms and hierarchies, and construct identities. He emphasized the role of discourse in shaping social reality and argued that power is not just repressive, but also productive, in that it produces and regulates knowledge and truth. According to Foucault, discourse can be seen as a set of practices that regulate what can be said, thought, and done within a particular social context. Discourse shapes our understanding of the world and the power relations that are embedded within it. Foucault argued that it is important to
analyze the discursive practices that underlie social institutions and power relations, to understand how power operates in society (Yates, 2002).

In this research, Foucault’s ideas which is a form of discourse analysis seeks to uncover how language use reflects and reinforces power imbalances between modernity represented by the Westphalian system and a local ethnoreligious community called the Samin community in Indonesia. We are interested in how power operates through the Westphalian system of discursive practice represented from the colonial era to the post-colonial era. Based on discourse analysis, this article argues that power is not just exercised through the Westphalian system in the Dutch colonial or the Indonesian government, but also operates at the level of language and knowledge. Therefore, we will examine ways in which previous researchers display a sense of the language of marginalization, repression, and oppression to produce knowledge, establish social norms and hierarchies, and construct identities between the Westphalian system of nation-states of the Dutch colonial and Indonesia and the Samin identity. We will emphasize the role of the Westphalian system discourse in shaping the social reality of Indonesia, especially dictating the Samin community. The power of the Westphalian system is not just repressive to the Samin community that cannot be disciplined, standardized, and tamed, but also productive, in that it produces and regulates knowledge and truth on being Indonesia and being the Samin. From Discourse analysis, we can understand the encounter modernity and the Samin and the power relations that are embedded within it.

The paper will be structured by first, explaining the limitations of the politics of modernity to not lose focus. The definition of the politics of modernity will not deduct data but for the sake of limitation, reflexive mind, and to get close to the argument that modernity is politically destructive discourse. Second, the paper will explain modernity in pre-Indonesia order during the Dutch colonization and its repression of the native local movements. Third, it will explain modernity in the process of Indonesian nationalism and its challenge from the native and religious communities. Fourth, to explain how the nation-building process of the Westphalian system has marginalized the local native religions during Indonesia’s independence in the Suharto era and post-Suharto era. Finally, to conclude the process of modernity in Indonesia through the Westphalian system that has marginalized the local native communities.
The politics of modernity

Modernity is a concept that originated in the fields of sociology and anthropology and developed in the European civilization. It refers to the European condition of social existence that is radically different from all past forms of human experience that are categorized as sociologically "traditional" and/or anthropologically "primitive". Although IR is largely a derivative discipline to sociology and anthropology when it comes to debates over modernity, these debates – and they have historical roots that reach back into seventeenth-century European thought – have largely provided the framework within which the IR theory has developed. The IR theory, discipline, and history are rooted in and developed from European thought. The IR is part of the debates of modernity. The debates over modernity and its impact on the world political order have indeed raised significant epistemological questions. One of the key issues at the heart of these debates is how to explain the emergence of the modern subject. The debates in the Western Academy have had a significant impact in creating a consensus that knowledge which is considered context-free is universally valid and modern, while context-sensitive systems of thought are considered traditional and thus biased. This consensus implies that personalized, communalized, and sacralized knowledge is inferior to knowledge that is considered impartial. This distinction brings into the assessment of knowledge production a geo-political and temporal constituency, namely the modern West versus the traditional non-West. This view has had a profound influence on the way knowledge is produced and evaluated in the Western Academy, where empirical research and scientific methods are often privileged over other forms of knowledge, such as experiential or intuitive knowledge. The modern West is legitimate, scientific, and trustworthy whereas the non-West is untrustworthy and fiction such as India, Asian discourse, and as such (Shilliam, 2010:13-15).

