THEORIES OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY IN THE SITUATIONS OF (NATURAL) DISASTERS

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A. INTRODUCTION

My paper discusses the concepts of social solidarity in disaster context. This is especially related to the long debated question whether disaster influences the construction of social solidarity among community members and why? Sometime, the question is followed with the other questions, like why are community different in terms of solidifying themselves in the extreme instability brought by natural disasters?, and are there the required conditions for social solidarity to function in disaster, and what are they?

Like crime, war and violence—as mentioned in Emile Durkheim and Hannah Arendt’s theories—natural disaster leaves the chaotic situations such as the broken...
social relations, the damaged infrastructure and the loss of property. For Durkheim, extreme instability forces community to make concessions one another and share responsibility, called social solidarity, to get the normal situations back. Indeed, social solidarity cannot automatically work like an on/off button as society is complex due to their sociological, anthropological, and political circumstances. There are some conditions required for social solidarity to work. Therefore, although in some disaster cases social solidarity is strengthened, things can be very different across societies.

One key word to explain this is related to power. The nature of power and power relations in society can either fasten or slower social solidarity building in society, that clearly influences the pace of post disaster recovery in each society. This is not to ignore the crucial role of the government besides society in recovery. However, in many occasions, although government is needed, the role of society is not neglected. Thus, giving attention on the nature of power in society is important.

Referring to Malinoswki, social solidarity is a matter of exchange and to share power. Unless the action is beneficial for both parties, social solidarity will not happen, except, as leftist views, it is based on coercion. Leftist scholars yet underly that in grass root social solidarity can also be a way to intersect interest to build “webs of relations” to manifest collective consciousness to challenge the existing dominant power. Leftist view, however, is not the only explanation of power in social solidarity analysis. This paper also pays attention on liberal views of social solidarity. Francis Fukuyama is amongst the liberal scholars who need to consider for asserting social solidarity as crucial in development, including in disasters.

Responding to the idea of power—leftist vs liberal, which is assumed to be by nature rationalist, it is worthy to see the very micro idea of theology that asserts social solidarity as an expression of spiritual consciousness, challenging leftist/liberal belief of rationality and modernity. Such a discussion is unavoidably needed; moreover, as this research focuses on disaster, something generally believed to occur beyond human control, despite the massive rationalisation of its definition through positive science. To deepen the discussion, this paper is equipped with gender analysis as an inherent issue in as well as potential of resolution for social problem.

B. SOME BASIC IDEAS OF DISASTER AND SOCIAL SOLIDARITY
Disaster in the Perspective of Social Science

The word “disaster” in this context refers to what commonly coined as “natural disaster”, that not attaching the word “natural” before the word “disaster” is not to disappear its meaning as naturally originating phenomenon. Referring to Enrico Quarantelli, the classification of disasters into natural and non-natural is a flaw because those caused by human-beings and technological failures already have their own definition such as war, conflict, genocide, and so forth. As this research is focused on social issue, namely disaster and social solidarity, being seen from inter-ethnic relations post the disaster recovery, definition being used is social science. Sociology and political science are amongst the disciplines that contribute significantly to the discussions. This, nonetheless, does not ignore some possibilities of touching some perspectives from other disciplines, i.e. anthropology and history.

In the early stage of disaster study, disaster is defined as negative, agent-caused event, for the desruption it entails as products of its consequence (Perry, 2007, p. 4). As seeing disaster from its destructive impact, Fritz (1961a), for instance, defines disaster as part of social problems. However, rather than being
seen as an active destructive agent, later disaster is defined from the human-centred perspective, resulting in definition that disaster is a failure of the social system to deliver reasonable conditions for life (p. 5). This is based on the assumption that should social system is well structured; disaster will not disrupt human beings. As a result, experts tend to see disaster as a problem solving exercise (Jigyasu, in Perry, 2005, p. 49), resulting in what Cuny (1983) classifies as traditional and modern approach. Traditional approach focuses the reconstruction of the destroyed buildings and facilities to normalize the live-beings. Meanwhile, the more progressive one asserts many alternatives for crisis counters such as diversifications of the staple food and agriculture, including the introduction of insurance.

Although important, such an approach assumes too much that society dealing with disaster is homogenous and linear, and problems in the situations of natural disaster are simple—reconstruction. In fact, disaster involves complex issue that the way of the society to respond to disaster varies. Referring to Perry (2007, p. 3), disaster can mean many things for different people, and the definition will describe many different purposes. Jigyasu’s argument (in Ronald Perry and Enrico Quarantelli, 2005) that tries to clarify disaster as a construct (p. 49), that its understanding is a matter of contestation—also coalition, is important. As a construct, disaster is not only defined by its spatial and temporal reality, but is more deeply related to the consciousness of the self (p. 59). Perceiving disaster as a construct will give us even deeper meaning than its visual (p. 51), reflected not only from the way people see the cause of disaster, but also the way they respond to it.

Although important, Jigyasu’s point is not enough. His classification of disaster as spiritually and scientifically originated construct referring to the division of society into traditional and modern one (pp. 57-8), as Cuny’s views (1983), is problematic. Jigyasu’s identification of “spiritual” construct with the so called “traditional” society is difficult to accept especially by those of anthropologists and theologians. “Spiritual” construct referring to the notion of human being as an object of disasters in which disaster is perceived as an act of the “God”, and human’s dignity is part of the God’s authority, for anthropologists and theologians is never meant to be old-fashioned, left-behind, and more importantly traditional. Conversely, “scientific” construct, which for Jigyasu places human as a subject, and sees that it is human own responsibility to save their lives and recover from the disruptive effects of the disaster, does not always mean better and resolving beings. Although crucial, “scientific” perspective is not adequate to understand complex social mechanisms of post disaster recovery in society. There is a need to avoid seeing society in disasters as simply “black” and “white”. They need to be understood through their respective natures with specific backgrounds and history in order to understand more deeply how they—social mechanisms—function in society.

Dealing with this, Saba Mahmood (2005, p. 67), strengthening Talal Asad (1983, p. 61) reminds us that society has its own typology, uniqueness, and definition towards their self, including in this case in defining and responding to disasters, which is not comparable one another. For Mahmood, particular categories addressed to society applied commonly in social science in seeing society including for instance, leftist and liberalist perspectives, need to be used very carefully. Indeed, Mahmood does not ignore the importance of these views as they help us identify the social structure and its influence on socio-political behaviours. However, Mahmood points out that this is not enough. For Mahmood, seeing society from merely leftist or liberal view might only partly be helpful, as it might not fully capture the complexities in society (p. 24). This is confirmed what Farsijana Adeney-
Risakotta (2005, p. 60-2) argues that ignoring the complexities of society through applying a one-size-fits-all perspective, including in religious and social issues, can cause a misinterpretation. So, let society say what they wanted to say.

Secondly, separating “spiritual” and “scientific” could be a misleading as it seemingly gives us impression that the “spiritual” strictly contradicts traditional society from that of “scientific” modern society. Meanwhile, there is no society that fully qualifies the features of traditional or modern society. There must be combination and mixture. Even in what is called indigenous, what is called modern way of thinking can be easily found. JW School’s finding (1997, pp. 283-447) of ethnic Muyu in Papua is an example. A fact that Muyu, usually called as indigenous, has strategy to deal with political penetration of the colonial government and foreign missionaries through very smart way, namely apoliticism, if I may term, referring to non-aggressive rejection as well as non-passive acceptance, shows us that society is never simple. Similarly, Weber’s idea of capitalism as having root in Protestantism reveals the fact that there is rationalization behind the thing that is seen irrational, namely religion, challenging Weber’s own theory of ‘rational’ and ‘traditional’—with the additional of charismatic—typology of leadership and solidarity (1958).

