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Nationalist-Islamist Party in a Liberal Ecosystem: The Solidity and Campaign Strategy of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) during the 2014 and 2019 Elections

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Abstract:

This paper examines the nationalist-Islamist party's solidity and campaign strategy, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), in coping with the legislative election under an Open List Proportional Representation (OLPR) system, mainly during the 2014 and 2019 elections. The party solidity is measured by a fourfold indicator: procedural leadership in the decision-making process, conflict resolution mechanism, systematic candidateship, and the commitment upon the values/ideology. In the meantime, the campaign strategy is assessed by four indicators of marketing-mix: product, price, place, and promotion. The finding demonstrates that PKS can maintain the party solidity despite addressing the internal turmoil, mainly related to beef bribery committed by the PKS president in the early of 2013. Furthermore, although PKS executes all campaign strategies in dealing with the 2019 legislative election, the most effective strategy for increasing the PKS' vote is product and place. The party has a specific platform and strong candidate characteristics. Indeed, it is supported by the loyalty of legislative candidates, cadres, members, and sympathizers who have significant contributions as the vote-getters in mobilizing the electorate. Those proofs indicate that the ideological party can adjust itself in the electoral competition under the liberal system of open-list proportional representation applied by Indonesia. PKS is a good case with its pragmatic strategies.

Keywords:

Partai Keadilan Sejahter (PKS); campaign strategy; nationalist-islamist party; Indonesian election

Introduction

Since 2004 political parties are the sole participant in the Indonesian elections, mainly under Open List Proportional Representation (CLPR) system. All political parties should obey the applied regulation, and, in turn, they need to change campaign strategies in dealing with the election under the liberal system. In

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this context, the open-list PR is categorized as the liberal system rather than another system, namely closed-list PR. Why is such a system liberal? Under open-list PR, the ideological contestation is no longer critical for political parties in appealing electorates' support to vote for their party.

As the electorates vote the candidate directly, whether for the legislative or executive wing, political parties' role ideologically in the election is minimal. Instead, the direct role of the candidate in attracting voters is significant. That is why open-list PR is classified as a liberal system. Nevertheless, political parties can adjust themselves to the existing regulation. One of the consequences of the open-list PR system is ideological consideration is no longer exist fully like in the election of 1955 and during the New Order regime. Maybe, the 1999 election is the last ideological contestation among political parties. Since 2004 by applying open-list PR and the direct presidential election, ideological contestation is waning.

Even though Ufen (2009) argues that parties in Indonesia have good performance, Ambardi (2008) puts forward that the competition among parties terminated after the election, followed by the invention of a cartel. The cartelized party system's source is the parties' collective dependence on rent-seeking to meet their economic necessaries. In terms of the party institutionalization, Tan (2006; 2012), Tomsa (2008), Choi (2010), and Hamayotsu (2011) hypothesize that the party system in Indonesia is feebly institutionalized. Nonetheless, in the worldwide trend, Ufen (2008), Hamayotsu (2011), Croissant and Völkel (2012), and Mietzner (2013) argue that parties and party system in Indonesia are well institutionalized if contrasted to remaining Southern America, Asian countries, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. It designates that, consistent with Noor's (2012) finding, parties in Indonesia have a greater opportunity to maintain cohesion, but it is possible for them to be fragmented parties if they are feebly institutionalized. Fionna (2013) believes that the parties can operate various programs if they are more institutionalized. On the contrary, the parties incline to be ineffective and passive if they are less institutionalized.

Although some ideological parties were gone in post-Soeharto elections from 1999 to 2019, a few still exist such as Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and United Development Party (PPP). These two parties can be classified as the nationalist-Islamist party with a fourfold reason, as was proposed by Al-Hamdi (2017). First, although they adopt Islam as the party ideology, they welcome Pancasila's values due to its compatibility with Islam. Second, they no longer impose the sharia laws and establish of an Islamic state as its primary goal. Instead, they underpin democratic and governance issues and revise its image by focusing on prosperity, justice, religious tolerance, bureaucratic reform, and corruption eradication. Third, they still apply Islamic symbols and teachings to their party attributes. Fourth, most functionaries are dominated by orthodox Muslims. Therefore, they reach out to a broader network with various backgrounds of society, even approaching non-Muslim communities as the impact of applying pragmatic ways.

