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Elite in Sub-national Politics: Structure and Continuation in Post-authoriatarian East Java, Indonesia

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Abstract:

Study on political elites in sub-national politics in post-1998 Indonesia did not pay much attention to identify the shifting or continuation of structural change in the post-New Order authoritarianism. From a case study in East Java, this article shows the change and continuation of political elite structure. Democratization does not necessarily produce significant changes that shift the position and privilege of the old political elites. Their organizational power might have declined, but their control over patron-client relationship remains strong. This is also finds that the political changes were, institutionally, not strong enough to cause the significant damage to the patron-client relationship developed during the New Order era. The democratization pressure has only caused the partial diversification of elites' political affiliation while the inter-intra elite power relations model has not changed much. This explanation provides a new contribution to the understandings on the dynamics and changes in the structure of political elites in sub-national politics in the era of democratization in Indonesia.

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Introduction

Indonesia's experience on democratization after 1998 still leaving problems on the political elite configuration which is the way to explain how far the successfully democratic values can change the previous authoritarian structure. Study on Indonesian elite had been located to contribute as part of major exploration on political conditions. In the early period of New Order regime, there was a lack between national and subnational elite such as modal personality or national character establishment (Emmerson, 1976).

What happened at the national level had an impact on local politics which its level of institutional changes explains the timing of provincial proliferation. Even the triggers can vary and depend on historical and cultural contexts (Kimura, 2010). Although, at the local level, government leadership can be an effective, and often underestimated, reform mechanism, which compensates for weak societal pressures in early transition periods (Von Luebke, 2007).

In the case of subnational politics, at least three major national phenomena are interesting to study and reveal the structure and pattern of the political elite at subnational politics. *First*, since local direct election (*Pilkada*) in 2005, there has been an elite fragmented in political contestation. Local strongmen, journalists, military retired and former student activists were running as head of local government candidates through various political parties.

Second, a new political party establishment since the 2004 election which covered party official switching, party denomination and separation, followed by shifting political bases and its patron-client model.

Third, military reform during issuance TNI Law 2004 which replaces military to police to control civilian security and at the same time they also should leave politics. Military control is getting weaker, followed by releasing their various networks to elites and its associations in civil society that they previously used as instruments.

East Java is a strategic province with the second largest voters with more than 30.9 million voters in 2019, as per KPU data 2018. In addition, the strength and strong military network where all branches of the armed forces have large bases of operations and the distribution of land asset ownership makes them connected to the lives of civilians. In terms of the peculiarities of political culture, there are different typologies of society that affect the direction and political affiliation as well as other organizations that provide support for political parties.

Changes in the elite structure, its dynamics and continuity at the sub-national level are important to explain. Not only to prove that democratization brings changes in actors,

structures to sub-national and local levels. But further to answer how far the changes in the elite structure at the sub-national level can be understood?

Departing from a case study in East Java, this article seeks to understand the extent to which the elite structure changes at the sub-national political level? Many studies of national and local elites have been carried out, but they are still rarely explored at the sub-national level. In general, this article offers an approach to the study of sub-national politics by providing a framework for interpretation of political conditions and changes in Indonesia after the New Order.

Elite Studies in Indonesian Politics: An Approach

In the case of Indonesia, studies of elites are mostly carried out by paying attention to the relations and roles of elites in sustaining the political regime. The era of "Guided Democracy" in the 1950's had resulted in a regime with strong patrimonial characteristics (Crouch, 1979). The New Order began in the 1970's where the regime has sought to consolidate its power in patrimonial style. Efforts have been made to depoliticize the masses while confining political competition to non-ideological jockeying for power within the elite.

However, the New Order's dependence on economic development to obtain support from key groups outside the military elite has tended to push the regime toward increasing regularization and bureaucratization and growing conflict within the military elite (Crouch, 2011). In this era, elites also played a role in creating capitalist hegemony which had led to the regime ultimately having political stability supported by effective personal leadership factors and able to reduce elite competition and conflict in ensuring control over society. This is a unique process when comparing with Thailand, for example, which has a divided elite and episodic social pressure (Case, 1994; Shin, 1991).

On the other hand, those social forces that were marginalized under the New Order, for example, organized labour, remain politically excluded as country neighbor Malaysia (Hadiz & Teik, 2011). It argues that while personal self-enrichment remains a key motivation for military leaders, party politicians and bureaucrats to collect off-budget funds, there are also other crucial factors.