The idea of the politics of modernity that we define is the imposing of European thought on the rest of the non-Europeans as inferior, no thought, barbaric, primitive, and needing to be civilized. We consider modernity as the movement of European racial formation of modern subjecthood produced through imperial projects and colonial rule. By the time modernity (European discourse) expanded all around the world, the white man attempts to morally and kindly civilize the rest of the world. The act of imperialism and colonialism of the Westphalian system is the white’s man burden to establish modern civilization (Kipling & Wise, 1899; Yazzie, 2000; Easterly, 2006; Murphy, 2010). In relating to the IR, As Henderson, (2014:21) quotes important massage to the IR scholarships, Reinsch (1900, 9), whom
Schmidt (1998, 75) maintains “must be considered one of the founding figures of the field of international relations”, noted in what may be considered the first monograph in the field of IR, World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century (1900), that “national imperialism” was transforming the landscape of international relations as states attempted “to increase the resources of the national state through the absorption or exploitation of undeveloped regions and inferior races”, without “impos[ing] political control upon highly civilized nations” (1900, 14). Olson and Groom (1991, 47) note that Reinsch’s work “suggests that the discipline of international relations had its real beginnings in studies of imperialism”; and studies of imperialism at the time were firmly grounded in racist assumptions of white supremacy… In the 1920s, Buell’s (1929) International Relations, which Vitalis (2000, 353) describes as “the most important US textbook” of the decade, “opens with the classic trope of the discipline, a man on the moon looking down upon earth divided ‘into different hues’”.

Henderson’s explanation is implied that the IR is impartial because it represents the Western discourse to imperialize the rest throughout the Westphalian interstates system introducing the European Westphalian system to the rest of the world during colonialization and adopted by post-colonial states in the post-colonial era. Knowledge is the same as the power to control. The IR is knowledge to continue the West’s control over the rest either in the colonialization era or post-colonial era. Therefore, it is important to note that the idea of consensus in knowledge circulation from the West academia is not universal and has been subject to critique and revision by scholars from various disciplines. The West knowledge that the IR established is privileging certain forms of knowledge over others is a form of epistemic violence that marginalizes non-dominant groups and their ways of knowing. We argue that the Westphalian system under the Dutch (including the British and the Japanese) colonial and Indonesian government marginalizes the native groups such as the peasant communities, Javanese communities (kebatinan) including the Samin community.

Our approach to addressing this issue is to develop a critical theory of modernity, which seeks to examine the social, economic, and political conditions that have led to the emergence of the modern subject in which we take Indonesia’s case as a reflection. This approach recognizes that modernity has produced significant social and political transformations and that these transformations have had a profoundly destructive impact on the relations between the Westphalian system adopted in modern Indonesia and the native communities.
Ultimately, the key to understanding the modern form of subjecthood is to recognize that it is shaped by a complex set of social, economic, and political dynamics and that any attempt to understand it requires beyond the IR disciple instead, we believe a multi-disciplinary approach is crucial to draws on a wide range of knowledge/power production strategies. By embracing this approach, we can gain a deeper understanding of the politics of modernity subject and the world we inhabit.

The beginning of the Westphalian system: the Dutch relations with the natives

The Dutch colonization in Indonesia was indeed part of the larger global expansion of European powers during the early modern era, which was marked by the rise of capitalism, the development of nation-states, and the spread of nationalism. The Dutch East India Company (VOC), which was established in 1602, was one of the most successful and powerful corporations of its time. It played a major role in the Dutch colonization of Indonesia. The VOC’s primary goal was to control the spice trade, which was highly lucrative at the time. It established trading posts and colonies throughout the Indonesian archipelago, including in the Moluccas and Java. The VOC’s presence in Indonesia led to the exploitation and subjugation of the local population. It had a significant impact on the social, economic, and political development of the region. In short, the Dutch colonization of Indonesia reflected the broader trends of European imperialism, which was driven by the desire for wealth, power, and prestige.

They had also done that, among other means, by taking advantage of various social-political conflicts engulfing in and between different ethnicities and groups in the area, under the pretext of freedom and cooperation with local rulers. For example, the Dutch (including the British colonial) were involved in some wars such as in Minangkabau, west Sumatra Area, during the Paderi War (1821-38), Banjarmasin War (1859-1863) in southeast Kalimantan, the Java War (1825-1830) in Yogyakarta, Jambi War (1833-1907), Aceh War I (1873-1907), Lampung War (1834-1856), Lombok War (1843-1894), Puputan War in Bali (1846-1908), South Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan War (1852-1908), North Sumatra Resistance (1872-1904), Batak War (1878-1907), and Aceh War II (1912-1942).