This study focuses on examining the solidity and campaign strategy of PKS in coping with two last elections, 2014 and 2019. Why PKS? Comparing to PPP, PKS is more institutionalized. Studies conducted by Permata (2008), Nurdin (2009), Noor (2012), Hidayat (2012), and Nurdin, Saputra, and Prayitno (2019) demonstrate that PKS is the sole ideological party in Indonesia with Islam as its foundation which can adjust itself with pragmatic ways as a strategy to survive in the national political stage. Although its vote decreased at least 1.09 percent from 7.89 percent in 2009 to 6.79 percent in 2014, this party still does not miss many votes drastically, not like the Democrat Party, which dropping of roughly 50 percent. In 2019, the PKS' performance seemed to be good, and its vote raises to 8.21 percent. In the meantime, the PPP's vote decreased continuously in the election from 10.71 percent in 1999 to 4.61 percent in 2019. It cannot be separated from the fact that PPP suffered the internal conflict in two last elections, 2014 and 2019, which induce weakly party institutionalization.

Therefore, 2 key questions are proposed: To what extent does the solidity of PKS in dealing with various impediments in the 2014 election? How does the PKS strategy maintain the stability of its vote to surpass the parliamentary threshold of the 2019 election when it has internal conflicts? This study has some objectives. First is to reveal the solidity of the ideological party under the liberal system. Second is to investigate the campaign strategy pattern of the ideological party by employing pragmatic ways.

Party Classification, Party Institutionalization, and Party Strategy

Political parties can be catalogued into a lot of distinctive standards, based on the organizational degree, the social and political aim, the social classes which they tend to represent, the positioning toward the political system, or the name that symbolizes particular social and political aims that the parties want to be recognized with (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011). This paper classifies political parties based on a twofold consideration. First is a social and ideological conviction because lots of political parties institute their programs based on ideological orientations. Second is the organizational degree as parties invent their programs based on their human and financial capacities.

Scientists have different theories to categorize Indonesian parties ideologically. Liddle (2003) classifies them into three main clusters: the nationalist-soekarnoist (PDIP), the universalist (Golkar, PAN, PKB), and the Islamic (PKS, PPP, PBB). Baswedan (2004) catalogues them into a fourfold cluster: nationalist-secular (PDIP), Islam-friendly (Golkar), Islam-inclusive (PKB and PAN), and the Islamist (PKS, PPP, PBB). Mietzner (2013) separates parties in Indonesia into contrasting spectrums, namely secular and Islamic. PDIP represents the secular, and PKS and PPP embody the Islamic. Other parties create themselves in the mid spectrum: PAN and PKB. In the same vein, Al-Hamdi (2017) groups them into three categories: nationalist-secular like PDIP, nationalist-Muslim, which can be manifested in PKB and PAN, and the nationalist-Islamist, which can be represented by PKS and PPP. Nevertheless,

Baswedan (2004) and Al-Hamdi (2017) postulated that political Islam in Indonesia indicates a normalized path in consolidating democracy. Bubalo, Fealy, & Mason (2012) hypothesized that normalization in political Islam is currently a global trend. Considering those classifications, this study catalogs political parties into three main groups: nationalist-secular, nationalist-Muslim, and nationalist-Islamist.

Such a classification is conceptualized based on some arguments: 1) this classification represents variants of Indonesian society: *abangan*, *santri* and *Jemaah Tarbiyah*; it characterizes main forces of people's aspirations; 3) the parties in this classification already participated in five election cycles respectively and reached parliamentary seats repeatedly. Why are all of the classification grouped as nationalist? The first two groups adopt Pancasila as their ideology. Although the latter does not apply Pancasila as its ideology, it accepts Pancasila as the fundamental values inside the party platform. Therefore, those three groups are friendly of Pancasila because there are no contradicting values between Pancasila and Islamism (Al-Hamdi, 2017).