Most importantly, all the three actors aim to control independent funds in order to maintain or strengthen their autonomy from other state institutions, such as parliamentary budget commissions, executive monitoring bodies or official auditing boards. By engaging in extensive self-financing practices, however, the three political actors undermine their own professionalism, functional effectiveness and internal coherence, and obstruct Indonesia's process of democratic consolidation (Mietzner, 2008). In the otherwise deeply disparate cases of Indonesia and Bolivia, the origins of promiscuous power-sharing can be traced

to similar periods of high political uncertainty surrounding crisis-wracked transitions to democracy (Slater & Simmons, 2013).

The impact of the 1998's political reform and democratization on the fragmentation of national elites was not necessarily followed by fragmentation with the same pattern at the subnational political level. It takes time to implement new regulations from the central government that are directly related to changes in political and governance aspects. One of these regulations is the enactment of the Law on Regional Autonomy in 1999.

Until 2004, the changes brought about by the law had not touched much on the massive changes in the elite structure. This means that changes occur only at the level of government structures where local governments have greater authority to manage their territories. The power of each elite structure has not shifted much where military actors and politicians from Golkar still hold power in the government. The shift in the map of the political elite at the sub-national level can only be seen after 2004, which is marked by the emergence of *Pilkada* regulations. This regulatory factor does not work alone but is followed by dynamics in the increasingly diverse patterns of support of political parties.

Pilkada becomes the new epicenter where all local political elites who are not accommodated in national political events try to win the competition as regional leaders. In the case in Batam municipality, the direct *Pilkada* demonstrated that a wealthy and politically influential local elite dominated the electoral process. In another study in Pontianak, West Kalimantan, it was found that the local political elite in Indonesia not only consisted of those who inherited the New Order structure or the old elite, but also the emergence of new elite groups and various backgrounds or new elites (Choi, 2007, 2014). In South Sulawesi, the *Pilkada* has shown that candidates with strong personal networks at the sub-district level have a greater chance of winning the candidacy (Buehler, 2007; 2014: 158).

Several other important studies show a change in the pattern and role of elites in politics, especially nationally. Then slowly followed by changes at the sub-national and local level. Intended change specifically, during democratization, there are changing conditions in which relations among the elites that dominate the state apparatus have subsequently altered state-society relations. In local politics, the enactment and implementation of new laws are likewise described as decisively shaped by the interplay of competing interests of rival business and criminal cliques rather than by the broader interests of the local population (Sidel, 2005).

Consequently, informal power is rising up. For example, in the Province of Banten, local leaders came from gangsters to strong local politicians (Masaaki & Hamid, 2008). Village elites and their relatives are more likely to receive welfare programs from the government

than non-elites where those in formal positions receive more benefits than non-formal leaders (Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., Purnamasari, & Wai-Poi, 2013). In a more open political space, elite contestation provides an opportunity for anyone to rise and survive as a new elite.

Meanwhile, the old elite must update its strategy and network in order to survive. Government decentralization has also been shown to dramatically change local political configurations where local elite networks are able to build negotiations with the central government. This causes the state authority in the border area not to run absolutely (Eilenberg, 2009).

From various studies that have been conducted to look at elite relations in political change, this article offers three things. First, of course, to describe the extent to which elite-mass relations have changed in politics at the sub-national level, as has not been done much. Second, it offers an analytical perspective to complement the analytical framework in identifying and measuring the relationships and links between elites and their subordinates. Third, provide a better explanation in looking at the relationship between actors, formal and informal institutions and elite structures in sub-national politics.

The study in this article explains empirically how the portrait of changes and dynamics of the political elite can be explained in case studies at the sub-national politics. We take the conception of the political elite as a group of people, corporations, political parties or civil society organizations that control, regulate and organize the government or broadly as a manifestation of its political power. A group of people through their strategic position, through certain organizations or movements that have an impact on political outcomes, either regularly or substantially (Pakulski & Higley, 2007; Vergara, 2013: 33).

We define it as a group of people within a limited group who are in control and are very decisive in the political process and power management. Specifically, the political elite can be identified in the formal figure of the regional head as the holder of political power in the government and the politicians who sit in the legislative body at the provincial level. This study pretends to complement previous studies in explaining the extent of changes in the structure of the political elite and how they maintain their influence in society.