Thirdly, “spiritual” classification that is being contrasted with “scientific” one gives us an impression that the spiritual is not scientific. Meanwhile, it is clear that the “spiritual” can be “scientific”, and conversely, the “scientific” can be “spiritual”. Again, Mahmood’s finding of Egyptian women movement in the mosque, in which women at the same time are seen to confirm the critique of liberalist view of being the object of patriarchal religious rules for sharing patriarchal ideas of life through qur’anic and hadist studies, as well as to negate it for occupying the mosque that is usually perceived as male area, is important to bear in mind. As such, not only does Mahmood address the paradox of liberal view, more importantly this highlights spiritual consciousness referring to the politics of apoliticism of religiosity clarifying the sense that spirituality is the rationality itself. Mahmood has blurred the strict separation of what is called “spiritual” and “scientific” and highlights that the separation is somehow useless. This applies as well in seeing disasters that merely counting it as spiritual or scientific will not be helpful. Otherwise, we need to free up society to find their own definition of disasters based on their own experience.

Strengthening this, it might be important to consider Quarantelli’s argument (1988, p. 5) in which disaster needs to be seen as one of the causes of social change, as it accommodates various approaches to define disasters. The sense of social change enables the use of various perspectives to see disasters, although, as Quarantelli asserts, this is initially a term from sociology. Developing such a definition, Quarantelli has made it clear that disaster is not a matter of physical disruption, as it is more often about human response. It is a reflection of weaknesses, as well as strengths, in social structure or social system. As such, Quarantelli enables the discussion of both leftist and liberal in seeing disasters, including of religious scholarship, which has close relations with anthropology.

What Quarantelli (2005a, p. 345) asserts that vulnerability is socially constructed situations due to the weaknesses of social relationships in social system, therefore needs to be equally underlined with theological idea that human beings is part of nature, and their response towards nature is part of spiritual expressions of social change. In this sense, not only is it confirmed that nature is

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5 Difference between religious scholarship and anthropology is recognized, in which anthropology is more focused on human religious phenomena, while religious studies refers to spiritual beings of human in social life, which is historically bounded (see Asad, in Syamsul Maarif, 2012, p. 2).
something beyond human control, but it is part of things that energizing human to act—conducting social change, besides the idea of social system as leftist and liberalist promote, referring to human way of engineering the social situations to tackle both the controllable and uncontrollable occurrence.

Some Fundamental Ideas and Debates of Social Solidarity

By definition, social solidarity is described as an attachment between individuals in society, becoming a source of consensual morality, and a way of society to pursue social order (Edward Tiryakiyan, in Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith 2005, p. 307). This is inspired by Emile Durkheim who has strong belief in society; that society will function itself to give advantage for its members (1995 and 1984). Durkheim’s theory of social solidarity is basically of a response to Herbert Spencer, Sumner Maine and Ferdinand Tönnies, who say that as people get more individualistic, solidarity will not exist in modern society (Durkheim, 1984, p. xiv, Tiryakiyan, in Alexander and Smith, 2005, p. 306).

For Durkheim, putting too much emphasis on individualism and claiming society’s decay due to modernism is a flaw; as society will always need social order in spite of the complex circumstances of the modern life they have to face (1984, p. xv-xvi). People are by nature bound together, by the feeling of obligation (2010, p. 35), so that no individual is entirely independent. “The whole from the part, or the complex from the simple” (p. 15), argues Durkheim, means that society will always represent itself inside individual, making the sense of “society makes them more manifest but has no monopoly on them” (p. 17) convincing. There will be collective norms that bind individuals in social life but there will still be spaces for them to produce their own creative actions.

Of social science scholars inspired by Durkheim is Max Weber, and in Indonesian context are Sartono Kartodirdjo and Freek Colombijn. Max Weber is in line with Durkheim in terms of seeing the compatibility of individuality and sociability to build mutual enforcement called civic solidarity (Sung Ho Kim, 2004, p. 69). Learning from the case of French Revolution, Durkheim underlies that society was bound by civic moral to participate in civic engagement to foster political revolution as a response the despotic government (Durkheim, 1992, p. xii). This leads Durkheim to be renowned as the owner of ethico-political vision (Dominick LaCapra, 2001, p. x), enriches the existing social solidarity Durkheim has theorized. Weber relates civic solidarity with authority, which for him not merely represents a custom or self interest but a representation of social obligation. The aspect of obligation, according to Andreas Kalyvas, clearly represents the “will to power” that is inherent in social system (Kalyvas, 2008, p. 32).

Confirming Durkheim’s dichotomy of simple and modern society, Weber differentiates authority into simple and modern one. This consists of traditional, charismatic and legal authority (1964, pp. 328-33). Legal authority refers to impersonal official obligations, hierarchy of office, competence, and contractual relationship (1964, pp. 333-338). Traditional authority is based on traditionally transmitted rules, involves personal loyalty, and applies patrimonial recruitment, through a definite rule of inheritance, is identical with strong kinship, and bases leader and community relationship on paternalism (1964, pp. 338-358). Charismatic authority refers to, “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he

6 Capitalistic enterprise is an instance of this, revealing the functioning rational organisation of formally free labour. This implies a disciplined labour force and the regularised investment of capital, although is seen as inseparable from what Weber calls as theological “calling” (1930, p. xi and 143).

POLITIKA, Vol. 6, No.1, April 2015
is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or realities” (1964, pp. 358-359), to believed as divine origin or exemplary (p. 359), such as in prophet or hero.

Sartono Kartodirdjo (1961) is seen to be very influenced by Durkheim and Weber at the same time, for deeply believing in strong relation of leadership and its function to tie society, such as in social movement. Recalling Foucault’s theory of power and knowledge (1980), in Kartodirdjo’s study, kyai has been mentioned as being very influential in society for holding traditional authority because of his religious knowledge, letting them to hold strategic position in society, to be both madjikan (borguesse) and imam (religious scholar). Similarly, the concept of bridging as Freek Colombijn (2006) underlies in his study of Padang, identifying the connecting link between indigenous and new comer inhabitants is another instance of how Durkheim is influential in social analysis. The idea of bridging itself refers to an action to mediate two different groups in collective activity in order to lessen potential of conflict and moderate social tension (Deepa Narrayan, 1999, p. 1). In disaster, bridging is used to organise mutual cooperation to tackle the disaster impacts (Chamlee-Wright, 2006 and Tricia Wachtendorf and James Kendra, 2004).

Although helpful, Durkheim’s ideas of social solidarity are seen to remain containing some weaknesses. Marxism is of the theories that poses objection on the existing ideas of social solidarity for seeing society as too good, rather than as being full of contradictions in terms of power, access, and resource ownerships. Durkheim’s theory that divides social solidarity into mechanic and organic solidarity, for instance, referring to different patterns of social mechanism of cooperation, is subjected to be a point of criticism. By definition, mechanic solidarity binds directly individual to society (1984, p. 61), where the communions of mind share the same beliefs (p. 63), values, and norms (p. xv). Therefore, mechanic solidarity is built upon likeness, rigid controls, and uniform (p. xvi). It is usually found in ‘simpler’ society. In this regards, Durkheim sees that religion is an effective institution to create social solidarity (Turner, 1998, p. 87), leading to the irrationality of communal sentiment, so that solidarity is nothing but to please God (1993, p. 175). Organic solidarity on the other hand is built upon complementarities between actors in a more complex society engaged in different pursuits and in highly functional specialisation, in order to achieve higher efficiency. Organic solidarity is usually found in ‘modern’ society. If in mechanic solidarity ritual plays crucial role as media for manifesting social solidarity, in organic solidarity contract is important media for sharing collective understanding and social exchange (1984, p. xvi).

Although Durkheim’s argument of mechanic solidarity is interesting for highlighting the sense that religion is not merely a sacred matter, but rather has strong relations with the profane, for some scholars it sounds simplistic. For Mark Juergensmeyer (2000), for instance, religion does not only have energy to solidify people and create unity, as what Durkheim calls in his theory as social solidarity. What Juergensmeyer calls as ‘cosmic war’ (2000, p. 146) referring to the war against the others in the name of God, as occurred in terrorism, fundamentalism, and religious radicalism, tells us that religion could also disintegrate society, besides integrating them. Religion could be a signifier of borders, not only between different religious believers, as Moslem and Christians, but also between the smaller sects within religion, as between Syiah, Sunny, and Ahmadi in Islam.