To examine the solidity and party campaign of PKS, the theory of party institutionalization and marketing-mix are employed as the theoretical framework due to its relevance to this topic. According to Huntington (1968), institutionalization is how organizations and procedures acquire value and stability where some criteria can measure it: the ability of the party to develop adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Huntington (1968) is sure that "the more adaptable an organization or procedure, the more highly institutionalized it is". Moreover, Panebianco (1988) defines institutionalization as the way the organization solidifies.

Similarly, Randall & Svasand (2002) put forward that the party institutionalization is "the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of their integrated patterns of behavior and attitudes, or culture". More specifically, they differentiate the aspects of this process internal aspects (internal development) and external aspects (relationship with society) so that there are four dimensions in the party institutionalization as was developed by Randal & Svasand (2002), namely systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy, and reification. In doing so, this study is going to focus on internal aspects (systemness and value infusion) rather than external aspects (decisional autonomy and reification). It is in line with this research, which focuses on the internal aspect of PKS, where a political party is a miniature of the political system. More specifically, Noor (2012) introduces three systemness factors and one factor of the value infusion.

1. Procedural leadership in the decision-making process. It needs a consistent realization of the policy once the members pass a policy. Procedural leadership preserves the sense of togetherness since it ensures the realization of the rules, equality before the party constitution, and engagement in the decision-making process.
2. Conflict resolution mechanism. It is a mechanism that copes with the conflict to help develop a win-win outcome that satisfies each conflicting group.

3. Systematic cadrerization. It includes the issues related to holding fair recruitment, systematic evaluation of the cadres, systematic and gradual training in recruiting new members and elites, and their career level.

4. The commitment to the shared values or ideology. The presence of shared values commitment impacts the existence of value infusion, where certain values infuse the members. Thus, the institutionalized party is the party that can develop their values and builds its roots in society.

In this study, discussing the party strategy is investigating how the party communicates itself with voters, the way it campaigns its platform to the public, and the way it attracts people to vote for its candidate when votes come to the ballot box. This study applies the theory of marketing-mix with a fourfold indicator to measure the party strategy, as was explained by Niffenegger (1989) and Firmanzah (2012):

1. Product. It is the way the party promotes its slogans, ideas, and candidate profile. It contains three things: a) the party platform; b) the past record; and c) the party candidate profile.

2. Price. It is the party members and candidates' ability to contribute to the party with the finance, psychological burden, and branding. It has three sub-indicators: a) economic cost, which denotes to the financial expense; b) psychological cost, that indicates emotional approaches like tribal, blood, and religious ties; and c) image impact/cost, which signifies to what extent the party can take advantages from the patron they have to be promoted to public.

3. Place or distribution. It is the way the party distributes its cadres into various electoral districts (*Daerah Pemilihan, Dapil*) and sets them with campaign strategies. It encompasses three things: a) how the party optimizes its local networks; b) the party strategy in gathering people (canvassing); and c) the leader tour to institutional and influential figures. If the price tends to build the party's image, the place denotes to the party strategy in attract public interests.

4. Promotion. It is the tactic the party promotes its activities and programs into mass media. It consists of two sub-indicators: a) direct promotion in mass media, social media; and b) event publication.

The Solidity of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in the 2014 Election

In this section, the study explains the party solidity with a fourfold factor: procedural leadership in the decision-making process, conflict resolution mechanism, systematic cadrerization, and the commitment to the shared values or ideology.

Procedural Leadership in the Decision-making Process

In early 2013, the president of PKS, Lutfi Hassan Ishaq, was arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) due to his deed in the beef bribery case. Soon after this tragedy, PKS consolidates itself to change the party president position.

Some candidates were proposed by the party's *Syura* Council, such as Al Muzammil Yusuf, Sohibul Iman, Anis Matta, and Hidayat Nur Wahid. Among these names, Anis Matta and Hidayat Nur Wahid were potential candidates. The Council eventually decided to select Anis Matta despite some critical notes of him. Other positions were also changed, like Muhammad Taufik Ridho as secretary-general of PKS.

The decision to select the president and secretary-general of PKS on 01 February 2013 after Ishaq arrest on 31 January 2013 denotes the PKS' fast response to the existing situation. In PKS, the *Syura* Council's chairperson has a dominant role in governing all party functionaries and programs (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PKS, 2008). It was led by Hilmi Aminuddin, so that mass media frequently calls him the "godfather" of PKS.