The question is how does structure affect agency? Changes in the national political structure have an impact on sub-national agencies and changes in the national elite structure have an impact on sub-national elites. In answering this question, we use a morphogenetic approach. This approach states that structure and agency can be analyzed in every space and time with two basic propositions. The first is structure necessarily precedes action that leads to its reproduction or transformation. Second, structural and cultural elaboration must be carried out after these actions (Archer, 1995: 16). This approach departs from the

thesis that social formation is generically shaped by social institutions and their interactions (M. S. Archer, 2021).

However, this approach is also useful for calculating changes and stability in the forms and types of social institutions. It is also a tool to see changes and developments in social processes, practices, and policies and even their rejection. Archer in Róna & Zsolnai (2020). What is the configuration of the local political elite structure? In order to gain an assessment of the change and sustainability of elite patterns and structures, an analysis that includes the previous regime period is needed. The aim is to provide an overview of the important events that led to a shift in the pattern. We begin by explaining the evolutionary phase of the political elite structure in East Java which is related to the national political conditions.

We conducted the analysis at three levels. First, analysis of data on the social, political and professional backgrounds of municipal and regency heads and members of the provincial parliament. This data is collected from official sources and mass media with simple verification as an entry point to explore the structure of the political elite and the evolution of its formation. Analysis of this data produces a pattern that will be the basis for the second level of analysis.

The second analysis builds a framework to see how structural change affects agency. This analysis produces a model of the evolutionary phase of structural change. Extracting the structure of the political elite by providing an explanation of the workings of elite control mechanisms over their institutions and subordinates.Third, an analysis of the map of socio-cultural actors who have connections with political elites and how they are used as tools of subordinate actors for vote mobilization in elections and local elections.

Insight from East Java

How far can the effectiveness of the vertical mobilization of political elites be known? We conducted an analysis of three rounds of post-conflict local elections after 2005 and five years after. We divide it into three periodizations, namely period I (pre-2004), II (2005-2010), III (2010-2015) and IV (2015-2017). In tracing the background of the political elite who were elected as regional heads of regents and mayors, there are important findings regarding the shift in the background of the political elite.

In the period I, regents/mayors only came from military or police figures who were still actively serving. This became part of the general policy of the New Order government which is defined as *dwi fungsi* (dual function) in military doctrine which allows the military to actively occupy positions in the administration of civilian government. Even after 1998, democratization led to the election of regional heads through the DPRD which gave rise to a limited number of non-military/police figures.

In period II, the bureaucratic background dominated the position of regional head replacing the military. In this transition period, bureaucrats have a better chance because they have experience mastering the bureaucratic structure of government for a long time. Most of them are former regional secretaries as the highest bureaucratic positions in local government.

During the period of regional head elections by the DPRD, bureaucrats can beat the dominance of military retirees because they are more communicative with civilian politicians who control the DPRD. In addition, the phobia of military leadership in the early period of reform was also an important factor in explaining the dominance of bureaucrats.

In period III, the data show more diverse variations. Bureaucrats no longer dominate but share almost equal numbers with politicians and businesspeople.

In period IV, in several areas, new figures emerged who initially did not have a clear track record, but had kinship relations with the previous regent or mayor. Both in the capacity as husband or wife, biological children and close relatives. In terms of the sustainability of incumbents, only a few regions have regional heads with the same work background. Meanwhile, they have varying backgrounds in periods II and III in most regions. This explains that the mobility and shift of the political elite in each region tends to be dynamic.

Table 1 Background of Regional Heads and Members of the East Java DPRD

Periods	2004-2009	2009-2014		2014-2019		2019-2024	
Background	Head Local Government	Head Local Government	DPRD Provincial Member	Head Local Government	DPRD Provincial Member	Head Local Government	DPRD Provincial Member
Military/ Police Retirees	11	2	0	0	0	0	1
Politician	0	9	60	9	41	6	71
Bureaucrat	26	15	2	10	3	8	4
Businessman	0	3	11	7	15	6	9
Employee	0	1	5	2	14	1	6
Professional	0	2	14	3	18	2	17
Society Figures	1	4	7	4	4	6	8
	0	2	1	3	5	9	4
Total	38	38	100	38	100	38	120

Source: Counting from official data from Local Election Commission and verified through other mass media

In the following data, namely the composition of the political elite who occupy seats in the East Java DPRD, there are no less important findings. In table 1, data was taken starting in 2009 when the polarization of political elites from civilian circles began to be identified. In the 2009-2014 period, politicians dominated the council seats, followed by professional and business backgrounds. In the following period, 2014-2019 and 2019-2024, the background of politicians, businessmen and professionals became the main actors of the domination of the board.