Indeed, it is acknowledged that Durkheim is not interested in viewing religion as a set of belief—from the philosophical perspective. He is rather interested at seeing the social functions of religions; how religion could make social mechanism
work. However, Juergensmeyer’s idea of ‘cosmic war’ reminds us that social functions of religion do not only have a good face. They could have an evil face. By ‘cosmic war’ Juergensmeyer meant is referred to state of beings in which the ‘calling’ to war against the others is understood as of the ‘calling’ from God (pp. 146-7). Thus, Juergensmeyer warns us that religion is not only to solidify society; it could dissolidify society. Even, argues Juergensmeyer, religion could be of solidifying (one society) to dissolidifying (another) for none of the reasons except God.

Another important criticism is of Farsijana Adeney-Risakotta’s (2005), which tries to question Durkheim’s perception of ritual, which for him is identical with the practice of ‘simple’ society. Durkheim mentions that ritual is a religious element that binds people together and becomes the media of social solidarity. For Adeney-Risakotta, Durkheim is too simplistic in seeing ritual. Ritual, as Adeney-Risakotta argues, needs to be seen as not only about religious practices, and thus is not right to be said as identical with the ‘simple’ society. Ritual is a matter of negotiation, in which people agree another one to conduct collective activity, on the basis of exchange, of which the forms develop continuously, based on the development of social, cultural and political contexts. The most important aspect of ritual, as Adeney-Risakotta underlies is that it involves some aspects of symbols and symbolic actions, to either unite or distinguish people, in order to express power differences. What Adeney-Risakotta tries to assert is that ritual is not exclusive to traditional community (2005, p. 57)—see Durkheim’s mechanic solidarity, thus using ritual to categorise society into developed and less developed ones is questionable. Adeney-Risakotta never agrees with this as each society has its own backgrounds and history. Although Adeney-Risakotta confirms that ritual has strong relations with social solidarity, she never agrees with Durkheim’s categorization of modern and traditional society. For her, this sounds deterministic, and of course, Western biased. Adeney-Risakotta keeps criticizing the use of ‘simple’ and ‘modern’ terms in categorizing society as it is prone to generalization.

In relation to organic solidarity, similarly, there are some questions that need to take into account. First, Durkheim sounds too naïve for ignoring the fact that responsibility distribution through what Durkheim calls as integrated ‘organs’ in the idea of organic solidarity is not taken for granted. This leaves questions related to who determines the kind of ‘organ’ an individual would and might be and how it is determined unanswered. Durkheim’s assertion that society will find its way to solidify their selves when they have to deal with some complexities in their life for some people sounds too partial. In fact, it goes through a complex social structure and processes that consciously or unconsciously induces the creation of social classification into into higher and lower class, as Marx (1995) argues.

For those who are suspicious of power, as Marx and other leftist scholars, discussing job distribution without sufficiently touching the issue of power and power disparities is kind of non-sense. This is not to agreeing with Marx’s question of mores or anything else in the idea of organic solidarity, such as those of relating to low wage of the labour in industrialized society, etc. This rather confirms Marx’s argument that the division and distribution of members of society into ‘organs’ in what Durkheim calls ‘organism’, as an analogy of society, is never happened voluntarily or based on full and equal agreement. This implies social structure that segregates society based on ‘materialistic value’ they contribute to ‘organism’. The social construction of what is good, what is high, what is valued more, what is important, and the like, influences much the way people see themselves and the others in the social webs called social solidarity. There is social structure that needs
attention as it could force particular people to receive fewer privileges than the others, which is never easy to deconstruct through what Marx calls as ‘class struggle’.

**Social Solidarity in the Situations of Natural Disasters**

Although Durkheim’s idea of social solidarity is full of critiques, in many occasions it is seen as helpful, especially with regarding the discussions of social solidarity in the situations of natural disasters. Durkheim is seen to provide a foundation of discussions of social solidarity in disasters. This is applicable in Durkheim’s view of social solidarity in chaotic situation as disasters, as he points out in his theory of extreme instability. For him, extreme instability, such as in crime, violence, and disasters, can encourage people to cooperate one another to normalise the situations (1984, p. 76). Upheavals can trigger society to strive for the balanced situations back (p. 170), encouraging them to share responsibility, called social solidarity (p. 77). Durkheim believes that society will find its social glue to engage one and another (1995, p. 10, and 1984, p. 49).

Confirming Durkheim, Lynn Letukas, Anna Olofsson, and John Barnshaw’s research (2009) on media reporting in the United States and Sweden assert that during the situations of natural disaster social solidarity got strengthened in areas where people were not affected in order to assist those who are affected (p. 14). In regards, they see the important role of media in building public sympathy as a basis of social solidarity. Similarly, Emily Chamlee-Wright (2006) and Christopher Cooper and Robert Block (2006, p. 249) who study New Orleans underly that collectively shared feeling of sadness for the destroying impacts of disaster encourages people to participate in mutual actions to tackle the hard situations during disaster recovery. Agreeing with Russell Dynes (2002) and Jon Ingleton (1999, p. 131 and 269), Chamlee-Wright sees that society’s self help restores social capital to mutually cooperate in tackling the needs for safety and health facilities that are not provided by formal public institution like the government, coined as social solidarity. Being inspired by the community collective action in Hurricane Katrina 2005, those scholars see the positive outcomes of mobilisation of private citizen resources in solving the problem strategically amidst the slow response of the government (p. 3).

Strengthening this, Wolf Dombrowsky asserts that disasters provide a trigger for social actions which might not present under the non-disaster condition, and in regards, social solidarity provides a basis of action (1983, p. 193). For Dombrowsky, social solidarity would have deeper meaning when community faces collective adversaries that he suggests to see social solidarity as, “the behaviour patterns which give people the feeling of unity, assistance, and cohesion in difficult circumstances”. Criticising Durkheim’s organic solidarity, Dombrowsky assert that social solidarity is not merely a socio-economic division, but more importantly social actions, including those practiced in modernised living beings (p. 193-4).

Although those arguments sound obvious, some criticisms remain worth considering. Mahdi (2007) mentions that unlike many other disaster-hit areas, Aceh is among those suffering from weak mutual actions post the 2004 tsunami. Aceh context is rather complex, argues Mahdi, not only not being used with gotong royong (mutual actions), as Javanese, the “cash-for-work” methods donors introduced is seen to decrease Acehnese’s interest to participate in voluntary actions (2007, p. 24). Aceh also has different political background compared to Java due to Aceh Liberation Movement (GAM), segregating Aceh into penduduk asli (indigenous inhabitants) and new comers (transmigrants). When tsunami hit in 2004, people face
difficulty to consolidate themselves, that inter-ethnic/group cooperation was rare. In addition to this, Mayumi Sakamoto and Katsuya Yamori (2009) assert that Acehnese are relatively slower in terms of life recovery compared to other regions, such as Yogyakarta and Central Java, for the weak grass root mechanism of social actions. Three years after the 2004 tsunami, Acehnese said that they recovered only 40-50 percent, while Javanese felt to almost totally recover after the 2006 earthquake (p. 14). Politically fragmented society and the weakening of social networks—such as arisan (socially managed saving), gotong royong, and ronda (collective security maintenance)—led to a rare mutual social cooperation in disaster relief (p. 18).

Mahdi and Sakamoto and Yamori make it clear that although important, social solidarity in disasters is not an automatic mechanism. It requires some conditions to function. This can include politics, economy, and social, manifested in the forms of neighbourhood system, local trading, women activities—arisan and pengajian (socially managed saving and collective religious study), and local humanitarian organisations. Wening Udasmoro and Joachim Tridiatno (2012), however, remind us that although sounds good, understanding social solidarity in the situations of natural disasters needs to be connected with the way people perceive disasters. Their research finding in Merapi eruption in 2010 mentions that the way an individual sees disasters—whether being related to positive science or religious belief— influences much the way s/he see one another and the way they attach themselves in collective actions. As such, there is a need to see social relations prior and during disaster, which will tell us much about religious, political and social climate in disaster-hit areas, and how they change or sustain post the disaster events.