The emergence of Anis Matta as the new president of PKS seemingly demonstrates new expectations in coping with the 2014 election in the post-Ishaq case. He frequently met PKS' cadres in the grassroots to inspire and convince them that this party still can reach the parliamentary threshold in the 2014 election. Even he said that the Ishaq tragedy was a huge conspiracy to demolish his party. So, according to Anis, this tragedy should be momentum for PKS to revive itself. He argued that there are three things missed in PKS' cadres: expectation, proud of the party, and confidence. These three things are the source of energy to make someone works and fights. Thus, if the three things can be reached again by the cadres, PKS still exists. For Anis, the concept of conspiracy is the right issue to bringing PKS back as the leading party.

When PKS was in the worst situation in dealing with the 2014 election, the Anis leadership style can stabilize the party vote. Although PKS' vote decreases 1.09 percent in 2014 compared with the 2009 election, it can ward various predictions and surveys which stated that PKS could not reach the minimum 3.5 percent of the parliamentary threshold. In this context, Anis Matta can be classified as a charismatic leader because he can convince the party's cadres, members, and sympathizers with his optimistic personality and influence them never to quit fighting.

Conflict Resolution Mechanism

Although PKS can be classified as the solid party, the internal conflict within still exists. The conflicting faction can be divided into two main groups: the justice faction (idealist) *versus* the prosperity faction (pragmatist) or the conservative *versus* the progressive (Munandar, 2011). These two factions can be traced back to the 2004 presidential election where "the justice faction" supported Amien Rais while "the prosperity faction" nominated Wiranto. The former consists of old cadres such as Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, Sohibul Iman, and Tifatul Sembiring. Meanwhile, the latter encompasses young cadres like Anis Matta, Fahri Hamzah, and Mahfudz Siddiq.

In the upcoming 2014 election, these two factions have conflicting perspectives in responding to the issues related to Ishaq's case and the rise of the oil price in the middle of 2014. The PKS' prosperity faction created a legal team to safeguard this case and ensure that the case is going well and fair. Fahri Hamzah supervised this legal

team. In the meantime, the justice fraction represented by Tifatul put forward that the public should obey the court verdict. Furthermore, in terms of the rise of the oil price, Fahri rejected it, while Tifatul accepted it because PKS was part of the government coalition.

Another internal conflict occurred in PKS was between Yusuf Supendi and other PKS' elites. More specifically, Supendi has disappointed and grudging feelings when he was getting the ax from PKS dishonorably. This conflict can be traced back to the fragmentation of the support between Amien Rais and Wiranto in the 2014 presidential election. Although most of the votes of PKS belong to Amien, Supendi was angry with Hilmi's behavior, who want to change the PKS' position to Wiranto. Because of this case, Supendi is always taking critical attitudes toward the PKS' policies. Consequently, since 2008 PKS banned its cadres and members from interacting and communicating with Supendi. In PKS, the *Syura* Council has an immense authority to solve various internal conflicts (Noor, 2012). Although PKS convinces its cadres and members that such conflict was done, Supendi still believes that he was a victim of the unfair policy and there was no a peaceful way between him and Hilmi until he died in 2018.

Systematic Cadrezation

In coping with the 2014 election, PKS consolidates itself organizationally by toughening the party cadrerization. Although PKS already declared itself as the open party at the 2008 Congress in Bali by recruiting legislative candidates of non-Muslims, mainly for the eastern of Indonesia, PKS still relies on the robust internal cadrerization. Even though some provinces are dominated by non-Muslims, such as Bali, North Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, and Papua, the Election Commission's (KPU) official website proved that no non-Muslim legislative candidates were coming from PKS (www.kpu.go.id). It indicates that it is not easy for non-Muslims to be a PKS' legislative candidate.

