Populism, Radical Democracy, and the Indonesian Process of Democratization

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Abstract:
This paper discusses the ideas of populism as highlighted by Mouffe and Laclau to analyze its relevance for Indonesian democracy context. Populism is a political style which is a source for change based on the systematic use of rhetorical appeal to the people. This research focuses on populism in relation to democracy which brings forth left and right-wing populism. The concept of populism in general leads us to look at the fact of populism in Indonesia democracy context. Some crisis such us economic crisis, poverty, inequality and the failure of the government in looking after the common will and the common good of people lead to create a ‘populist moment’ particularly in Indonesia context. Therefore, radical democracy and left populism of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau which this research is focusing on, offers some relevant suggestions to enhance the democratic participation of the people to overcome some crises in Indonesia democracy, which is mostly being co-opted by predatory oligarchy.

Keywords:
Populism, Indonesia, Radical Democracy, Oligarchy

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Introduction

The return of identity politics is a global phenomenon and is exemplified through the global threat of populism. The populists have taken over political power not just in the fragile democracy of the global south. The election of Donald Trump as the US president for example can be regarded as a sign that populism is in the cradle of liberal democracy (de la Torre, 2019: 1). Similar developments are occurring in consolidated European democracies. In Greece the coalition between right wing populism and leftwing populism succeeded in winning the general election in 2015. In France the populistic party founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen has become a powerful political party. Some populist politicians such as Viktor Orban, Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Robert Fico are leading some European countries now.

In the Indonesian context, the issue of populism has become an important part of political discourse since the presidential election of 2014. According to Vedi. R. Hadiz and Richard Robison, the emergence of populist leaders in Indonesia reflects the protest against the systematic social injustice that has remained unaddressed in the past two decades (Hadiz, 2017). The gap between rich and poor has reached an alarming level. This social discrepancy can shake our unity as a nation if politics cannot find the best solution to establish social justice and welfare for all. Otherwise, the social gap keeps strengthening identity politics and right-wing populism.

This research focuses on how populism offers a turbulent way in expressing demands, articulating collective wills or performing political exchanges behind the procedural normality of democratic politics which has transformed into a consensus machine (Arditi, 2007: 60). However, this can only be realized in a pluralistic milieu and populism can be transformed into an antagonistic and radical democracy.

This research is also going to explore the populistic dimension of Indonesian politics nowadays. The question is, to what extent populism be an alternative antagonistic power for Indonesia democracy which is coopted by the predatory oligarchy? What should be done in order to transform populistic ideas into the new democratic institutions independent from the domination of the oligarchic political parties inherited by the New Order regime?

Populism: A Conceptual Framework

Populism is a very broad concept but it does not mean that the phenomenon is intractable. According to Arditi, one way of approaching it is to describe populism as an ‘anexact’ object. Considering the range of interpretations and positions, populism could well be an anexact object and therefore any precise description faces a real and perhaps insurmountable limit. Moreover, Populism is not a stand-alone phenomenon and that its intelligibility is intertwined with contemporary democratic politics, be it because it is a fellow traveller, an unpleasant by-product or a threat to democracy (Arditi, 2007: 57-58). Besides,
populism embodies inclusion as displayed by left-wing populism in some countries in Latin America using populism as a tool to fight against social injustice and marginalization. In Asia we can see different faces of populism as displayed in India, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines (Mietzner, 2019).

Although there are a lot of faces of populism, according to Daniel Stockemer, populism is generally understood as “a discourse or strategy and thin ideology” (Stockemer, 2019: 2). As a discourse populism appears as a kind of marketing ploy or political strategy that plays a paradigm role in order to mobilize an anti-elitism and people-centrism attitude. An important understanding of populism as ideology was formulated by Cas Mudde. He defines populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of general will of the people” (Mudde, 2017: 3). In more comprehensive way Manuel Anselmi supports the idea of Mudde by defining the populism as:

… a social configuration of political power, based on an unmediated social interpretation and expression of popular sovereignty; characterized by the presence of the basic scheme community–people, with an inter-class nature and ideologically non-differentiated; a strong connection between the community–people and a leader (who is often charismatic); a Manichean discourse (Anselmi, 2018: 92).