Of course, the biggest ones are still politicians. In contrast to the configuration of regional heads, the backgrounds of East Java DPRD members are dominated by politicians who are career politicians – who experience vertical mobility because previously they were DPRD members at the district/city level, or those who were previously active in mass organizations, youth organizations and student alumni organizations. Another interesting thing is that at least the East Java DPRD members have business backgrounds. Although so far entrepreneurs have had large capital compared to elites with other backgrounds, the lack of capital in elections is not the only factor without a network at the grassroots level.

Evolutional Phase of Ruling Elite

In the 1980s, the New Order's centralized political power reached its peak. It is characterized by the complete control of the military over the civilian government. The military at the provincial level, the Regional Military Command (*Kodam*) is the main instrument. The consolidation of the political elite is carried out through Golkar, which is in control of the political process in the local provincial parliament (DPRD Provinsi). While the bureaucracy is fully controlled by the governor who comes from the military. We call this phase *State-Centric*. In this phase, the patron-client relationship and elite circulation are converging on state authority.

With the fragmentation of the New Order's militaristic power in the early 1990s and the collapse of their 32-year rule in 1998, the structure of the political elite has not yet fully experienced serious setbacks. Even so, the changes at the provincial level were actually recognizable at the end of 1996 which we call the *Meso-leader* phase which lasted until 2004 when the 2004 TNI Law was passed and the Pilkada was held immediately. In this phase, the local elite is still dominated by military retired leaders and their combination with the bureaucratic elite. They still enjoy privileges and fairly effective control over their territory. They can easily get a victory when the DPRD is still holding the elections for governors or regions below.

Even after the 1999 election, the composition of the DPRD was shaped by the entry of politicians with a high diversity of backgrounds. However, they can still be easily subdued by commanders and officials who are still perched at the top of the power pyramid. In this phase, middle-up bureaucrats share with civilian politicians who initially emerged because they had strong political support. Power was managed by using political policy instruments with mass mobilization as pressure.

Graph 1: Evolutional elite organization

1980-1995	1996-2004	2005-now
State- Centric	Meso-Leader	Cartel

a. Military has powerful control over civilian government through Panglima Kodam (*Pangdam*)
b. Governor need consultation from Golkar representatives at local parliament (DPRD Provinsi)
c. Provincial government structure operate tight bureaucratic polity.

a. Military withdrawal from politics in 2004 as UU TNI consequences
b. Direct head of local government election Act

a. Military no longer controlling the civilian government.
b. Golkar demoralised
c. Local government has greater authority as Regional Autonomy Act implementation

a. Revitalization of *Politik Aliran* which exist in legislative election.
b. Bureaucracy as different class apart from ruling elite
c. Businessman as money maker to supporting politician in election

Source: Author, 2021

In the phase after 2005, what worked was a *cartel* model characterized by the military no longer having control over the civilian government. Then Golkar, which no longer dominates and the 1998-2004 period experienced political demoralization, even though it persisted and in the 2009 national elections, began to squirm with its new image.

The process of forming a new political cartel outside the military's influence and the Golkar network shows a revitalization in current politics as seen from the strengthening of the nationalist party represented by PDIP and other parties based on Islamic constituents such as PKB, PAN and PKS. In the era of strengthening the role of the regions after the enactment of the 1999 Regional Autonomy Law, the bureaucracy was able to appear as a separate and relatively stronger class and have a bargaining position against the elite or ruling class. Meanwhile, the business group has a continuous agenda as funding support for politicians who are fighting in elections to get a concession.

Tabel 3: Phases and its mechanism

Phase	Actor	Mechanism
State-centric	State Apparatus: Military + Bureaucratic elite	- Using bureaucratic instrument followed by coercive approach. - Fully control exists under military leaderships.
Meso-leader	Craftsman Leader: Middle Bureaucrat + Civilian Politician	- Using political instruments to force public policy followed by mass pressure. - Partially control exist under politician leadership.
Cartel	Collegial Power: Politician + Businessman + Bureaucrat	- Using money instruments to connect actor interest followed by opinion making through mass media. - Controlled by balance tension between actors

Source: Author, 2021

After 2005, there was a change in the structure to become a cartel where the composition of the DPRD was dominated by political groups which could be called revitalizing of the political stream (*Politik Aliran*). In this phase, the bureaucracy appears as a new ruling elite that is relatively more independent from the government leaders. The inclusion of business groups as suppliers to support funding needs in the local elections is a new important variable where their position as actors begins to gain a place.