Some argue that the recruitment of non-Muslim legislative candidates caused the decreasing vote of PKS in 2014. It was conducted in 2009 when the party declared itself as the open party. According to *Lembaga Survei Independen Nusantara* (LSIN), since the cadrerization system of PKS was changing from closed to open, including in selecting regional heads, the PKS' vote was decreasing (Beritasatu, 2014). Although PKS accepts non-Muslim legislative candidates, Abdul Munir Mulkhan still believes that they are not involved in PKS' *Syura* Council because it is the highest institution of the party with considerable authority. Once this council has non-Muslim members, it implies that the party ideology was changing (Wadrianto, 2010).

Concerning cadre recruitment, Noor (2012) argues that PKS has a systematic procedure to select the legislative candidate. Through a transparent process involving other cadres, the party can remove the potential deed of collusion and nepotism. Therefore, in selecting external legislative candidates, the party decides to select them

with having many supporters. Nasir Djamil, PKS' functionary, stated that his party prefers to nominate its internal cadres, and no one candidate was a celebrity (Sembiring, 2013). Djamil's statement was supported by Hidayat Nur Wahid's view that his party is not anti-artists, but it prioritizes the cadres who have the required qualifications. Afterward, Hidayat argues that if any external candidates wish to be the legislative candidate, they should fulfill three requirements: free from criminal acts, having no immorality, and having a good family (Asril, 2013).

The Commitment to the Shared Values or Ideology

In post-PKS Congress in Bali 2008, this party has a dilemma, between choosing the strategy as the representative party for its primary electorates (moderate Muslims) or following the logic of electoral competition (Muhtadi, 2012). The former directs it to become the ideological party with narrowed voters, while the latter indicates the pragmatist party with anchoring voters outside Muslims. Nevertheless, although PKS frequently makes a coalition with PDIP in various local elections, it never created a coalition at the national level with PDIP, whether during Megawati administration (2001-2004) or Jokowi administration (2014-2024). The PKS commitment with its ideology and the image of PDIP as "the left-secular party" makes both never in one coalition at the national level.

In addressing the 2014 election, PKS is still committed to its platform as the *da'wa* party, which denotes the fact that PKS cannot be separated with the symbols of Islam. Sohibul Iman, the PKS politician, emphasizes that PKS realizes that Islam is a determining inspiration for his party to conduct various programs (Virdhani, 2014). This commitment was reinforced by the fact that it has no legislative candidates coming from non-Muslims. This strategy can bring PKS' cadres trust back to the party when the public has distrust views with PKS in post-Ishaq' beef bribery case. Therefore, PKS continuously consolidates itself with cadres and members to infiltrate the party ideology and values to strengthen their commitment to fighting for the electoral triumph. It can be seen with some activities like *halaqah* (focused discussion) among the party cadres and *usrah* (family gathering) among the party elites. Both restricted activities to study Islamic issues can also be called "Taklim Rutin Mingguan" (weekly Islamic study).

These ideological infusion activities are routine and never stop for all cadres and members, although they have a new position as parliament members. With such strategy, PKS' cadres and members still have the ideological commitment in realizing shared values in dealing with the 2014 election and, in turn, it affects the successful performance of PKS in maintaining its solidity despite having a "big storm" of the Ishaq's case and other internal conflicts.

Among all party solidity indicators, PKS is vigorous, particularly in systematic candidateship and the commitment to its values. Nonetheless, this party has the absence of conflict resolution in maintaining its internal conflicts. Therefore, PKS is a solid party with a lack of well conflict resolution.

PKS' Campaign Strategy in the 2019 Election

After the preceding passage discusses the performance of PKS by investigating its solidity in coping with the 2014 election, it continues with the examination of the PKS strategy in addressing the 2019 election by applying a fourfold indicator of marketing-mix: product, price, place, and promotion. It is also so-called "4P".

Product: Serving People

In terms of the party platform in coping with the 2019 election, PKS proposed the slogan "Berkhidmat untuk Rakyat" (serving people). This slogan was based on the party's national meeting on 29 April 2017. According to Jazuli Juwaini, the chair of the PKS' Fraction, to achieve the electoral triumph, we need a commitment to serve the people and to hear their aspirations (Pradipta, 2017). To reach such a slogan, the party has a fourfold program: realizing driving license for a lifetime, removing tax for motorcycle, safeguarding *ulama* (Muslim scholars) and religious symbols, and removing any tax for citizens who have incomes per month under 8 million IDR (Tribun News, 2019). With such a program, Almuzammil Yusuf, PKS' politician, stated that it would minimize people problems where people have many burdens, like the rise of electricity and rice with the best quality (Astuti, 2018).