Various definitions of populism emphasize three basic features which express the essence of populism namely the people, the elites and the general will. The people are normally perceived as poor, marginalized, homogenous and authentic or pure. The people are regarded as the main concept of populism, as the other two terms are always defined in relationship or in opposition to the concept of the people. The question is, do “the people” really exist? According to many authors, the people are the result of social construction of the populists as the concept of “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983). Compared to some ideologies such as social class or nation, the concept “the people” does not have real content.

However, it does not mean that the people are not capable of affecting social movements. Conversely, Cas Mudde (2017: 6) emphasizes that as an “empty signifier” (Laclau, 2005) the people can appear as a flexible concept that refers to an authentic conception of community in order to exclude others. The exclusion of the others happens on the basis of moral reasoning or by using a Manichean discourse of polarization between “the good people” and “the evil elites” (Anselmi, 2018: 92).

In the populism theory, the elites are understood as the antithesis of the people. Therefore, the elites on the one hand represent the powerful social class registered as corrupt, evil and immoral, whereas, on the other hand, the people are regarded as moral,
good, pure and authentic (Hawkins, 2009). However, beside the moral point of view, populism can also operate with other ideologies such as class or nationalism.

Regarded as a social class, the ordinary people for example are positioned by the conservative populists in USA as an antithesis to the liberal elites perceived as “latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving, New York Times-reading and Hollywood-loving” (Nicholson and Segura, 2012: 369). Regarding the issue of nationalism, populist politicians construct the people based on ethnic nationalism in order to exclude immigrants or minority groups (Mudde, 2017: 7).

The “general will” is closely linked to the concept of the people and articulated through the opinion and common sense of the people. Furthermore, it is generally assumed that the concept of general will is based on the conviction that there is a correspondence between the community-peoples’ common sense and government policy. In this sense of this understanding, populists claim that they can do no wrong. Such absolutism leads to an anti-pluralistic attitude characterizing populism.

The populistic slogan such as “we are the only group capable of representing the true general will of the people” expresses the anti-pluralistic tendency of the populism (Müller, 2017: 9). Therefore, populism avoids establishing political discourse in order to discover alternative solutions to public problems. Furthermore, because the people are the expression of the general will, “any group of people is seen as either artificially created or irrelevant for politics” (Mudde, 2017: 8). Moreover, as noted by Stanley, the populist idea of the general will is connected to ideas of majoritarianism and authenticity. It is highlighting how populists appeal to the ideals of “authenticity and ordinariness”, he noted that what was most important to populists was “to appeal to the idea of an authentic people” and to cultivate the idea that they are the “genuine” representatives of “the people” (Stanley, 2008: 105).

Another further reason for the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elites lies in the populist assumption that the political institutions and the system of representative democracy are already co-opted by the corrupt and immoral elites. Ordinary people see the elites as antagonists and the two poles cannot be reconciled. This is clearly pointed out by Barbara Wejnert that populism generally expresses the conflict between the majority of the people who are “out of power” versus the small but powerful elites (Wejnert, 2013: 146).

The competition is the response to the perpetuating social divisiveness between the small elites and the marginalized majority. Jan-Werner Müller underpins the idea by emphasizing two basic characters of populists namely being critical of elites and anti-pluralist (Müller, 2017: 26). Showing an anti-elitism attitude, populists represent the voice of the marginalized people as a protest against the powerful, corrupt and immoral regarded small elites. On the other hand, the people are generally described as a monolithic, homogenous, victimized and marginalized group.
Populist Moment as a Response to the Crisis of Democracy

The populist moment occurs in the democracy system because it fails in tackling some humanitarian issues. There are three main factors that cause the rise of populism. First, if there is a crisis in the economic sector, a recession will lead to poverty, unemployment, unequal growth, the impact of globalization, and the exploitation of natural resources. Inequality in society has become a modality for some parties to narrate political rhetoric that leads to claims of populism. Second, there has been sharp criticism over the failure of representative democracy. Third, through the existing economic inequality coupled with the imbalance of democratic promises, it is profitable for populist leaders to start their political rhetoric (Muhtadi, 2019:5).