Most of them do not seek security for their business but trade from the investment of funds that have been spent on government project concessions. This phase shows that raising support for the government is no longer mostly done by mobilizing the masses, but rather mobilizing public opinion through the mass media, which has a higher cost. In general, there is a balance between political actors, businesses and pressure groups, especially the mass media.

Each phase has a main actor who plays a role in carrying out control mechanisms over the society. The state-centric phase is supported by the state apparatus, namely the military and the bureaucratic elite, both of which have structures that reach the community to the lowest level. They have guarantees from the state to take coercive approaches and actions in order to meet government goals. In the 1980s, this phase reached its peak where the face of the New Order political regime reflected an authoritarian character. In the Meso-leader phase, the main actors are categorized as craftsman leaders, namely the middle elite positions who always improvise to ensure that they can consolidate power. They consist of middle class bureaucrats who head technical areas within government

agencies who can play a role to serve the top level bureaucracy and politicians in the local parliament at the same time.

In addition, the emergence of civilian politicians who dominate parliamentary seats also expands the negotiation space in the allocation and priorities of the public budget spent on building their political constituency. Politicians ultimately need a consolidated mass with incentives from various government aids and programs to become a pressure force.

In the cartel phase, power rests on collegiality between three actors, namely politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. They met in general consensus that money was an important part of political mobilization. Money is also an important factor in the formation of public opinion. There is a trade between authority commodities owned by the bureaucracy, masses or constituents owned by politicians and money owned by entrepreneurs in this phase. The third transaction creates a new balance in maximizing profit sharing together.

From the explanation of the three phases above, it can be seen that bureaucratic actors and institutions are players whose roles are not displaced. They occupy a central point that always persists in every change. Unlike the military, which lost control of politics in a democratic era. Bureaucracies can play a relatively stable role by asserting their control over the public budget. Politicians cannot act by themselves without positioning them as implementing instruments. Likewise, entrepreneurs still need them as a medium for policy formulation. The bureaucracy has formal tools through networks and hierarchies of government structures. Political elites, party politicians mobilize through political parties that have networks as formal tools. Then, to what extent are politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen using informal networks to maintain their power?

Maintaining Power: Clicks with Actors and the Informal Institution

After the 1998 reform, the existence of the state apparatus to effectively control the political mobilization of the people experienced a decline. Formally, bureaucratic networks or political parties experience obstacles due to the fragmented dynamics of the patron-client structure. This causes the elite to use informal channels of actors and institutions by activating their existence. Either those who were forced to remain silent during the New Order era or the new actors who emerged later. Political elites are interested in maintaining their connectedness with civil society organizations and their communities.

They need support to strengthen social, cultural, religious and ethnic identification that can be converted into voting support. Stronger networks can be built later which can be used to legitimize public policies. Political elites who hold power, whether executive or legislative, have the authority to control government institutions or other formal institutions to implement their capacity provided by regulations. Apart from going through formal institutions, leaders also have access to manage support from informal institutions or actors. In East Java, at least seven (7) significant informal actors have a symbiotic relationship of mutualism with the elite.

Tabel 4: Informal actor as elites subordinate

Name of Informal Actors	Region	Role	Key Function
Klebun	Madura	Head of the village who collects votes during elections through traditional and local violent groups.	- Community group network - Political mobilization network - Support mobilization
Botoh	Java Mataraman (rural)	Gambler who supports candidates for financial benefit. They distribute money to voters	- Capital accumulation and distribution - Support Mobilization
Dukun	Entire	Supernatural adviser who came from abangan or santri mystical groups.	- Traditional Consultant
Bangku Panjang	Surabaya and big cities	Small contractor who gets government projects through their connection with politicians. They run projects with a high benefit rate under the distribution to politician constituents.	- Financial support
Aktivis Rea-Reo	Surabaya and big cities	Unrecognized activist. They established a temporary organisation. They move in order to hit someone or other organisation under a politician, police or bureaucrat request.	- Community group network - Information sharing - Political fund distribution

Name of Informal Actors	Region	Role	Key Function
Kyai	Entire (Rural)	religious elites who have influence in society as guardians of norms, and are able to mobilize political support both publicly and symbolically, through religious forums, lectures, and recitation	- Cultural broker - Traditional community group network - Support Mobilization
Pencak Silat Elite	Java Mataraman (Rural)	Elites at the organizational district, sub-district and village levels. The bigger the members of the pencak silat, the greater the influence in the mobilization of votes at the local level.	- Community group network - Support mobilization