The Dutch colonization was not only involved in the local conflict but also had been challenged by native peasant movements. Sartono Kartodirdjo (1978) described four types of peasant movements (‘rebellion’) from the nineteenth to the twentieth century against the Dutch colonial rule (collaborate with the Mataram Kingdom): anti-extortion movements located
in Batavia, Bogor, Banten, Kerawang, Cirebon (West Java), Semarang (Central Java) and Surabaya (East Java); messianic movements located in West Java and others called *King of Tandjung Putih* in 1800 and *Eru Tjakra* in 1900 in Pekalongan, Banyumas, Banjarnegara, Cilacap; sectarian movements; and local *Sarekat Islam* movement (1912-1916) Solo and Surabaya. The protest never stopped from the forced cultivation policy that was introduced by the Dutch government in 1830 until 1870, when the Mataram Kingdom and the Dutch made the Agrarian Agreement (*Agrarische Wet*).

The Samin movement was also associated with the peasant movement (Day & Reynolds, 1989) to challenge the Dutch colonial through certain actions. Some scholars analyze Samin’s teaching or *wong sikep* during the Dutch colonial era as a small number of Javanese peasant movements founded by Samin Surontiko Blora, Central Java (Benda & Castle, 1969; Widodo, 1997). This movement is equal to other movements such as *Kebangkitan Nasional* (Indonesian National Awakening), *Budi Utomo*, *Serakat Islam*, *Muhammadiyah*, and *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU).

According to the government of the Dutch colonial data, Samin Surosentiko’s teaching spread to Bojonegoro, Blora, and Rembang regency starting from 772 people (1903-1906) in around 34 villages to approximately 3,000 people. The Dutch colonial viewed Samin and his followers as a group of people that developed to be rebellious. Because of their hesitancy to pay taxes, the Dutch colonial took action to arrest Samin Surosentiko. He was captured on 27 February 1907 and after that was exiled to Padang, Sumatra. Samin himself died in Padang in 1914 (Benda & Castle, 1969:210-212; King, 1973:458-459; Sholeh Ba’asyin & Anis Ba’asyin, 2014:20-23). The next leader who developed Samin thought in 1911 was Samin’s son-in-law, Surokidin, who was already actively assisting Samin in 1906. In the last record, regarding Encyclopedia van Nederlandsch, the number of Samin households in 1919 reached 2,300 people in Blora, Bojonegro, Pati, and Kudus (Sastroatmodjo, 2003:10).

These example protests reflect the struggle for their freedom in the traditional discourse while the political power of the Mataram Kingdom has engaged more with the modern entity that was influenced by the Dutch colonial. In Ulbe Bosmo’s term, the Mataram Kingdom was “the semi-independent ruler” (Bosmo, 2004: 667) against the people in Java. The collaboration between the Mataram and the Dutch colonial also expanded to the global political economy of sugar (Kahin, 1952: 6; Knight, 2013). It should be noted that the Sultan of Yogyakarta gained profit in the colonial sugar economy and hence became part of the colonial (political) economy decision.
In this context, we conclude that the most suffered during the Dutch colonialization were the native peasants (religious peasants), exploited by both the Dutch and the Mataram Kingdom under global modernity.

It is unfortunately true that throughout history, marginalized minority groups have often been overlooked and excluded from the dominant narratives of political power like during the Dutch colonial period. Illiteracy and the lack of written records have also contributed to the marginalization of these groups. Without written records, their history and contributions to society may be lost or overlooked, especially if they were not part of the ruling class or dominant culture such as the Mataram Kingdom.

The example of the Samin movement that started to exist in 1890 and also other peasant movements around the 1850s were the natives that were framed as uncivilized and needed to be educated by modernity (Kahin, 1952, p. 43-44; Kartodirdjo, 1978&1984). The negative image they have received in some circles is due to biases or limitations in the historical and cultural perspectives that have been studied and disseminated. Colonial narratives of modernity from the Dutch side have perpetuated certain stereotypes and biases against peasant communities, portraying them as backward or primitive. Similarly, studies focused on aristocratic culture and Javanese elite power politics may have overlooked or minimized the contributions and perspectives of smaller communities (Kahin, 1989; Bootsma, 1995). The Grand Narrative of Indonesia is the story of elite politicians who win power politics and put aside the rest as rebel deviants and unimportant. Marginalized and sooner or later eliminated are scary movements of modernity.