Moreover, according to Anselmi, the homogenous community-people are formed in the process of “an extraordinary period of social mobilization and inclusion” (Anselmi, 2018: 92). The mobilization and inclusion are based on the same issue of marginalization and victimization experienced by the ordinary people. After all, the mobilization is linked to the need to articulate the demand of the people ignored by the democratic representative institutions. Therefore, populism can be understood as a response to the crisis of representative democracy and the contemporary discourse on democracy cannot be disconnected from a reflection on populism (Anselmi, 2018: 92).

This situation leads to a ‘populist moment,’ which arises from the multiplication of anti-establishment movements that signal the crisis of neoliberal hegemony. Various movements of resistance have emerged against the post democratic dismissal of popular sovereignty and the devastating consequences of neoliberal globalization. For instance, in several European countries those resistances have been captured by right-wing populist parties which have articulated in a nationalistic and xenophobic vocabulary (Mouffe, 2019: 2-4).

Populism emerges because representative democracy is not capable of articulating the demands of the citizens as owners of sovereignty. There is a close relationship between populism and the problem of representation, as Ernesto Laclaus asserted: “The crisis of representation . . . is at the root of any populist, anti-institutional outburst” (Laclau, 2005: 137). The populist leader succeeds in mobilizing the masses and to represent “the people” due to the inability of liberal democracy to accommodate the demands of the people. Facing the problem of representation, the people need a direct social expression of popular sovereignty (Anselmi, 2018: 3).

It is a demand for more democracy on the part of citizens due to the problem of political intermediation or representative democracy. The problem of representative democracy leads to the fact that the aspirations of the people cannot be met by political institutions. It happens for example in oligarchy in which a few rich take advantage of political institutions and exploit them for their own interest. In such a condition, laws are not designed to establish public welfare but to strengthen the power of the oligarchs over the state institutions. This leads to the marginalization of the citizens from all social-
political processes and access to welfare, as Canovan emphasizes that social uprooting is one of the main factors benefitting populism (Canovan, 1981).

Populism is an expression of the demand of the people to be significantly included in political participation and government that can be clearly seen as a populist moment. The example of this populist moment can be pictured through a political strategy that we find in movements like Podemos in Spain, La France Insoumise of Jean Luc Mélenchon or Bernie Sanders in the US. It also informs the politics of Jeremy Corbyn whose endeavour to transform the Labour party in a great popular movement, working “For the Many not the Few”, has already succeeded in making it the greatest left party in Europe (Mouffe, 2019: 2-4).

Marginalisation is the result of the failure of liberal democracy to set up political and social justice. Hence, populism can be regarded as a critique on the representative democracy system that fails to uphold social justice and to be representatives of the people. Furthermore, populism is always coming to surface as an anti-elite and anti-establishment attitude. Populism can be consequently described as a social and political protest of the citizens against the failures of elite-oriented and pro establishment oriented representative democracy. In this case, the democracy tends to leave the people behind who are the primary goal of the the democracy itself.

**Populist Moment In Indonesia Democracy**

In line with the rise of global populism, the development of democracy in Indonesia has been affected by global populism. The survey conducted by the Institute of PWD (Power, Welfare and Democracy) from the University of Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta showed that 47% of main political actors and 31% of alternative actors deployed populism in order to mobilize masses and garner support (Savirani et al., 2013: 17).

Furthermore, some international experts on Indonesian have focused on the rise of populism in Indonesia, for example Marcus Mietzner (2005), Edward Aspinall (2015) and Vedi R. Hadiz (2018) affirmed the populist impacts on democracy in Indonesia. The populism movements in Indonesia are as elsewhere in the world expressed through the protest of the pure people against the corrupt elites which we call a ‘populist moment’. As Mietzner explains, the reason for the rise of populism in Indonesia was the dissatisfaction with the decade of Yudhoyono’s presidency in dealing with poverty, social injustice and marginalization of the people.