In addition to this, paying attention of leftist and liberalist view of social solidarity in disasters is important, as it will gives a rough map of how this issue is seen in academic discussions. This will be elaborated later, after we discuss the issue of social exchange which gives us a sense that social solidarity is about negotiation and power sharing.

“THERE IS NO FREE LUNCH” PRINCIPLE: ASSERTING THE IDEA OF EXCHANGE IN SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

One way to help us understand the dynamics of social solidarity, especially relating to the issue of power, is to understand social solidarity as one of the forms of social exchange. Malinowski (1922, in Linda Molm, 1997, p. 11) asserts that many forms of social interaction outside the economic marketplace can be conceptualised as an exchange of benefits. As the meaning of social solidarity clearly refers to interdependence and reciprocity (Ken Reshaur, 1992, p. 723), the sense of social exchange in social solidarity is undeniable. Looking at how power distributed is important to see why particular solidarity is built in particular way while the others are in different ways. As Molm (in Richard Emerson, 1972b, p. 31) argues power distribution in social exchange can be a measure of cohesion of relation.

One key word to find a connection between social solidarity and social exchange, referring to Malinowski, is power sharing. Departing from rational choice theory, the idea of social exchange criticises the existing theories of social solidarity for focusing too much on superficial social behaviours but leaving the aspect of exchange that motivates individuals to participate in solidarity activities. Social exchange makes it clear that social solidarity is inseparable from mutual interactions. The very idea of social exchange emphasizes the “give-and-take” principle that people will consider equilibrium in making a decision in joining with particular social
activities and relations. “There is no free lunch” principle clarifies us that even in seemingly voluntary activity such as in social solidarity, people are not free from personal motivations. Milan Zafirovski asserts that more often economic motive constitutes the exchange (1958, p. 14 and 27) although does not always appears apparent like in trading in traditional market or barter in a smaller environment.

In Zavirovski’s view, what differentiates mechanic and organic solidarity as Durkheim argues is that the motive of exchange in mechanic solidarity includes mainly religion and other non-economic factors. As such, Zavirovski confirms Durkheim’s idea of religion that, “religion is eminently a social thing” (1995, p. 10), and, “religion is something essentially social” (1984, p. 49). Meanwhile, in organic solidarity the notion of economy as motives of exchange is clear, coined as rational economic action (p. 62). Dealing with this, Malinowski and Zavirovski’s argument of motives of exchange clarifies the sense that social solidarity will only happen with mutual power sharing. Molm (1997, p. 11) argues that as most of individual need and value in life can only be obtained from others, people depend one another. The higher the absolute dependence of two actors, the more likely the relation is to form and survive, even in the midst of conflict.

Social exchange happens to fulfil human needs, involving aspects of actors (the parties involve), resources (related to utility), structure (mutual dependence), and process (equal benefit) (p. 12). Structural condition of exchange that creates mutual dependence provides the basis for power in social solidarity (p. 29). However, as one’s power is dependence one another, power in social exchange is non zero sum (p. 30). This means that an increase in one’s power does not decrease the power of another. In this ground, the basis of social solidarity is built. Molm, however, notifies that in practice power is not always evenly distributed, creating center and periphery structure with the dependence mode of relations. In this regards, paying attention on leftist views on power and social solidarity, as Marx, Gramsci and Arend’s, is important, especially those of dealing with elite and masses relationships. Yet, paying attention on liberal view of social solidarity is equally important as it equally asserts the idea of social exchange in solidarity but with stronger assertion of individual autonomy.

THE QUESTIONS OF POWER DISTRIBUTION: MARXIAN, GRAMSCIAN, AND ARENDTIAN PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY IN DISASTERS

One of the crucial perspectives in understanding social solidarity in the situations of natural disasters is of leftist. This perspective asserts that social solidarity is susceptible for elite manipulation for power is not distributed evenly. However, this also sees that social solidarity could be of importance as it engages people in the grass root to build social consciousness and class articulation. Social solidarity, therefore, is foundation to build social movement, called revolution in Marx and Gramsci’s term, and rebellion, in Arend’s.

Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, and Hannah Arendt’s Main Ideas

Karl Marx discusses deeply social relations in economy, which he sees as full of injustice. He emphasizes strongly mode of production dominated by the owners of capital—bourgeois—which accumulate their commodities through the uses of capital—land, machineries, waged labour, materials—in production processes (Marx, 1995, p. 47-8). However, referring to Robert Holton (in Bryan Turner, 1996, pp. 17-31) Marx’s theories have provided crucial insights of social analysis which can be a useful foundation for understanding social phenomenon. Marx’s theory about
economic structure of society and social class shows us the idea of social stratification and inequality that is often found in society. Marx himself argues that mode of production corresponds with social relations, in which the economic structure of society is the real basis of the juridicial and political suprastructure (1995 [1887], p. 48). As such, Marx underlies that economy determines the characteristics of social, political and intellectual life, where relations between humans are shaped.

Living in such a world with massive discrepancies between the rich and the poor, Marx’s thinking helps us to trace the root of problem, namely uneven distribution of economic resource, which corresponds with uneven distribution of power. His concepts of structure and agency are clearly useful for us for identifying how inequality happens; that is simply because particular people who act as agents dominate or have legitimation to carry out the structure. By being an agent, such the people drive the others for the sake of their own interests. Marx’s theory triggers us to think through what do not really function in society that inequality exists rampantly, leading us to see Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s writing (1996, pp. 53-67) who provides foundation for looking social problem, such as inequality, through institutionalism. Injustice and inequality, as Marx argues, for Berger and Luckmann, therefore, is as part of the troubling institutions, manifested through unequal social relations or an unfair economic interaction.

Recalling Berger and Luckmann (1996), institution is described as habitualised social order, in which people repeat pattern of and typicalised social performance, to define something that is socially acceptable. However, it is not always clear whether institution relates to value and value judgement, as unclear as if it deals with morality, and, somehow, power. Nonetheless, as Durkheim argues (in Berger and Luckmann, 1996), morality is sort of social product, and it is in this respect morality has a cross-cutting point with institution. Standard of morality, as Durkheim (in Berger and Luckmann, 1996, p. 74) argues, whether is perceived ascriptively as law, tradition and social conformity (and called mechanic solidarity) or perceived by its ends-or essence (and called organic solidarity), as institution, is changable over time and thus becomes dynamics.

By understanding institution, it would be much sensible for us to understand that society does not merely consist of people as part of nature, but also as social and cultural creature (pp. 48-9). People interact and communicate (as George Mead described, in Berger and Luckmann, 1996, p. 218) as well as construct mutual reciprocity (as George Simmel’s thought, in Berger and Luckmann, p. 43) in the so called institutionalised social life. In order to understand the dynamics of institution more deeply, De Tocqueville’s idea (in Holton, 1996, pp. 36-9) is helpful for illuminating the sense of human as political creature, as it lets us embrace the sense of interest within institutions, that intersect with power, ideology and legitimation.

De Tocqueville’s assertion of active voluntarism and social association to achieve an end called civic culture, although interesting, for Marx, however, is being questioned. It is seen as susceptible for elite capture, which later benefits borgeouis class. Active voluntarism, for Marx, will only be meaningful if it is directed for class struggle through worker organisation, such as labour party (Alex Callinicos, 1995, p. 1452) to carry out revolution to end the class system, which dyhotomizes human beings into the rich and the poor (p. 141). Mode of production that enriches one party but impoverish the others (Marx, 1999 [1885], p. 418) through the exploitation of human beings as labour—in production process (Marx, 2000 [1885], p. 27), needs for reformation. In this sense, what is called labour solidarity, united for the shared
awareness of unjust economic and political structure, is highlighted, to end private ownership of society's resources (James Devine, 1989, p. 294).