Engaging with the Westphalia system: becoming Indonesia by excluding the native

The history of Indonesia adopting the Westphalian system is a complex and multifaceted one. It involves a long and continuous process of interaction and negotiation between various local cultures and the colonial powers of modernity that came to dominate the region. While it is true that the Dutch colonial presence played a significant role in shaping the modern nation-state of Indonesia, it is also important to recognize the agency and resistance of local communities who sought to preserve their traditions and cultural identities in the face of external pressures.

The process of Indonesia’s formation as a nation-state was marked by various milestones, including the establishment of the Dutch East India
Company in the early 17th century, the colonization of various parts of the archipelago, and the eventual formation of a Dutch-controlled government in the 19th century. However, the struggle for independence and the eventual formation of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 were also crucial moments in the country’s history, marking a decisive break from the colonial past and the emergence of a new era of self-determination and national identity. Throughout this process, local communities and cultural traditions have played an important role in shaping the contours of Indonesian identity, from the diverse linguistic and ethnic groups that make up the country to the rich artistic and cultural traditions that continue to thrive to this day. While the Dutch colonial legacy of modernity has undoubtedly left its mark on Indonesia, it is important to recognize the complex and dynamic nature of the country’s history and the ongoing dialogue between tradition and modernity that continues to shape its identity today. For example, the movements of Perhimpunan Cina (Chinese Association, 1900), Budi Utomo (1908), and Perserikatan Komunis di Hindia (1920). Perhimpunan Budi Utomo was a sort of awakening of the elite Javanese aristocrats, which were initially cooperative with the Dutch. This was the seed of Indonesian nationalism from the side of Javanese (Kartodirdjo, 1978, p. 78). Sarekat Islam was established in Solo as a response against the ethnic Chinese who gained more control in the Javanese economy. This movement is an elaboration between Islam and Marxism, adhering to Anti-European, Pan-Islam, and Communism spirits (Means, 1947: 234-247). Indische Partij (National Indies Party) was established by Javanese aristocrats as the leftist movement (Marxism), which at that time was popular among Dutch students. The movement also involved Tan Malaka, a prominent intellectual figure at that time who had strong relations with China and Russia. The movement focused on laborers that held protests against the Dutch policy, particularly in 1926 and 1927 (Kahin, 1952: 70-71). After the Japanese colonization and the beginning of the Indonesian revolution, leftist groups became one of the major players in the struggle for power in controlling Indonesia (Barker, 2008: 526). Islamic movements followed, such as Muhammadiyah in 1912, and Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) in 1926. Muhammadiyah advocated Islamic modernization in Java, particularly in Yogyakarta, while NU advocated the Javanese tradition of Islam, by referring to the ones who introduced Islam in the first place in Java, the Nine Council (Wali Songo). Muhammadiyah adopted the Dutch colonial education system, while NU attempted to preserve Javanese tradition in the way it had been done by the Wali Songo. All these movements were the dominant power that will lead and ruled Indonesia. All these movements strongly influenced European modernity.
Building rational institutions and its elements such as political parties. There were Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Party) in 1935, Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) led by Sukarno (Abeyasekere, p. 262-276), Partai Sarekat Islam (to change its name into Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia), (van der Kroef, 1951, p.166-171), and further Masyumi as the representation of Islam. With Sukarno as the first president, Indonesia was born adopting the Westphalian system, which emphasized the sovereignty of nation-states and the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. In line with this system, he and many of his colleagues also proposed ‘Pancasila’ as the foundation of the new nation-state of Indonesia. Pancasila is a set of five principles that serve as the basis of the Indonesian state ideology. These principles are belief in one God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice. While the first principle emphasizes the importance of a belief in God, Pancasila does not define Indonesia as an Islamic state, but rather as a pluralistic state that accommodates all religions. The state administrative model was strongly influenced by the liberal government model, such as the division of power system (executive, judicative, and legislative), and debate in parliament. This appeared because of liberal democracy (1951-1959). The government’s cabinets ceaselessly changed and parties were mushrooming at that time, and parliamentary debate against the executive made the government so chaotic and stagnant. Then, it came to the second system after the Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959, the so-called Guided Democracy (1959-1966). Feith (1962) described it as a traditional system highlighting charismatic, strong, and myth-bounded leadership (Jones, 2007:444-445). Guided Democracy made many Indonesian liberals criticize Sukarno’s leadership.