There was a kind of economic alienation among the people where economic growth did not impact on increasing their welfare. This situation has been leading people to distrust public institutions. Moreover, the people are putting their trust more in religious leaders rather than in parliaments, political parties, police and court. It seems that Indonesians are still living in a traditional society. This condition provides fertile ground for populism (Muhtadi, 2019: 8). Furthermore, populism appears, according to Eby Hara Abubakar,
in three models namely Jokowi, Prabowo and Islamic Defender Fronts (Front Pembela Islam – FPI) model of populism (Abubakar, 2017: 3).

Populism has been a part of the development of democracy in Indonesia. In this respect, it is important to explore populist moment in relation to human rights, democracy and inclusive development. However, as described by Robison and Hadiz, democracy in Indonesia is being co-opted by the predatory oligarchy (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). The question to be addressed is to what extent populism in Indonesia becomes an alternative and antagonistic power to the practices of the contemporary democracy? What should be done in order to transform the populistic ideas into new democratic institutions which are independent from the domination of the oligarchic political power nurtured under the authoritarian New Order regime?

The rise of global populism is connected to the crisis of liberal representative democracy expressed in its inability to represent the demos. It leads to the marginalization of the people, as Hadiz emphasizes:

… contemporary populisms are mainly a response to two closely related processes – growing frustration with prevailing modes of political representation and participation that preserve such inequalities as well as the development of new kinds of social marginalization, as expressed, for example, in widespread precarious existence (Hadiz, 2019: 177).

What is going on at the global level, also applies to the Indonesian context where oligarchy has created disparities between small elite rich and the poor majority. The threat of oligarchic power in Indonesia can be shown through the terrible injustices and the gulf between rich and poor. According to the 2018 Global Wealth Report issued by Credit Suisse, the assets of the richest 10 percent in Indonesia dominate 75.3 % of national wealth. Compared to other countries in the world, Indonesia is located at the 6th worst position after Thailand, Turkey, USA, Russia and India.

In other words, the richest one percent in Indonesia has 46.6% of the national wealth. It has been increasing from 45.4 % in 2017 to 46.6 % in 2018 (Basri, 2019). Furthermore, the way conglomerates have been becoming richer is less fair economic competition than a close relationship to political power. This is based on the crony-capitalism index that obviously indicates that Indonesia ranks 7th. The April 2019 general election could not magnificently bring changes because 45% (262) of the 575 elected representatives for the period 2019-2024 are from the business world. It makes the control system of power more difficult, even impossible due to the close relationship between legislative power and economic power.

In the hands of politicians, political institutions are hijacked for predatory goals in order to have more access to the capital and resources. This is based on the fact that many politicians are involved in corruption. According to the data of Corruption Eradication
Commission (KPK), from 2004 to 2018 there were 101 regents or mayors who were arrested due to the involvement in corruption cases (Tajuk Rencana Kompas, 2019). Until July 2019 there were 255 members of the House of Representatives at the national and regional level and 7 political party leaders who were suspected of committing corruption (Theodora, 2019).

Consequently, disregarding the massive student protests, the representatives decided at the end of September 2019 to revise the anti-corruption bill weakening the fight against corruption in Indonesia. Moreover, President Joko Widodo who promised to rescind the new KPK law by issuing a regulation in lieu of law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang – Perppu) has made sure not to do that, against his own political campaign to fight against corruption by strengthening KPK (Bayuni, 2019). KPK is one of the products of the reformation (Reformasi) of 1998 credibly working to meet the ideals of reformation in order to set up a clean government free from corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN).