Strengthening Marx, Antonio Gramsci asserts that economic structure creates elite hegemony, leading to power disparities, conducted through non-coercive means for maintaining bourgeois’s dominance in capitalist societies (Joseph Francese, 2009, p. 1). Referring to Cox, Francese (p. 113-5) argues that hegemony is a form of domination, in which hegemoniser creates circumstances in as much as that the hegemonised do not realise of being dominated. Power disparities in hegemonic social relations are unconsciously unidentified, so that it seems to be politics as usual, and coined as perceived ‘reality’. Hegemony, therefore, is about consciousness, and it is a kind of thing that stops consciousness to work. Self-consciousness refers to criticism towards imbalanced social and political relations due to power disparities in unjust structure (Gramsci, 1992, p. 234). Hegemony represents the ceasing of self-consciousness to work in individual entity to preserve elite’s status quo. Citing Gramsci (1975, p.134), Morton (2007, p. 61) asserts that social consciousness is important to end hegemony as it reveals class feeling and mentality, that constitutes class struggle, building solidarity of interests unravelling shared feeling of being oppressed, that it can be a machine for revolution.

In a similar vein, Hannah Arendt asserts that the world system divides people into the ruling and the ruled class. Arendt’s idea of violence and totalitarianism portrays the complexities of the political relations between the ruling and the ruled class. For Arendt, violence is a way of the ruling class to reign the people through coercion (1969, p. 35). Agreeing Marx, violence is the state’s instrument of oppression in the hand of the ruling class (p. 36), to gain legitimacy of power, with no consensus, nor power distribution (p. 38). Rooting her idea from the global politics, in which the world political climate is full of violence from one period to another, such as from the World War to the Cold War—to war against terrorism in recent times, Arendt argues that violence is inherent in human life (1969, p. 9). The truly political being is that of violence rather than peace, reflecting the unstoppable power contestation, between those who both feel lacking of power.

Grounded in Nazi era with the politics of anti-semitism, Arendt personally experienced that violence is present in everyday life, and concludes that it has nothing to do with power. Unlike many other scholars who see violence as being committed because of too strong power, for Arendt, those who are powerful do not need violence. Arendt cynically sees that violence is needed for those who are powerless to gain power. Although seeing power and violence as different issues, Arendt recognises that power and violence usually appears together (p. 52) in the forms of the guise of authority, demanding instant, unquesting recognition (p. 46), neglecting deliberation, and resulting in totalitarianism, consisting of absolute power, indoctrination, and terrors (1973, p. 409). In regards, social consciousness is crucial to constitute social movement to end totalitarianism. Although a bit doubted of whether totalitarianism will end (Arendt, 2005, p. 1-24), Arend sees that people’s ability to organise their selves to challenge absolute ruler to articulate the collective interests of anti-status quo in the forms of class solidarity is crucial.

**Marxian, Gramscian and Arendtian Views of Social Solidarity: Elite Manipulation vs Consciousness-based Revolution**

For believing that social solidarity is about social exchange, and exchange is about power, while power is usually not distributed evenly, Marx, Gramsci, and Arendt strongly criticise the idea of social solidarity. For them, should social solidarity
requires the conditions that enable social exchange, based on rational choice, whose rationale is it that is used? What is counted as rationale? How is it measured? Who determines exchange? This clarifies Warren Goldstein’s Marxian argument (2006) that rationale is not one-dimensional (p. 1)—as the market logic of buying and selling asserts—as it reflects pluralities of logical expressions of class, ethnic and cultural conflicts (p. 3). In Marx’s perspective, social solidarity therefore may contain injustice (Simon Clarke, 1993), or as Amartya Sen (in Jon Elster and Aanun Hylland, 1989, p. 213) argues entailing the issue of exploitation.

Contractual relation in organic solidarity, for instance, referring to Clarke (1991, p. 8) is prone to power abuse through the down-paying of the workers, using pressure mechanism, either consciously or unconsciously identified by the workers. Organic solidarity for Marxist clearly reveals the gap, imbalance, and disparity of power between the employer and the employed, creating the structure of superordinates and subordinates (Karl Löwith, 1993, p. 38). Indeed, power disparities are not exclusive to industrialised society. Through what Marx calls as feudalism, Marx argues that mechanic solidarity is no more than the use of symbols to drive the community to agree with the leaders in the name of religion or tradition. In short, Marx and other leftist scholars consent with the issue of power in social solidarity.

Strengthening Marx, Gramsci’s theory of domination and hegemony highlights the cooptation of the powerful over the weak. The difference between domination and hegemony is that in domination the the weak is conscious towards the gap of power between themselves and elite. In hegemony the cooptation happens as something seemingly to be normally perceived with no problematisation or criticism (Hagai Katz, 2006, p. 335). Hegemony therefore refers to manipulative solidarity to gain one party’s benefit over the others. As hegemony underlines soft cooptation, Katz (p. 334) argues that hegemonic solidarity does not regard the adverse social effects nor pay attention on the realities of human suffering. Resource is distributed only for new network of elite that generates more group advantages. It tries to wield power and wealth on the expense of the others through the agreement structured in as much that the third party is unable to avoid. Development program is an example Katz mentions to place civil society in difficult position: to be for the poor, and being poor, or to be for capitalist, but being wealthier.

As in Gramsci’s view civil society’s power is weak, it becomes easier for the capitalist to drive them to be part of the capitalist in grass root level. Gramsci is apathetic of civil society and sees it as no more than locomotive of the capitalist power to extend its hegemony in society (1971). Gramsci never believes in civil society as much he does not believe in the very notion of social solidarity. Although later Gramsci changes his view on civil society as an autonomous institution—from the state, rather than the dependent one, his emphasis on the need to keep an eye on civil society in terms of how they organise themselves and respond to social issue addresses his worrying expectation of hegemony (Anne Sassoon, 2000, p. 70). This is in line with Marx who sees civil society as no less than a representative of the state laying in the sub-structure but using a mask of people to dominate politics (David Ost, 1990, p. 22). Contrary to Durkheim and Weber who see civil society and social solidarity as strongly interlinked, both Marx and Gramsci do not see the clear advantage of social solidarity, moreover to form such kind of civil society (Katz, 2006, p. 335). For both scholars, it will only generate hierarchy and power disparities in society, unless it is able to mobilise the people’s conscience and create revolution.
and transformation (Ost, 1990, p. 26 and 336). In fact, in many cases, what is called civil society is no more than the state’s or corporation’s puppet.

Nevertheless, Marxian and Gramscian view do not neglects that social solidarity is important for the grass root to conduct social movement. Although it is not rare that social solidarity is manipulated by elite to mobilise masses’ support, grass root with the same interest of ending elite’s domination and of generating classless society needs social solidarity for consolidation. As Katherine Adams (2002, p. 9) argues, Marxism sees grass root’s interest as productive source of change for becoming the basis of political alliances and activism. Therefore, in Marxism social solidarity is very political. For Marxism, social solidarity provides a basis of revolution as it collects people with the same interest, namely ending labour exploitation (Callinicos, 1995). In addition, Gramscian view believes that social solidarity can be a means for raising social consciousness, such us peasant solidarity or proletariat solidarity, to cut off the hegemonic relations in economy and hegemonic power in politics (Walter Adamson, 1980, p. 30).

Another crucial theory to discuss is of Hannah Arendt on violence and totalitarianism. Being a bit different from Marx and Gramsci, Arendt asserts that the violent situation referring to unsolidified state of being is inherent in human being. Social solidarity as Durkheim argues, for Arendt is just nothing, because what is seemingly peaceful is never meant peace, and in peaceful being violence is not absent (1969, p. 51). Arendt underlines coercion as a means to force people to obey the repressive power of the ruling parties unquestioningly (1994, p. 305). Arendt clearly points out the state as a crucial agent of the coercing social solidarity.