Sources: Compiled by authors

The informal powers in table 3 above represent the power variants other than local strongmen or local bosses. In East Java, local strongmen are formally affiliated with power tools, both the government bureaucracy and law enforcement officials. While local bosses refer to economic elites who cultivate the loyalty of their followers with both rewards and threats. The actor is an informal elite who is categorized as a downliner of the political elite. We have not found local bosses as political elites in the sense of having networks in independent communities. They become independent actors who can transact their power.

On the other hand, some local strong people work as religious/community leaders who win political contests and become motivators. Looking at the context of East Java, seven important informal actors are strong subordinates of the political elite, both for mobilizing voters in elections and securing regulations made.

First, in the Madura region, the strongest informal actor is *klebun* – to mention the position of village heads in the Madura (especially in Sampang and Bangkalan regency). However, from its cultural roots, *klebun* is mainly dominated by *blater* – social status as a local hero, which is owned because of certain courage, especially in doing *carok* (holy and bloody fighting). This is the cultural difference between the position of village heads in

Madura and other areas in East Java. *Blaters* mostly control the villages in Madura with roots, networks and social influence in the village community (Rozaki, 2009). This is because the one-sided *blater* group can present themselves as protectors, with an image that has a smooth, polite, and respectful attitude to others.

On the other hand, they are also synonymous with images of violence, trouble and various criminal activities. In the opening of post-*Reformasi 1998*, the political competition allowed blaters to emerge to gain political support in the cultural or business areas of violence and security and formal politics from villages to districts. With a solid and broad network, the involvement of the *blater* is often a determinant of the success or failure of holding elections (especially in village head election - *pilkades*), and determining whether or not a candidate for village head or regional head is elected in the region.

Candidates for village heads, legislative candidates or regional heads, as well as party officials in the regions, even though they are not part of or have a *blater* background, must be able to get along with the *blater* group. Therefore, the services of *blater* and *klebun* are used to mobilize support in elections through networks at the village level. In some cases, it can be easily seen that the mobilization of the *klebun* in the general election or local elections has a pattern of support for certain political elites.

In the 2014 election in Bangkalan Regency, the son of former regent Fuad Amin, who is affiliated with Gerindra, bought the party's votes in the national legislative election and Presidential Elections. Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa's votes received between 95-98 percent of the total voter lists at polling stations. Mobilization can be carried out effectively because of pressure as well as job incentives for *klebuns* who fail or succeed in meeting targets (Pribadi, 2014).

Second, *botoh*, in Javanese means gambler. With this meaning, *botoh* is synonymous with transactional and pragmatic behavior to influence election results. The usual practice is through money politics. *Botoh* is synonymous with non-electoral actors, usually informal (such as businessmen, landlords) – although also formal (such as village heads or bureaucratic officials), who are believed to influence the political behavior of voters and influence vote acquisition. Referring to these activities, *botoh* is actually not only understood as a gambler, but also refers to the practice of brokers or vote brokers. The goal is to obtain financial benefits from the elections, either directly or indirectly. This practice was previously common in village head elections, both in the *Mataraman* sub-culture area of East Java and the Madura subculture in *Tapal Kuda*. Their practice was widespread when the Pilkada was held in Indonesia.

Because it is part of a network maintained for a long time, candidates also use botoh services to win elections. The method of vote mobilization carried out by *botoh* is to accumulate capital by buying and selling votes with many candidates, channeling it through money practices in a retail, structured and timed manner that is considered strategic. Although the practice of *botoh* can occur in several areas, this group is more commonly found in the areas of Tulungagung, Trenggalek, Blitar, and Kediri.

In 2013 Tulungagung's Pilkada, the botoh network was claimed to be the decisive factor in Syahri Mulyo's victory where his father named Dasar, was a big *botoh* in the region. A similar thing happened in the 2018 Pilkada which made Syahri elected for the second time (Abbiyyu, 2020). Pilkada is considered more effective in measuring the role of *botoh* because the distance between candidates, voters and *botoh* can be closer where transactions can be carried out directly. This is due to the *botoh* network that reaches down to the household level in the village. The role of *botoh* as a political broker and gambler is caused by the pilkada event which has a large amount of money bet. The rewards from the candidate as part of the success team and the direct election system make candidates trust *botoh* to fill their winning team because they are considered to have an understanding of the characteristics of voters (Yohanes, 2013).