KPK is regarded as a threat and obstacle by the corrupt political parties coopted by the oligarchy to satisfy their greediness by controlling political institutions in order to have predatory power over the state capital and resources. The weakened KPK opens up the way for the oligarchic political parties to accumulate power and resources. Therefore, democracy is becoming more procedural curbed by a small group of rich and powerful people. Laws can be designed and revised based on the interest of political parties ignoring aspirations of the demos as source of political power. It is mirrored for example through the composition of speaker and deputy speakers of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) for the period 2019-2024 distributed to all political parties.

In this context, democracy is at stake and the state becomes more repressive. It is not surprising that in September 2019 police violently and repressively faced students and activists demonstrating in many cities of Indonesia against revision of the KPK Bill and the revised Criminal Code that potentially curbs freedom of expression. Besides, falsehood was spread that the student demonstrations were ridden by factions planning to thwart the presidential inauguration. Activists were arrested by being accused of having committed defamation.

According to the data of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI – Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia), during 2019 there were 44 people killed and disappeared for expressing their opinion in public (Nurita, 2019). These all prove that the powerful oligarchy reveals an authoritarian and repressive state to protect the interests of oligarchs.

In other countries such as in Latin America, populism is capable of being an antagonistic power to the oligarchy. This development does not occur in Indonesia. The populism in Indonesia fails to set itself against the oligarchy due to the absence of liberalism (struggle
for civil and political rights) and leftist movements (struggle for social justice and fairness) in the Indonesian tradition of democracy (Hadiz, 2017: 498).

Furthermore, the populistic leaders in Indonesia including the Jokowi regime fail to transform the populistic ideas into the new democratic institutions independent from the domination of the oligarchic political parties inherited by the New Order regime. In this situation, populism has become a war of identity politics steered by oligarchic power. Therefore, populism does not have an emancipatory force, but it is instrumentalized to perpetuate the oligarchic power.

As Hadiz and Robison emphasized, the absence of liberal tradition and leftist movements in the Indonesian politics tradition renders difficult organizing and advocating grass root groups such as laborers, peasants and middle-class workers in order to set up independent and civil society based organizations being capable of fighting for their own human rights (Hadiz, 2017: 500). In addition, due to the impacts of the long authoritarian regime of the New Order, the independent civil society is not well organized and still co-opted by the oligarchic state.

Furthermore, in the first term of his government, Jokowi did not show the good will to improve human rights. In order to restrain the organizations such as HTI that plan to replace the democratic state with theocracy, Jokowi used authoritarian means ignoring civil and political rights (Power, 2018: 24). In other words, according to Mietzner, Jokowi used illiberal methods to combat illiberalism or ‘fighting illiberalism with illiberalism’ (Mietzner, 2015).

Some populist leaders such as Lula in Brazil, Fujimori in Peru or Hugo Chavez in Venezuela succeeded in taking over the political power and encouraging social transformation due to being supported by a mass basis outside of the traditional political framework (Hadiz and Robison, 2017): 26). As mayor of Solo, governor of Jakarta and Indonesian president, Jokowi was elected by posing technocratic populist agendas such as improving public service for the underprivileged or lower class including free healthcare and education scholarship program (Mietzner, 2015: 26) He set up personal connections and visits with the people, known as blusukan, to discuss public affairs. Jokowi’s style of leadership revitalized democracy in Indonesia (Wijanarko and Riyanto Armada, 2021).

In contrast to other populist leaders, Jokowi failed to institutionalize the populist ideas in democratic institutions and regulations. When Jokowi left for Jakarta to become governor, the social pact in Solo for instance could not be sustained. It worked because of the figure of Jokowi without the institutional basis of democratic rules and regulations (Törnquist, 2019). In addition, when Jokowi was elected president in 2014 and 2019, he did not rely on the pro-democracy movement to support his political power. In contrast, he set up an alliance with economic and political elites including political parties co-opted by oligarchies inherited from the New Order, ignoring the anti-corruption agency to avoid dirty politics (Törnquist, 2019).
Consequently, Jokowi cannot represent the will of the people who elected him. Furthermore, some promises for social transformation, more democracy, practice of human rights and clean government cannot be applied because these all are against the will of oligarchic political parties (Hadiz, and Robison, 2017: 499). This shows the fact that populism in Indonesia is being absorbed by the logic of the Leviathan state cooperating with predatory oligarchs.