In that modern organization, Sukarno learned about organizations with different elements of society, such as business people, the abangan (practitioner of Islam that mixed it with Javanese belief), peasants, journalists, and even ratu adil (messianic) movement. Sarekat Islam, PKI, and PNI were respectively mediums that were quite different from Indische Partij and Budi Utomo which tended to be elitist. With PNI, Sukarno’s version of developmental nationalism was aimed to govern various political and ideological interests, just like Sarekat Islam, particularly when attempted to unite Islamic ideology and political interest, nationalism, and communism under the banner of Nasakom (nationalism, religion, communism). Nasakom was the right form of syncretism that can provide the basis for Indonesianization. In addition to Nasakom, Pancasila is the nation’s ideology, and Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) is Indonesia’s motto applied in state life. Pancasila has sufficient meaning and basis to
accommodate the massive diversity of Indonesian people to remain united under the Bhinneka Tunggal Ika spirit (Unity in Diversity). Sukarno’s ambition was to put many different kinds of ethnicities, religions, and ideologies in one container.

In that sense, as we obtained data from the story of Samin in Kudus and Pati, the Samin community had good views and relations with Sukarno because Sukarno embraced the Samin community discourse as equal to any other movement discourses and level of social status. Generally, in the Sukarno era, the native is included and recognized by the new system of political power called the Westphalian system. It had been yet deeply well-organized and standardized by the government. Therefore, the native did not feel threatened or forced to follow the government program.

Sukarno’s regime was preoccupied with many projects of nation-building to construct the Westphalian system. Conducted hand in hand with local and traditional discourses, the modernization of ‘Pan-Indonesia’ body and spirit was being formed through oration and construction of national architecture to show national pride under the Westphalian system such as Monas (national monument), Istiqlal Mosque, West Irian Liberation Monument, Hotel of Indonesia, Wisma Nusantara, Welcome Statue, Sarinah Shopping Center, Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, Conefo (Conference of the New Emerging Forces – now Indonesian Parliament) Building, and Dirgantara Statue (now Pancoran Statue), were carried out. Sukarno’s vision was an utterly new culture, purified from the old feudal traditions and liberated from its specific ethnic roots (Schefold, 1998, p. 269). Although he applied hybrid local and traditional philosophy and culture in his leadership style, he focused on building a modern national identity instead of the development of particular local traditions, ethnics, and local belief systems. Sukarno’s regime would like to establish a very much new nation-state instead of a primordial state or an ethnic state or a religious state.

However, religious recognition was not formally applied because the becoming Indonesia is dominated by mainstream religions (Christianity, Islam, and followed by Hindu and Buddha). Therefore, in the Sukarno era, the native religious belief system was also not being recognized, but they had not yet been forced to apply to any religions. The politics of religion is dominant. The Indonesian native religious communities cannot conduct their tradition such as legal marriage, personal ID cards, and family ID cards. At the end of the day, they are forced to admit one of the five legal religions (Islam, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, and Buddha) to obtain full Indonesian citizenship. The politics of religion is controlled by the mainstream religion, with Islam having a strong role to define the meaning of religion. Religion is
characterized with have God, scripture (*kitab suci*), revelation (*wahyu*), and a messenger (*nabi*). There is a group of Muslim orthodoxies who decided which ones are believers and which ones are not (Makin, 2016: 9). In other words, the definition of religion represents the domination of Semitic tradition. It has been predominantly toward the privilege of Islamic orthodoxy, which was safeguarded well since the debate of the establishment of Pancasila.

Moving to the Suharto regime, according to Chalmers and Hadiz (1997), Indonesia’s development policy applied a state-nationalist and liberal approach to economic development in this regime. State-nationalist was operated with a political policy of cutting down dramatically, the number of political parties into only three groups (Golkar, PPP, PDI), the reaffirmation of Pancasila as the state’s sole ideology, the twin function of the military (*dwifungsi ABRI*), military’s incorporation into village life (*ABRI masuk desa*) to maintain the country’s stability and security, and ethnic and religion being controlled to support Suharto’s Regime legitimacy. On economic development policy, Barker argued that Suharto’s regime was relatively more capitalistic than Sukarno’s (Barker, 2008:531-532). In large part, these were the result of Suharto regime repression (Meuleman, 2006, p. 55). Suharto also attempted to create a balance between Chinese, military, and Islamic forces (ICMI, MUI; Muhammadiyah and NU), and native businessmen (Javanese and Bugis) (Barker, 2008:537).