Regarding the past record, PKS was born as part of the reformation soul. It is always the participant in Indonesian elections from 1999 to 2019. It reached a spectacular performance, where its vote boosted from 1.36 percent in 1999 to 7.34 percent in 2004. Its vote still increased in 2009 by 7.88 percent. Although its vote decreased in 2014 by 6.79 percent due to Ishaq's case and internal elite conflicts, it improved in 2019 by 8.21 percent. This development demonstrates the institutionalized party. Furthermore, from 2004 to 2019, PKS never recruited legislative candidates who were coming from celebrities. According to Anis Matta, his party prioritizes the internal cadres. If the party recruits the candidate outside the party, the candidate profile should be better than the internal cadre (Detik News, 2012). The upshot, PKS can be classified as the party which has the lowest case of corruption. Based on the Indonesia Corruption Watch's (ICW) data, 23 members of the House of Representatives between 2014 and 2019 were arrested by KPK due to corruption cases. While other parties have many cases, PKS has only one (Tim CNN Indonesia, 2019).

Concerning the party candidate, there were 533 candidates of 575 seats who run for the 2019 legislative election. All of them are Muslims consisting of 60 percent male and 40 percent female. In the educational background, most candidates are college graduates (48.18 percent), followed by master and doctoral graduates (33.3 percent) and secondary school graduates (18.3 percent). In the occupational background, most candidates were dominated by businessmen, followed by incumbent candidates. It can be known that internal cadres dominated the profile of PKS' legislative candidates in 2019 (www.kpu.go.id).

Price: Having a Robust Image, Triumphing in Mainly Urban Muslims

Regarding the economic cost, PKS spent the budget for the 2019 election was approximately 150 billion IDR. It is in the seventh rank among 16 other political parties (Moneysmart, 2019). Nevertheless, this study believes that the real budget is more than 150 billion IDR because many other campaign facilities are not classified as part of the campaign modal. According to KPU's data (www.kpu.go.id), Adang Darojatun (candidate at the District of Jakarta III) is the PKS' most significant financial contributor with more than 3.6 billion IDR, followed by Tifatul Sembiring (candidate at the District of North Sumatera I) in the second rank with more than 2 billion IDR. There was a PKS' candidate with the lowest campaign budget, namely Hidayatullah (candidate at the District of North Sumatera I) with roughly 30 million IDR.

In the matter of phycological cost, PKS still campaigned itself as the Islamist *da'wa* party. It can be proven that, based on KPU's data (www.kpu.go.id), PKS was winning the electoral vote in the urban Muslim grassroots. More specifically, these were three districts where PKS' vote was surpassing other parties: West Java I (Bandung City and Cimahi City), West Java VI (Bekasi City and Depok City), and West Sumatera II (Pariaman City and Padang Pariaman Regency). Most backgrounds of the candidates were businessmen. Besides winning in those three districts, this party can reach the second rank in seven of 80 districts across Indonesia. They were DKI Jakarta I, DKI Jakarta II, West Java III, West Java IV, West Java X, West Nusa Tenggara I, and Riau. Nonetheless, the legislative candidates, cadres, and sympathizers have significant contributions in supporting the party's winning.

About the image impact/cost, PKS is consistent with campaigning itself as the party fighting corruption and disseminating justice and governance issues. Afterward, the party prefers to prioritize the internal cadres as the legislative candidates rather than to support celebrities as other parties did. It also does not rely on a particular figure like what other parties conducted. Thus, PKS succeeded to reveal various alternative leaders to the public so that society has many choices. The image in public is that PKS is a reliable party with Muslim candidates.