In order to protect the vested interest of the oligarchs, the second term of the Jokowi regime is on the one hand very friendly to “liberal economic globalization, but on the other hand is displaying “chauvinist populist resistance against international engagement for democracy and human rights” (Törnquist, 2019). This policy is supported by the lessened public control due to the government’s effort to revise the Criminal Code to constrain civil and political rights.

As Olle Törnquist asserted, the trajectory of populism in Indonesia started with positive populist movements, developed to “right wing populism and triangulation of international economic liberalism and chauvinist resistance against human rights-based democracy” (Törnquist, 2019). One of the reasons for this crisis is that the pro-democracy civil society fails to combine populism with a human rights based democracy and to dispose of the negative aspects of populism such as right wing populism and anti-pluralism (Widjanarko and Riyanto Armada, 2021).

The rise of intolerant right wing populism is expressed in the mainstreaming of religious moral conservatism and the strengthening of ultra-nationalism in the political discourse and praxis (Hadiz, 2017: 261). Furthermore, the rise of the two models of political conservatism is closely connected to the intra oligarchic battles that result in the violation of the human rights of minority groups such as religious minorities and the LGBT faction. After all, this development has been strengthening the illiberal tendency of Indonesian democracy (Madung & Mere, 2021).

How to transform the exclusive model of populism into the inclusive one fostering democracy, human rights and liberal economy? Two things need to be done. Firstly, establishing democratic political institutions and institutionalization of populist policies. As mentioned, the rise of populism in Indonesia is an impact of the mistrust of the people over the political institutions co-opted by the oligarchs and patrons.

The holes left by the formal institutions have been taken over by the populist politicians by using populist issues such as free health insurance and education scholarships for the underprivileged. However, populist politicians tend to use “populism as a shortcut” and fail to establish a populist system and bureaucracy. Consequently, populist policy is often considered as legitimacy to break the laws and regulations and finally results in weakening the democracy.

Democracy is in this respect understood as popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality” (Beetham, 1999). If the problem of welfare is regarded as a public affair...
and addressed according to the principle of political equality, it cannot be solved within the market framework. On the contrary, the problem of welfare should be discussed by including a broad participation of citizens. Beetham’s understanding of democracy helps us overcome the problem of exclusive populism, as decreasing political participation is a sign of the crisis of democracy that leads to populism.

In this context, democracy is regarded as the ultimate option in realizing public welfare. Welfare is broadly understood and not reduced to the fulfillment of material needs, rather than including the basic rights to happiness, freedom, equality and security. These basic needs can only be fulfilled if the political process of decision making occurs on the basis of public participation and broad public control. Such a meaningful democracy is understood “as popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality” and can avoid abuses inherent to all kinds of power.

Secondly, to empower and strengthen inclusive interpretation of religious values compatible with democracy and human rights (Madung, 2021). Contemporary democracy in Indonesia on the one hand is weakened by right wing populism expressed in mainstreaming of religious moral conservatism and ultra-nationalism threatening the fundamental rights of minority groups and criminalizing social activists in the name of combating the ideology of communism (Hadiz, 2017: 274). On the other hand, religion plays a significant role in the public sphere of Indonesian society.

As Hadiz underlines that cultural resources including religion can also be deployed to fight for social justice and “more progressive political and economic agendas” (Hadiz, 2018: 580). At the global level, Jürgen Habermas is posing the thesis of post-secularism as an antithesis to the secularism relegating religion to irrational private sphere. Post-secularism emphasizes the rise of religions in public space in order to encounter the crisis of modernity (Habermas, 2001; Madung, 2021). However, the public sphere is characterized by the pluralism of the concept of good life, religion, opinion and culture. Therefore, each religion should act publicly in accordance with the principle of “public reason” expressed in tolerance, freedom and equality (Habermas, 2005; Madung, 2021).