During the Suharto regime what happened to the native communities such as The Samin community (Central Java), the customary community of Wet Semokan (Bayan, West Lombok, NTB), Dayak Pitap, and Meratus (South Kalimantan), orang Wana (Central Sulawesi), and Patuntuang community (Bulukumba, South Sulawesi), had been forced to convert to one of recognized state religion otherwise they were identified to communism. Hoey, (2003, p. 114) mentioned that the development of religion during the Suharto regime (the five recognized religions in Indonesia) was much more significant compared to minority ethnic and religions in the above, as they had the influence to support and sustain Suharto regime.

Furthermore, the Suharto regime instrumentalized local communities and ethno-religions in the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah compound (TMII – Miniature Park of Beautiful Indonesia) as the politics of the museum. It is the reflection of modern discourse that impose the non-modern/traditional discourse as inferior, instrumentalist, and politics of the past. Meullemen (2006:45-69) agreed with Smith Kipp’s argument who stated that cultural diversity was used by the Soeharto regime to counterbalance class and religious differences, and in this sense, contributed to national unity.
(Meullemans, 2006, p. 60-61). In short, all native local and traditional entities and discourses were being instrumentalized by the Suharto regime for legitimating his power politics whereas their life was suffered and were marginalized. Paradoxically, they cannot submit to their religion and the Indonesian government did not recognize at all their belief system.

In the case of the Samin community which the authors deeply study, they were being accused as the opposite of the government because of their belief system. In line with the ethnographic field research in 2015, according to Widodo (1997:261-262), under the New Order era, the Saminist has been accused of being part of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). It meant that the Saminist challenged the government. They need to be educated and disciplined to support the government program of developmentalism (modernization). It meant also the Saminist was too far from engaging with the Sukarno regime. As a consequence, the Saminist was watched by the local government (anonymous interview, 2015). Other oppression, the local government repressed the Samin community to take advantage of the special occasion, like power performances in Pati, Blora, and Bapangan forcing them to apply one of five religions including wedding tradition based on this one of five religions (anonymous interview November 2015; Benda & Castle, 1969: 240). In addition, in political circumstances, it was very common in Indonesia at that time during the election period, Saminist were being forced to elect the Golkar party (Golongan Karya) to maintain Suharto's reign. In short, the Samin community in the Suharto regime, they were intimidated, discriminated and forced in the political, ideological, and religious aspects. In short, the Westphalian system under the Suharto regime was more repressive toward the native people which exist before the Westphalian system was applied.

In the Post-Suharto era, Pancasila is no longer the single ideology, the Indonesian government system entered the phase of decentralization and a globally neo-liberal era. This caused the growing number of centers of power in regions, an increasing number of political parties (48 parties), decentralized democracy, the strengthening of parliament, and the emergence of social organizations and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). Barker (2008, p. 534) analyzed the mushrooming of social and political organizations that speak on behalf of ethnic religious, or regional terms aimed to serve the more particularistic political and ideological needs of increasingly powerful local politico-bureaucratic elites. This will bring back the ideologies of cultural nationalism with which the elite is most familiar: native nationalism, Javanism, moderate Islamism, and multiculturalism. While national ideological formation (Pancasila) was
unpopular as the main source of values and basic views of the Indonesians. An example of this was the Conference of Sundanese Culture in Bandung (2001) which took place as a response to the government’s absence of attention toward Sundanese tradition. The capacity of every local ethnicity and religion differs in their resistance.