Place/Distribution: Depending on Candidates' Creativeness

Concerning the local network, each legislative candidate of PKS communicates and interacts directly with society to disseminate the party's platform. In West Nusa Tenggara, PKS has a good performance due to the contribution of the party's legislative candidates and ulama (Redaksi DS, 2019). In Bulukumba Regency, South Sulawesi, the local legislative candidate namely Sitti Aisyah Amin promoted herself and the national legislative candidate profile, Abdul Aziz, directly to society by applying the door-to-door technique (Fajar, 2019). In the District of Central Java I, Nur Yulianto promoted himself through Islamic forums like *Majelis Ta'lim* and maximized to campaign himself via posters (Ungaran News, 2019). In Riau, there was a joint campaign between national,

provincial, and municipal legislative candidates who organized together social activities (*Bakti Sosial*) and a health seminar in Pekanbaru City (Sergap Online, 2019). These campaigns denote various techniques conducted by candidates to build more robust local networks.

In terms of canvassing, each candidate has their techniques based on their abilities and background. It can be seen in Bengkulu, where the PKS's legislative candidate, Dani Hamdani, launched "Rumah Rakyat" (House of People) as a place to train young generations as entrepreneurs and as an informal school for pupils who have financial problems. Indeed, this house can be used as the channel to deliver public aspirations (RRI, 2018).

In regard to the leader tour, some PKS' elites conducted this activity. It can be proven with the visit of the chair of Syuro Council of PKS, Salim Segal Aljufri, to Kyai Kholil, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) figure who has the Walisongo Islamic Boarding School (*pesantren*), in Situbondo, East Java (Pinter Politik, 2019). Furthermore, Salim, together with Jazuli Juwaini and the delegates, visited the president of the Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI), Habib Rizieq Shihab, in Saudi Arabia on 08 April 2019 (Redaksi WE Online, 2019). These visits, indeed, to consolidate the power of Muslim communities in dealing with the 2019 election.

Promotion: Disseminating Flashmob Actions

Concerning the pull political marketing, most political parties promoted themselves through conventional and technological means. Conventional means can be seen in posters and billboards, which are put in mainly public spaces. In the meantime, the party indeed campaigned itself through mass media like television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and social media (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, WhatsApp, YouTube, and the like). It is a must because all political parties still attract old and young generations' votes.

In the matter of event publication, PKS carried out what so-called "Flashmob", joint actions particularly in the street to promote the party platform and programs to society, and, in turn, to appeal to public interests (Tribun News, 2019). This action is conducted together by the party cadres, members, and sympathizers in various places across the country. Due to this flashmob action, PKS received a reward as the largest flashmob in Indonesia from the World-Indonesia Record Museum or MURI (PKS.id, 2019). Indeed, the Flashmob action was published widely in various PKS' social media platforms.

Among the four marketing-mix's indicators, there are two effective strategies cause the increase of the party vote, i.e., product and place. In terms of the product, PKS has a detailed platform and the candidates' peculiar characteristics. Regarding the place, the devotion of all parliament candidates, cadres, members, and sympathizers in the grassroots in fighting for the electoral winning has fundamental roles as the vote-getters in assembling the electorate. Meanwhile, two other indicators

merely tend to complement the party's campaign strategy. Price and promotion are the party's image while product and place are the party's strategy. The image without an engineering strategy is frequently failure.

Conclusion

There are two main questions in this paper. First is, to what extent does the solidity of PKS in coping with various impediments in the 2014 election? This study answers with a fourfold indicator. Among the four indicators, the solidity of PKS is seemingly institutionalized well, mainly in the procedural leadership in the decision-making process, systematic candidateship, and the commitment upon the values. Nevertheless, it has no democratic resolution in managing internal conflicts. In other words, PKS is a reliable party with the absence of well conflict resolution.

The second is, how does the PKS strategy maintain its vote stability to exceed the 2019 parliamentary threshold when it has an internal conflict? By applying four marketing-mix indicators, two effective strategies affect the increase of the PKS' vote: product and place. Concerning the product, this party has a specific party platform and the candidates' distinguishing characteristics. In the context of place, the loyalty of legislative candidates, cadres, members, and sympathizers across the districts in fighting for the electoral triumph has significant contributions as the vote-getters in mobilizing the electorate.

These denote that although an ideological party still obeys its principles, it can adjust itself with the electoral system even the system is liberal like what occurs in Indonesia, mainly since 2009 until the present under the liberal system of open-list PR. PKS is a good case as the ideological party with a series of pragmatist strategies.

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