The concept of post-secularism can contribute to reinterpreting the public role of religion in the light of a pluralistic public sphere in order to encounter the problems of populist-identity based politics (Madung, 2021). Rightwing populism is threatening democracy because it does not come from independent and rational citizens (demos); rather it is being mobilized by the populist provocateurs. The populist provocateurs talk on behalf of the marginalized people about the collective wounds caused by blasphemy or criminalization of ulemas (clerics) by the state.

This rightwing narrative of religion must me confronted by the inclusive one in order to open up the universal and humanitarian dimensions of religion reinforcing and consolidating democracy, human rights and pluralism. In Indonesia this responsibility can be taken over by the state supported theological schools by fostering dialogue between
reason and theology or common sense and faith. It is the public responsibility of the state to guarantee academic freedom in accordance with the human rights principles (Madung, 2017).

Theology plays a significant role to foster critical skills of religions in public space. The rationalization process of religions brought up by theology certainly leads to crisis and internal conflicts within the religion itself. However, it can productively result in self-criticism and critical reinterpretation of religion as an institution and system of values. This condition of freedom prevents exclusive and radical values growing in a religion. Furthermore, inclusive theology can transform religious life from privatization of piety to public piety. It means that prayer and religious practices should impact on public morality, inspiring people to struggle for social justice, democracy, solidarity, freedom and equality (Madung, 2021).

**Radical Democracy vs the Pathology of Liberal Democracy**

Populism appears as fundamentalism in politics, neglecting pluralism as a basic trait of democratic society. The question to be addressed is: Should populism in general be rejected in order to establish democracy, or does populism contain democratic elements useful to set up a democratic society especially in Indonesia. According to Chantal Mouffe, the pathology of liberal democracy expressed in rejection of critical discourse to search for alternative solutions in politics is a model of neoliberal democracy as a consensual machine that stimulates the birth of populism (Mouffe, 2015).

In Indonesia’s context, this fact happens when the government tries to shut the mouth of the people up by producing regulations in the legislative office. It means that liberal democracy avoids every political debate and tries to provide the citizens with a rational policy or political consensus that must be accepted by the people. Through the idea of “the third way” or the formation of social democratic parties, Mouffe argues, liberal democracy succeeds in domesticating the conflictual dimension of democracy and the antagonism between right-wing populism and left-wing populism (Madung & Mere, 2021).

Some liberal political thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas (1992) and John Rawls (2003) contribute essential thoughts to bury conflictual aspects of democracy by putting forward the concept of politics as a consensus machine (Mouffe, 2008). Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau pose some criticism against the practices of liberal democracy transformed into a consensus machine and in this way ignore the dissensual or conflictual aspect of democracy. The dissensus democracy emphasizes the unlimited conflictual dimension of the democratic discourse. From this point of view, populism can appear as social transformative forces that bring democracy back to its original meaning as an expression of the people’s sovereignty.

However, this can only be done in a pluralistic milieu and populism can be transformed into an antagonistic democracy. In Indonesia populism cannot appear as a way for democracy to find its original meaning because it has been co-opted by oligarchs. Both
the practice of consensus and dissensus democracy in Indonesia does not focus on the sovereignty of the people but it tends to focus on oligarch needs and their particular group. It occurs because of the absence of liberal tradition and leftist movements in the Indonesian politics tradition renders difficult organizing and advocating grass root groups to build up independent and civil society which is the basis of populism.

In the 1980s Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe established the social philosophical foundation of democracy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 126). According to them, society is not given harmoniously in front of us; rather it is constructed through a complex discursive process. The discourses create meaning and significance. Consequently, meanings are not established through empirical reference, but the results of discourse taking place in diverse social and political fields. In this case, discourse is understood as a changing social totality. Furthermore, due to the dynamic of social process, the social meaning constructed in the discourse cannot be reduced into one.