Third, *dukun* or shamans, as part of a social phenomenon in Indonesia, have strong roots of belief and tradition despite modernization, technological developments and rapidly developing science. As a person or group who is believed to have supernatural powers, shamans are also believed to be able to treat, increase authority and beauty, or even put other people in miserable situations. In East Java, belief in shamans is still preserved in all sub-cultures. In elections, shamans are believed to be able to help and promise victory and luck to politicians. Shamans are often in strategic power circles among officials or candidates.

Uniquely, he was never seen, hidden, but had influence in guarding the contest, besides politicians also doing rational political work. Before there were modern political consultants, shamans were traditional consultants who first existed in election contests. Shaman groups can be found in all areas in East Java. However, the use of their services in elections is easy to find in the southern and northern coastal areas of East Java. In Kediri, the role of shamans in Pilkades is to help candidates to neutralize the bad influence of magical powers sent by political opponents. They will also give amulets, certain rituals and other magical objects to increase the candidate's confidence (Trihartono, 2021). In addition, the shaman is also tasked with warding off witchcraft and fencing the candidate and his family to survive from spiritual attacks. One of the shamans in Sidoarjo had to

retire early from his formal job in the company because of the large number of clients who asked for his help in the elections (Hidayat, 2019).

Fourth, *bangku panjang* or long bench. Long Bench refers to associations or groups of small entrepreneurs engaged in construction services, residential developers, business centers and real estate. This group is more accurately referred to as an association because of its more dynamic and fluid interactions than formal professional associations structured with certain rules of the game. As a group of entrepreneurs, their role is more to provide capital assistance for political activities of candidates. As a large capital stock group, candidates who need financial assistance see the long bench group as a strategic partner for political funding.

For entrepreneurs, this assistance is considered a medium-term investment, with the hope that when the candidate they support wins, they can take up various infrastructure development projects in an area, or further, accommodate their interests in the preparation of development plans and urban spatial planning. The existence of a long bench in winning is usually only on capital. However, it is not uncommon for long bench groups to invest in more than one candidate. In some local elections, the long bench also calculates who to give their capital to. The decision is usually determined by hiring the services of a survey agency to determine the electability of a candidate. The existence of these groups can be found in large urban areas in East Java, or areas with centers of rapid regional and economic growth.

The actors of this group can be included in the management of professional employers' organizations even if it is only a formality. Meanwhile, their political activities are carried out informally directly with the candidates. In some cases, they set up small organizations that became lifeboats to speak out in the mass media. Official professional organizations could not easily express their support openly because they were considered partisans. In the 2020 Surabaya Pilkada, there was support from entrepreneurs who directly expressed their support for one of the candidates. This choice is certainly risky if made through a formal organization statement with a reputation (Azmi, 2020; Wijayanto, 2020).

In the Pilkada, candidates are allowed to receive funds from only three sources: individuals or groups, corporations, and non-government enterprises. In reality, most funds are sourced from unofficial channels, namely from businesspeople. At the local level, they are mostly form contractors. The connection between contractors and local politicians was found in many areas, including in Surabaya(Savirani, 2019).

Fifth, *Rea-Reo* Activists. This group consists of various actors with NGO activist backgrounds or political party partisans. Networking among them becomes important

because of the circulation of important and strategic information between them and networks with several communities they know through advocacy activities in the past, or communities they have facilitated to obtain social assistance from the government.

Through their information and community networks, they can become service providers for regional head candidates or legislative candidates to build a mass base that can be mobilized for support during elections. This network of activists often moves around in helping regional head candidates, legislative candidates or political parties. Loyalty is short-term and pragmatic, depending on the employer (regional head candidate or legislative candidate). Their ability to connect candidates with certain community groups is considered important for candidates who are trying to build electability and mass base. Because it is a group with a rational character in helping to win candidates, this group is easier to find in big cities in East Java where there are a lot of elites with big capital.

This group has a permanent organization but most of them are organs that appear suddenly where the activist can use several names of organs to speak in public according to their interests and orders. They are aggressively building public opinion by supporting a candidate. Even in some cases, they can also be used to attack other candidates. In several Pilkada in Lamongan in 2020 and Gubernatorial election of East Java 2018, for example, activists who became exponents of permanent community organizations and those who set up new organs, mobilized votes with their organizational tools or recruited new people to move to persuade voters to carry out guarding until they arrived at the village ballot box (Effendi, 2018; J., 2020).