For Arendt, peace which means victory, is actually a situation in which the others are coquered, and that the potential for retaliation is always there. The poor will always think of how to sit-in the rich’s prosperity, the lower class will unstoppably look for strategy to mobilise into the higher one, the opposition will always intimidate the status quo, and women will always struggle for replacing men in the patriarchy system. Indeed, for Arendt, things are never that easy. Higher class will always try to reproduce its highness, and the lower class will remain in their stance despite of their efforts devoted to against the social system, through what she calls as violence, confirming what Marx and Gramsci assert about domination and hegemony. Peace therefore is only a temporal pause of violence.

Yet, Arendt does not look at violence as a way to strengthen power as Marx and Gramsci underline. She rather sees violence as a means to access to power for the powerless in elite circle. For Arendt, hose who held formal authority can feel powerless that to complete their power they use violence as an instrument. This is contrary with Marx and Gramsci, who see violence as occurring because those of the powerful parties are willing to extend their power. They commit violence because they are powerful, not the other way around. It is in this sense Arendt’s argument is important, because she reminds us of an always-on-alert, namely sense of power.

In her theory of totalitarianism, Arendt reminds us of the issue of racism, in which for her it is coined as an ideology rather than simply an issue of resource competition—as political economy perspective asserts. As such, Arendt criticises Marx who outweigh political economy over primordial ideology. Racism, as Arendt underlines, starts from the race-based thinking, and could lead to totalitarianism if

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7 Marxists are seen as “anarchist” for being not able to negotiate with the ruling class—as in French Revolution 1876-9. Yet, it is seen important to fasten revolution (Chistopher Ansell, 2004, pp. 84-6)
the masses could be mobilised for the sake of their racial identity, rather than consciousness of common interest and class articulates (1973, p. 311).

In simple words, racism for Arendt is simply for the sake of racism, departing from race-based hatred, rather than the masking of economic resource competition in the name of race-primordialism. In the case of anti-Chinese, for instance, masses who participate in violence against the Chinese simply are motivated because they are simply Chinese, rather than the high privileged exclusive class. Otherwise, the targets of violence will not only Chinese, because other race/ethnic, such as European, also enjoys the same privileges. Nevertheless, prejudice and hatred, or what Arendt coins as political propaganda (p. 312), often play crucial role in mobilising masses, because masses have to be convinced towards their racial ideology.

With regards this, Arendt clearly reminds us to be aware of the thick type of social solidarity—equivalent with what Coleman asserts as the thick social capital—as part of the dark side of social capital besides the thin one (in Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt, 2000, p. 532), referring to the blind social ties, manifested such as through racism, as what she theorizes. In-group solidarity is being ideologised to collect total loyalty of the members. Thick solidity refers to the situation in which people in group are bound too strongly one and another, leading to chauvinism. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Arendt does not see the importance of social solidarity. For Arendt, social solidarity is important for the oppressed to share common interest of anti status quo. Referring to Reshaur (1992) and Adams (2002), Arendt’s view of social solidarity is not about inter-party negotiation, but is rather of internal consolidation for rebellion, which again confirms Arendt’s view of violence.

Reshaur identifies that Arendt classifies social solidarity into four types: exclusive, inclusive, universal, and natural (1992, p. 723). Exclusive solidarity is happened among the oppressed with shared feeling and experience of being alienated. Inclusive type of solidarity is between the not-being oppressed (third party) to the oppressed (second party), not necessarily because of the same contention of anti-oppression, but because the oppressor (first party) is in different political stance with the third party. However, as this will remain advantaging for the oppressed one, this is seen very important. Universal solidarity is like a given nationhood that yields a national sense. Natural solidarity is in family. Arendt’s focus is mainly on the second type of social solidarity, namely inclusive solidarity, for it has the strongest political implication on the strengthening of the social struggle against the dominant power.

**Elite Capture and Groupthink: Seeing How Domination and Hegemony Operate in Daily Life**

In order to look at how domination and hegemony operate in daily politics, it is important for instance to see the concepts of elite capture and groupthink. Elite capture, referring to Diya Dutta (2009, p. 3), is a phenomenon in which public resource is usurped by a few of people, usually elite, who have power in decision making, with the expense of the others. Sometime, elite does not always occupy the resource for their own pocket, but they transfer it to their own group. Although this is often the common case, Dutta identifies selection bias based on caste, ethnic, family, party affiliation, and/or religion in public resource distribution as part of elite capture as well. In short, elite capture contains the acts of restoring public resources for the own group/self’s benefit, through what the hand of public authority.

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Jean-Philippe Platteau (2008) sees that information distortion resulting in information asymmetry is one of the causes of elite capture. Information, partly or wholly, is hidden to hinder society from accessing to the knowledge of their rights to shift it to be personal gain. Elite capture, argues Platteau (p. 1), is more likely to happen in patronage-based relations or ethnically fragmented society. In patronaged community, control is weak, that it is easier for elite/patron to authorise public resources and make use of social solidarity as a means for reducing public resistance. In ethnically fragmented society, elite capture could happen for the high competition among the groups given the limited resources. As Joseph Schwartz (2009, pp. 152-5) argues there is a tendency in which the elite feels advantaged from the situation in which social solidarity is weak. As believing in zero-sum game theory, elite sees that the real solidarity can weaken elite and reduce their domination over resources.

Relating to groupthink, Fred Lunenburg (2010, p. 2) asserts that it refers to the in-group oriented point of view, to form an absolute in-group consensus, and to discount the criticism towards group's decision. Contradictory to elite capture that usually happens in fragmented society, groupthink tends to happen in strongly cohesive society. As such, Lunenburg adds, groupthink disregards opposition and coins it as too evil for it disturbs the group consolidation. Individuals are absorbed to focus on group cohesion without being strongly critical to what the group cohesion is for. Fear of community members to be excluded from their group is seen as an instrument to mobilise them in seemingly participatory public activity.

Groupthink can also present in the form of persuading a person to join with an abuse this persuader already committed. A financial manager that abuses the public money and persuades his/her staff to silently join with, that once the abuse is revealed he/she is not alone to tackle it, is also a form of groupthink. In short, groupthink hinders a person to rationalise his/her activity based on the consideration of social commitment. As elite capture, groupthink is considered to be a barrier for attaining public goal for not providing productive contribution to the policy processes (Martha Feldman and Anne Khademian, 2000, p. 159). As groupthink disables individuals to see themselves as an advisor or an advocate for either social transformation or policy development, carefulness in seeing public participation is needed. Consequently, looking critically at social solidarity is also needed, as public participation is usually built up through the sense of similarity and solidarity. For this purpose, tracing the ideas of why this is the case is important. Ton Derks and Nico Roymans (2009) for instance argue that elite capture and groupthink in the so called social solidarity cannot be separated from how individuals construct the idea about their selves. Power relations, for Derks and Roymans, agreeing with Manuel Castells (2010, p. 6), in this case is a clear basis of such a construction. In regards, Foucault's assertions that identity should be seen as, “a product of discourse and representational system in specific historical context, and emerges through relationship between power and knowledge”, and that human subjectivity in identity construction is, “to be subject (because it) is to be subjected” (in Neil Mackinnon and David Heise, 2010, p. 220) are sensible to consider.

The construction about others, besides the construction about the self, in identity politics, for Richard Jenkins (2008, p. 20), even plays an equally important role, to reclaim the area of domination of resources over the others. Reciting Seyla Benhabib (1996, p. 3), Jenkins asserts that as identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference (p. 20), any form of social commitment, such as solidarity, exclusion, belonging, or distancing (p. 23), should
also be coined as a political construction about others. As such, it becomes clear that identity politics is not merely a matter of social attribution between one group and another based on the appearing aspects of identity. It is a path for further purpose of politics namely domination.

Dealing with this, seeing Derk and Roymans’s argument is important. Learning from the study of ethnic construct and politics in Early Europe, Derks and Roymans suggest that there is always association between identity constructions with political system (p. 1). This association happens not only in macro scales of social organisation but also in a local level or a smaller scale of social group, creating sometime elite capture and groupthink as mentioned above. Social phenomena such as conflict, violence, social solidarity or political collaboration are merely a manifestation of how people construct their selves and the others (p. 2), based on the exchange of interests that involves a continuing process of either deliberative choice, manipulation or politicisation in the structuring of socio-political relations within the community and in relations to the others (p. 12).