During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s regime, Menchik argued the (oppressed) minority was at a very miserable point, as the state was not capable of protecting them from violence. This has led to productive intolerance (Menchik, 2014:594). On the other hand, the decentralization system has given Aceh an autonomous position with Islamic sharia applied as the ruling law. The autonomous position was also given to Yogyakarta as well. In the post-Suharto era, it does not mean that the state of Indonesia gives freedom of expression will give consequences to the freedom of religion right to embrace their religion as recognized religion. Since the birth of the Ministry of Religion, as we already mentioned above, the definition of religion and its practices has been monopolized by Islamic orthodoxy. Therefore, the traditional and so-called native local belief system, especially in the Samin community still in the logic of an isolated community (Komunitas Adat Terpencil-KAT) without any religious recognition (Nawari, 2015). The non-five religion (now six) such as hundreds of identifiable Kebatinan movements during the Suharto government defined and managed to legitimate the power of Suharto’s regime (Stange, 1986). In the post-Suharto era, the freedom of expression encourages the Samin community, Sunda Wiwitan, Kaharingan, and others to be acknowledged.

In Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) era, some Samin people met the president to discuss pluralism and the right of citizenship. In Joko Widodo era on 8 March 2015, the President of Indonesia and his wife, ministries including the governor of Central Java met the Samin community in Klopoduwur, Blora. The government met the grandson of Mbah Engkrek, Mbah Lasio, and supported the culture and philosophy of Saminist. Jokowi said Saminist’s teachings were essential to becoming one of the cultural richness of Indonesian. They need to be preserved and maintained. This movement is also part of political power that tamed the natives and instrumentalized them to get their sympathy including the media. Concerning this Jokowi visit, the government divide and conquer the Samin communities because not all Saminists were willing to come under this circumstance due to many reasons. In short, there are the Saminists who support, do not support, and ignore the government. The government create ‘divide and conquer’ similar to the Dutch colonial when the internal conflict happened and further took advantage of the conflict.
In conclusion, by engaging with the Westphalian system, becoming Indonesia does not matter to the Native/local communities. Though the people are not ‘White European’, the ‘brown’ people called Indonesian, still marginalize, discriminate, and frame the native/local communities as uncivilized, uneducated, and do not have religion. As framed by the colonial administration, their religions are not recognized, they have been forced to embrace one of six formal religions to be recognized as full citizenship under the Westphalian system represented through ID. As they do not have religion, they are under the protection of and not served by the MORA but by the Ministry of Education and Culture.

This colonial relationship between the Westphalian system of the Indonesian government and the native/local communities has been maintained up to now. It is no coincidence that the idea of race emerged at the same time as the age of colonialization/imperialism and nation-building. This modern relation becomes instituted and naturalized around the boundaries between color-coded sameness and non-European otherness (Thompson, 2020: 49).

Conclusion
The expansion of modernity shapes non-modernity (traditional) which is irrational, uneducated, and uncivilized. The arrival of the European colonial ruler was the expansion of modernity in pre-Indonesia. The native was subjugated. They were transformed into modern people. The birth of Indonesia as the new Westphalian system (nation-state) was the negotiation between the traditional culture and identity and modernity. It leads to the process of modernization. Under modernity injection, the Indonesian government in each regime instrumentalized the native to sustain modernity as mentioned above in ideology, architecture, cultural identity, norms, and values. Whereas the traditional culture and identity which strongly resisted modernity were marginalized politically, economically, socially, and further less recognized, sometimes forced to obey the government policy. These circumstances have been consistent making a pattern since the Dutch colonial era. Modern discourse is a metanarrative discourse that does not allow small narratives to exist and be recognized. The politics of modernity is the political exclusion of strangers. The strangers are the native groups who live in their territory. In the case of the native Samin community, the state of Indonesia marginalizes them in terms of religion, and agricultural livelihood facing industrialization. In this context, the Saminist discourse should be submitted to the Westphalian system of the Indonesian version of institutionalized religion and supporting industrialization otherwise they
are irrational, traditional, uneducated, and difficult to obtain their full right as Indonesian citizens. The Indonesian government standardizes and imposes the native groups. They should be modernized to establish order under the Westphalian system otherwise perish. It can be concluded that the Westphalian system remains the same between the colonial era and the post-colonial era. It is imperialistic. It is confirmed that Sukarno defined the post-colonial era as the era of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism (NEKOLIM) (Greefield, 2005). However, the concept of NEKOLIM is applied from within Indonesia, not as foreign policy overseas in the frame of the politics of modernity.

References