Sixth, *Kyai*, a cultural actor who is considered very important in building electability and mobilization of vote support. The role of the *kyai* can be seen as a cultural broker, bridging, connecting and mediating between community groups and political actors with the same or various backgrounds for certain purposes. Respectful social status, either because of descent or recognition of religious scholarship, as well as being a central figure in Islamic boarding schools, makes *kyai* as actors who become the main reference for voters in some areas in East Java in making choices.

The way the *kyai* shows their support is usually conveyed symbolically through religious events attended by many people, such as recitations or religious lectures. In contrast to other informal actors operating in the area of money politics, kyai play a role in building the popularity and electability of candidates through building the candidate's personal image. Departing from the widespread Islamic culture and education, kyai are informal actors or groups in almost all East Java areas. The openly mobilization of Kyai can be seen when the candidate is a figure in Nahdlatul Ulama religious organization or is promoted by its political parties such as PKB and PPP. Recently, the Gerindra and PDIP parties have

also emerged. The East Java Governor Election contest is a "war" event amongst Kyai who support the candidate. In the 2008 Gubernatorial Election, the Kyai Alawy from Sampang, who supported the Khofifah-Mujiono candidate, issued a *fatwa* that women also have the right to be elected like men and rejected the view that forbids them from becoming leaders (Pribadi, 2014).

Seventh, *Elite Pencak Silat*, martial arts organization. Another informal actor who has significant influence in the East Java area with the Mataraman subculture is the elite from martial arts. In areas with the largest organization base in East Java, such as *Setia Hati Terate*, *Kera Sakti*, *Setia Hati Winongo*. Compared to other organizations which are also large, the organizations that have developed in the Mataram area of East Java have strong cultural and historical roots, an organized mass base and traditions that are routinely carried out to recruit new members or maintain their loyalty. With a structure that is spread from village to national level, the existence of martial arts elites at various levels has a strong influence, especially in areas with a large and solid number of "warriors".

Our experience in areas with these characters shows that a candidate for village head or local government head can win without spending a large amount of money and without vote buying. The existence of martial arts can be found in areas becoming the center of annual activities, such as in Madiun, Magetan, Ponorogo, Nganjuk and Ngawi. In the 2018 gubernatorial election, thousands of members of the Setia Hati Terate and Winongo in Magetan were mobilized to win the Saifullah Yusuf-Puti Guntur Soekarno. Previously, East Java Setia Hati Terate elders also declared Didik Mukrianto to run for the 2018 gubernatorial election while claiming there were 2-3 million members throughout East Java, including around more than 40 thousand people in Bojonegoro, around 150 thousand people in Lamongan and Tuban (Azis, 2018; Hakim, 2017).

The seven elites in these informal institutions are not permanently affiliated with one or a group of political elites within the party or regional head of government. They have bargaining positions that vary according to the interests and benefits they want to get in the duration of the partnership which can be short when mobilizing support in elections or building long-term alliances to secure public policy from the ruling political elite.

Conclusion

The existence of political elites in sub-national politics has different dynamics from those in national politics. In Indonesia's democratization era, this study shows that subnational politics is more open to changes in the characteristics and types of political elites in formal institutions. Patron-client relationships that are built with elites in informal institutions are also more transactional, giving rise to exchange mechanisms in relationships that are

not fully co-optative. This has led to the emergence of new elites with different social, economic and cultural backgrounds who enliven sub-national political contests and are unique in each region.

This study proves that the structure of the political elite has changed from being concentrated on personal figures tied to military and bureaucratic institutions to becoming more fragmented with the strengthening of the elite of civilian politicians, businessmen and public figures from various professions. These changes produce dynamics in the building of interactions between elites and their exchanges so that the organizing mechanism, the basis for the legitimacy of political elites and their resilience in holding the reins of political power cannot be easily predicted.

An important contribution made from this study is that there are significance of the elite roles in Indonesian subnational politics. Paying attention to the study of their central role in sub-national politics in the case in East Java can prove that there is a shift in the elite structure that affects their working mechanism in moving their subordinates. Nevertheless, there is continuity in the use of the middle actor network from the political elite to mobilize voters. Some elites in informal institutions are old clients of political elites who come from the bureaucracy. The rest are new actors born from political openness and greater freedom in capitalizing on social, economic and cultural capital.

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