Therefore, such a society keeps being fragile and questioned. There are always contests of ideas in order to stabilize the discourse. Laclau and Mouffe name the described social condition the political (Mouffe, 2005: 17-18). In other words, the social and the political are the way to build up populism in the Indonesian context. The leaders and civil society are encouraged to create a populist moment where humanitarian values such as freedom, equality and security become the basis of their striving. It means that the ideal of populism in Indonesia is in the process of being constructed. Without social discourse and liberal democracy, populism in Indonesia cannot be an alternative way to bring democracy to its meaning.

Based on the antagonistic understanding of democracy, Mouffe started to design left-wing populism movements. Politics constituted on the basis of left wing populism have to be able to create noticeable fundamental antagonism and to open up new alternatives in the society. This goal can only be reached if populists are able to establish inclusive politics, neglecting racial, exclusive and anti-pluralism dimensions of populism. However, radical democracy can develop a populistic dimension of democracy in order to mobilize the people and to design collective awareness of a nation. It means the collective identity of the people never exists independently of the populist discourse on their representation, rather than being constructed by the discourse, as Laclau emphasizes, “the construction of a ‘people’ would be impossible without the operation of mechanisms of representation” (Laclau, 2005: 161).

In the Indonesian context, the left-wing populism has not been clearly seen because there is no strong civil society which is independent in order to criticize elites. Rather, some groups that name after civil society are established and funded by elites who are oligarchs. Consequently, they speak publicly for common people and their common good but behind the table, they promote their own values and groups. In other words, left-wing populism in Indonesia is still far from its dream and purpose, which frequently employs
economic arguments and attacks neoliberalism and the role of large corporations in society. In order to build up the strong left-wing populism of Indonesia, Indonesians particularly leaders are demanded to avoid reproducing exclusion and to “practice a more inclusive politics” (McKean, 2016: 1).

In contrast, right-wing populism generally focuses on cultural issues, often aiming to defend a national culture and identity against perceived attacks by outsiders, especially establishing alliances against immigrants and minority groups. In Indonesia, the emergence of right-wing populism has rapidly increased which can be seen through some moments of protests based on beliefs and interests, for example the “212” movement.

Based on the notion of populist waves, John Judis stated that populist activities have massive ‘political logic,’ where people protest against the ruling elite due to a lack of trust (Judis, 2016: 50). The people feel that these elites no longer pay attention to the ideals of a nation and ignore what they understand to be a common constitution. These mass associations are eventually mobilized by the support bases and create a political identity according to the beliefs of the majority of the supporting bases (Rizkimawati, 2021: 17). The reality describes that populism, especially right-wing populism, is a part of Indonesia democracy, even though it has not been a massive movement. Therefore, liberal democracy and radical democracy which is antagonistic and disensus democracy can lead to populism whether right or left wing populism specifically in Indonesia context.

Conclusion

This article has shown that populism is an expression of the dissatisfaction and protest by the people against the failures of representative democracy based on elites and establishment, ignoring the ordinary people as the fundamental goal of the democracy. Liberal democracy has been transformed into a consensus machine establishing and asserting the importance of collective political opinion and conviction as fundamental reasons for the citizens to accept democracy.

Consequently, disensus or the antagonistic aspect of democracy is neglected. It is a dimension characterized by ongoing conflicts and debates. Political antagonism results in establishing radical democratic recognition through identification, participation and confrontation which bring forth populism in democracy life.

It also described that in Indonesia the rise of populism had to do with the failures of political institutions co-opted by the oligarchs to create welfare for the people. It encouraged populist politician to launch populist issues in order to mobilize the masses and to boost political participation. However, populist leaders including Jokowi failed to institutionalize populist ideas and to include pro-democracy movements.

On the contrary, they relied on oligarchic political parties, religious conservatism and chauvinistic ultra-nationalism weakening and threatening democracy. These can be
named as right-wing populist moments in Indonesian democracy. It means that could become a transformative force that brings back the original meaning of democracy as popular sovereignty in order to encounter the crisis of liberal and representative democracy displaying technocratic faces.

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