However, Will Fowler and Peter Lambers (2006) remind us that there is no linear relation between politics, identity, and solidarity, or exclusion. Solidarity or exclusion can also be used to strengthen or weaken the construction of identity in order to accomplish particular political motives (pp. vii-viii). In addition, as politics—power contestation—is the queen of identity construction discourse, it does not change. What potentially changes is aspects of identity, such as the sense of ethnical, geographical or gender collectiveness, therefore identity is not fixed or predetermined and has potential to always be different (Vivian Vignoles, in Seth Schwartz, Koen Luyckx, Vivian Vignoles, 2011, p. 405).

**Leftist Theoretical Implications on Social Solidarity in Disasters**

The sense of power disparities in Marxism, as Edward Bryant (2005, pp. 5-7) argues, helps us clarify that disaster is a matter of unjust social system. In Bryant’s view, the vulnerability of developing countries towards natural disasters should be seen in the wide landscape of the world’s political system. Bryant clarifies that poverty that leads to vulnerability of the people in developing countries towards natural disasters is a result of the gap of power and access to resources. The capitalist states transform resources from those of developing countries into theirs, but leave the wastes and excesses on the exploitated nations, including in terms of the high vulnerability of the people in developing countries in disasters. Bryant (p. 6) does not ignore the fact that political system in the developing states is corrupt. For Bryant, corrupt government worsens the marginalisation of the poor in disaster for aid corruption, and keeping the underprivileged groups in a state of poverty. However, corrupt government is not merely a cultural feature of developing nations. It should be also seen an excess of capitalism (Havidán Rodríguez, Enrico Quarantelli, and Russell Dynes, 2007, p. 123), of which operation in developing countries involve compradors, consisting of elites in those developing nations.

In addition, there might also be a view that developing countries is by feature politically fragmented. As corrupt government, social fragmentation should also be seen as a part of elite’s grand narration of power contestation. Therefore, the idea that politically fragmented society is slower in life recovery as Mahdi (2007) and Sakamoto and Yamori (2009) argue, should also be connected with the structure of power in the context of disaster-hit areas. As such, Bryant strengthens what Quarantelli (1988 ad 2005a) argues that disaster is a matter of weaknesses in social system and structure. This clarifies Marxist view of power disparities, in which power
is to advantage elite, rather than the grass root. In disaster, power disparities have made elite less vulnerable to disaster risks than non-elite, which clearly points out injustice. Indeed, the idea of power disparities as such is helpful as an analytical lens including for analysing daily social relations. The issue of power disparities is everywhere, including in very micro level of social relations in everyday life.

On the other hand, leftist views are helpful to identify how collective consciousness toward disaster and unjust social system is built in society. Social solidarity between the poor in disaster, therefore, is not only important to see as a form of social harmony, but as a collective resistance to the existing divisive status quo and social system. Arendt’s point of social solidarity as grass root consolidation and interest articulation of class-based consciousness is worth noting to see how this operates during the situations of natural disaster. Hurrican Katrina (New Orleans, 2005) is an example of how disaster could raise consciousness of the oppressed towards the unjust social system (Nancy Scheper-Hughes, 2005, p. 2) among migrants (Blacks, Latinos and Asians) to build solidarity of the marginalised in disaster. As Chamlee-Wright (2006) argues, migrant solidarity built on the basis of neighbourhood helps Katrina victims to tackle adversaries of which the assistance is not sufficiently provided by the “white” dominant government.

CHALLENGING THE LEFTISTS: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY IN LIBERAL VIEWS OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY IN NATURAL DISASTER CONTEXT

Unlike leftist views, liberal paradigm counts individual autonomy important and gives strong attention on individual rights. In economy, the adherence of the state is seen to hamper the ideal type of market, namely free trade, which is based on free choice and free competition (Devine, 1989, 297). Adam Smith’s invisible hand, in which market is believed to have its own mechanism to work—through keeping the supply and demand in equilibrium—based on the laissez faire principle—free competition—is seen as “the natural law” of economy (Mark Skousen, 2007, p. 19 and 37). In politics, Gerald Gaus (2003, p. 1) underlies liberalism as individual liberty, comprised of freedom of speech and of thought.

Although liberalism—and its correlated concepts—and Marxism—and its varieties—are often seen contradictorily, both have similarities, namely seeing the state suspiciously. If Marxism suspects the state as the locomotive of the bourgeois, liberalism prefers to minimise the role of the state as it restricts human freedom. Later, John Maynard Keynes recalls the role of the state in capitalist economy through aggregate demand management idea to maintain the stability of capitalism post the 1930 big recession (135-6). Being influenced by Immanuel Kant, liberal views assert that the state is needed to guarantee liberalism, namely individual freedom, that they could exercise their reason freely to produce convergence of morals and political views (Gaus, 2003, p. 2-3).

Later, John Rawls’ idea of public reason is believed to be a basis of liberal political view for emphasizing freedom of thought and of speech (Gaus, 2003, p. 12). With public reason, Rawls underlines deliberation as methods of policy making (Rawls, 1997, p. 772), in which policy is made based on the best and most solving reasoning—not by corporation or organized interests (p. 773). In this regards, Rawls emphasises that each member of society is aware of the nature of plural reasoning which cannot avoid disagreement (p. 766), and dialogue is done upon the purpose of finding the most solving ideas. This is what later is termed as deliberative democracy, referring to, “collective decision through public reasoning and
discussions among equal citizen” (Ian O’Flynn, 2006, p. 1), manifested through for instance consensus conference, public hearing, and so forth.

From this, we can see how social solidarity is constructed based on liberal point of view. A good comparison to see social solidarity from liberal views is of social capital—defined as art of associational life with trust, cooperation and reciprocity (de Tocqueville, in Fukuyama, 2001, p. 11), proposed by Francis Fukuyama (2001), which is rather functionalist. Fukuyama (p. 10) emphasizes that social capital restoring the costs of economic transaction and promoting associational life that is necessary in democratic government (p. 10). The orientation of liberal view towards social solidarity, as such, is identifiable, namely to be a basis of future development. Referring to Fukuyama (1995, p. 91), social capital has elements that are of importance in social solidarity, namely trust and reciprocity. Assuming that trust and reciprocity is the basis of social solidarity this leads us think that liberal view underlines equality in social interrelations, called social solidarity.

Durkheim’s idea of social solidarity (1984), as such, by its origin, may be said as entailing liberal view, for asserting individual autonomy to agree with the job distribution and responsibility sharing. Contract, as asserted in organic solidarity, is clearly a token for liberal social relations in which the involving parties are deliberately making an agreement towards their rights and duties in collective works—in Durkheim case is industrialisation. Opposing Marx, Durkheim asserts that, “value cannot, as Marx would wish, be expressed as a function of the duration of work and of that alone because one must also consider “the difficulty of the work” as well as competition” (1986, p. 123, as cited in Eugen Schoenfeld and Stjepan Meštrović, 1989, p. 118).

Agreeing with Durkheim’s idea of social solidarity and political economic development, Jennifer Oh (2012, p. 531) argues that social solidarity can be of beneficial of strengthening civil society in order to support the building of strong state, to function democratic governance. Learning from the case of South Korea, Oh sees that social solidarity importantly constitutes the building of citizen’s movement organisations, to carrying out watchdog functions, representing the interests of the people, and of important element of civil society (p. 532), as represented by the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) founded in 1989 and 1994 respectively.

However, it is recognised that the acknowledgement of such ideas of political culture, including social capital and social solidarity, in the development agenda was not so prominent until the early 1990s. The World Bank, for instance, until the end of 1980 still strictly saw poverty as a matter of income, so that it often recommends massive industrialisation for developing countries in order to enhance employment for the purpose of reducing poverty. With the deepening definition of poverty, as Amartya Sen (1999a) argues, in which poverty is not only seen as an income issue, but also participation and social security which has strong relation with capability deprivation, poverty is transformatively understood as a combination of economic, political, and cultural matters. Social capital and social solidarity, as such, are seen to enrich the approach of liberal development agenda in order to eradicate poverty.

Dealing with disaster and social solidarity in disasters, liberal view relates them with the idea of reasoning, as well as deliberation. Natural disaster is seen through the frame of scientific perspective, in which it is a matter of technological and social system failure to anticipate its destructive impacts. In accordance, disaster impact is individual matter (Bryant, 2005, p. 112), in which it is basically the
responsibility of individuals to tackle the adverse impact of disasters. Social cooperation amongst members of society is built upon a full agreement of each member of society to work together, therefore participatory principle is underlined. Pokmas (Kelompok Masyarakat—social working group) built during Yogyakarta’s post 2006 earthquake recovery is an instance of how ‘liberal view’ of social actions were applied to push the working of post disaster development. In this respect, collective energy of social solidarity post-disaster recovery is in a way directed to strengthen associational life, to increase public participation in deliberative process of recovery. In this respect, social solidarity is built without clearly being associated with an articulation of social consciousness towards unjust system, as the way Marxism views disaster and social solidarity.

In macro scale, disaster is crucially seen as hampering market and business cycle, rather than as a picture of the past’s injustice, as Marxism underlined, for the destroyed industries and capital flow. With the globalised system economy, the impact of disaster in particular area is not seen as isolatedly influencing that hit region (Rodriguez, Quarantelli and Dynes, 2007, p. 165), as it could influence the whole economy. Given such a circumstance, for liberal view, social solidarity is unavoidably needed, to involving people in the grass root and women (p. 139) both in and outside the disaster-hit areas, to get the re-functioning of market and industries running more quickly.

In addition to this, natural disaster is seen to provide profitable opportunities for the companies to seize its business of disaster relief (Kenneth Saltman, 2008, p. 11). Borrowing Schumpeter’s term of creative destruction, disaster triggers policy reform and innovation, which can repair and improve the social beings. The difference is, in Schumpeter’s view, creative destruction is oriented to deliberate and controllable destructions, which paving a way for innovations (Tom Nicholas, 2003, p. 1025), while in disaster, although the scale of destructions might be managed, its occurrence is uncontrollable.

SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AS SPIRITUAL EXPRESSION: ANOTHER VIEW OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY IN DISASTERS

Although leftist and liberal views are equally important in seeing disaster and social solidarity in disasters, they sometime are not sufficiently helpful in explaining the complex social beings of society, including those of asserted in Durkheimian views. There is a situation in which social beings are not explainable through merely leftist or liberalist analysis, and therefore needs another insight. In this sense, borrowing anthropologist perspective in seeing society is important. Anthropologists, for instance, try not to bring their prior knowledge of social structure to see society. They rather let society to talk about their selves, and define their selves, as their history and experience tell them so. Indeed, this does not mean to isolate the social analysis from the existing categories, which rightly in some senses are helpful. However, as society is complex, letting them to tell us reality based on their views and define things from their own perspectives is important.

Dealing with this, paying attention on Saba Mahmood (2005) and Talal Asad (1983) is important. In their views, there is a situation in which society cannot be easily associated with the existing categories as social theories suggest. They give us lessons of the methods to see society not by isolating them from the existing categories, but through the categories they themselves created. Not to disregard the importance of the existing social theories, this kind of approach rather helps us enrich the perspectives in social science.
For this purpose, seeing the theoretical implication of Mahmood’s finding on the ideas of social solidarity and solidarity in disasters through her research in women movement in Egypt is important. Mahmood makes crucial point which can be seen as different from that of Durkheim and Weber. If Durkheim sees social solidarity as a result of religious practices, Mahmood sees that even social solidarity itself can be deemed as religious by the community.

Indeed, it is acknowledged that Durkheim clarifies the argument that the sacred is inseparable from that of profane. Being too deeply attached on the social science of religion, Durkheim, however, seems to disregard how society itself sees solidarity, from their religious views, apart from Durkheim’s own view of social solidarity. There is possibility that society sees social solidarity not separately from the collective ritual they conduct together, as Durkheim suggests. Rather, it is seen as part of what they are doing, as spiritual expression, neglecting the rough categories of the sacred and profane. Referring to Mahmood (2005, p. 67), it is kind of conscientising everyday life into religious sense, to be the self identity, although it appears as non-religious.

Similarly, being related to the category of leftist and liberal, Mahmood says that it is not that simple. Mahmood admits that there are some elements of the movement that fit with either liberal or leftist view. However, for her, this remains not able to be simply said as liberalist or leftist. There is a preplexing situation in which the movement both affirms and rejects leftist and liberalist views. Egyptian women movement has characteristics that are not about to blindly affirm patriarchal view of religion or to reject it aggressively. The movement to study qur’an and hadist is susceptible to be seen as affirming patriarchal religious views, which from the leftist perspective may be said as subordinating the self before the dominant power. Nevertheless, women occupation of mosque, to be a place for political consciousness is kind of either liberating self from status quo.

Mahmood’s assertion of how women make religious teaching relevant to everyday life as part of spiritual consciousness is important. In Mahmood’s view, “how to make moral precepts, doctrinal principles, and acts of worship relevant to the organization of everyday life”, through the movement, in which, “…engagement with sacred texts is aimed at deducing a set of practical rules of conduct to guide others in resolving the mundane issues of daily life” (2005, p. 67), is crucial to see. It reveals the idea that religion is not merely as Durkheims sees, namely the source of production of profane goodness, but everyday practices as religious goodness as well. There is a phenomenon in which society carries out contextualisation, in religious sense, which admittedly having impact on social and politics, through seeing text not as reality, but text as conduct of life, that is relevant to everyday organizations. Mahmood in this sense affirms the leftist idea of conscientization, but in the form that is slightly different from that of Gramscian or Arendtian. It is a rebellion through non-rebelling actions, revolution through non-revolutionary strikes, and liberation through non-liberal way. What an interesting puzzle and contradiction it is.

As such, Mahmood has challenged the ideas that “act-of-God” view of disaster is contrasting with liberal and leftist views. It is not a simple category. People can respond to disaster actively for their belief of God’s role in disasters, rather than passively, as liberal view suggests. As Udasmoro and Tridiatno (2012, p. 137) argue spirituality tells us much about collectiveness and togetherness, including in disaster, to find commonality as well as difference, in order to create solidarity. Referring to them, spirituality highlights sense of belonging, including materials and human
beings, in the hand of God, but pushing them to help each other to tackle disaster adversaries, as a pursuance of spiritual conscience.

CONCLUSION

Although it is undeniable that Durkheim is helpful in understanding the issue of social solidarity in disaster, it needs a critical look at power relations. In this sense, looking at the concept of social exchange is important as it shows us the sense of power sharing in social solidarity. Leftist views as posed by Marxism, Gramscian political thought and Arendt’s view of power let us know in practice power is not always distributed evenly. Those ideas remind us that social solidarity is susceptible for elite exploitation strengthening unjust social ad political system. In the situations of disasters, social solidarity is needed to raise social consciousness that disaster is a matter of unjust social system, that higher and lower class of society has different degree of vulnerability. However, leftist views of social solidarity in disasters are seen not enough as they neglect social solidarity as cultural potential to fastern the process of post disaster recovery, as liberal advocates argue. For liberal views, disasters should be seen as opportunity to redevelop that individuals should participatively be involved in cooperative recovery.

Nevertheless, leftist and liberal views are seen problematic for not paying attention on detailed complexities in society. Society is not as simple as leftist and liberal views categorize. Spiritual consciousness as Saba Mahmood underlies in Egyptian women movement gives us lesson that society is not “black” and “white”. It has their own unnderstanding and definition about their selves. So is with social solidarity in each society, in which each society has its own understanding and definition, which might overlap as well as contrast with teh existing perspectives of social solidarity. Attention on women solidarity in this respect is important as it might give us an alternative of the existing social solidarity, including in the situation of disasters. Women have spirituality that is potential to advantage society as a whole, not only for their fellow women.

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