The Political Economy of Fisheries Development During Joko Widodo’s Regime

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Abstract:
The article discusses the political economy of fisheries development in Indonesia and its dynamics during Joko Widodo’s regime. The development of the fisheries sector, particularly marine fisheries, has faced ups and downs since Indonesia’s independence. During the New Order era, fisheries development depended on foreign investment and international aid, which on several occasions has driven severe conditions in depleted fish stocks and the marginalization of small-scale fishermen. The fisheries sector began to be measured politically after the reform period when Indonesia established the Department/Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. Even so, the direction of fisheries development has not met its consistency. When Joko Widodo served as president, he created a big vision for maritime development, namely “Global Maritime Axis,” where the fisheries sector became one of the national development priorities. Jokowi appointed Susi Pudjiastuti as Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MAF). Under Susi, the development of fisheries began to be reformed and she enacted many strict policies to deal with fisheries problems that have been occurring for decades. Susi gained many political pressures because her strict policies disrupted the oligarchic system that had controlled fisheries resources at the time. Fisheries development experienced inconsistencies from the last of 2019 until the end of 2020 because the first Minister of MAF in Jokowi’s second period made contradictory policies from Susi’s period. Since 2021, Indonesia’s fisheries development has been using a blue economy model implemented through the regulation on measured fishing.

Keywords:
fisheries development; marine policy; exploitation; sustainable fisheries; blue economy

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Introduction

As an archipelagic country whose vast territory is dominated by sea, Indonesia should be a glorious country in the fisheries sector. However, on the contrary, Indonesia’s fisheries sector was often underestimated and did not become the government’s focus in the national development sector. At least, in the era of President Joko Widodo, the fisheries sector, especially capture fisheries, began to turn into a “prima donna sector” by carrying out development in a progressive direction. Nevertheless, the capture fisheries sector is still not fully managed optimally (Kusdiantoro et al., 2019).

Historically, fisheries management in Indonesia was regulated by the Directorate General of Fisheries under the Ministry of Agriculture during the new order regime. Politically, the fisheries sector during the new order regime did not become glorious because it lagged behind other national priorities in natural resource sectors. For example, the forestry sector, since 1983, has become the Ministry of Forestry after being separated from the Ministry of Agriculture (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan, 2021). Then, the mining and energy sector has been a separate department since the old order regime. The fisheries sector began to be seriously looked at and considered in the post-reformation period with the establishment of the Department of Marine Exploration in 1999. Thus, based on Presidential Decree No. 165/2000, this department turned into the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries or currently known as the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries.

The establishment of the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (DMAF) during the reformation period was a political economy decision that ideally could give the fisheries sector power at the national policy level to improve the fisheries sector and increase economic value (Tajerin, 2009). However, in the early time after the department was established, it was still unable to solve problems in the fisheries sector (Adam & Surya, 2013). In fact, from 2000-2005, the fisheries sector got decreasing in the development of Indonesia’s economic output, in contrast to 1995-2000 (the transition phase to DMAF), which showed an increasing trend in the role of the fisheries sector in the development of the economic output (Tajerin, 2009).

For approximately 14 years, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries has existed (2000-2014). However, the policies of the five existing MMAF have yet to be able to put the fisheries sector as a superior or primary sector. Even though the fisheries sector has become a ministry, during its initial phase, the marine and fisheries sector has yet to become a political regime and in budgeting politics is not a priority. On the contrary, the Department of Agriculture received a three times larger budget despite its Administration of Non-Tax State Revenue being below the marine and fisheries sector (Satria, 2015).

The unfavorable conditions for the fisheries sector slowly began to fade when Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was inaugurated as the seventh President of the Republic of Indonesia. Jokowi began to show his favor both economically and politically to fisheries development.
It can be seen from his first state of the nation speech on October 20th, 2014, shortly after being inaugurated as President, in which one of his big visions is to strengthen Indonesia’s maritime, where fisheries are one part of the maritime (Nurhasim, 2014). It was followed up by conveying his concept in the maritime field, namely the World Maritime Axis (WMA), consisting of five pillars, namely: maritime culture, maritime economy, maritime connectivity, maritime diplomacy, and maritime security (Yani & Montratama, 2015). The fisheries sector is included in the maritime economy pillar. To strengthen and implement the development of PMD ideas, President Jokowi established the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs (Ismail & Kartika, 2019).

Few scientific journal articles discussed the political economy of fisheries in Indonesia. However, at least two scientific articles can serve as the basis for discussion in this paper. The first article is entitled “The political economy of marine fisheries development in Indonesia” (Bailey, 1988). This article discussed the history of marine fisheries development during the old order regime and the new order regime faced the dilemma of the sustainability of fisheries resources at that time. Second, an article entitled “Susi versus the rest: the political economy of the fisheries industry in Indonesia during Jokowi’s first term” (Scarpello, 2020a). The article written by Scarpello (2020a) discussed more about the complexity of the political situation between Susi Pudjiastuti and those who tried to oppose policies related to the fisheries industry issued by Susi when she was the minister during the first period of Jokowi’s administration.

This paper scrutinizes how the political economy conditions related to fisheries development in the Jokowi administration from 2014 to 2023. The authors limit the fisheries development that will be discussed only to the marine fisheries sector or capture fisheries. In addition, the paper will emphasize case studies of several popular fisheries development policies. The focus of this paper will be divided into three main discussions. The first section will discuss the historical overview of marine fisheries development since Indonesia’s dependence until before President Jokowi. The focus of discussion in this section has an underlying link to the political economy of fisheries development in the Jokowi’s regime. The second section will discuss the dilemma of fisheries development between exploitation or maintaining the sustainability of fisheries resources which will be illustrated through several case studies on popular policies in the first and second periods of President Jokowi. Based on what was explained by Perrings and Ansuategi (2000), the point of debate was not whether economic growth (in this case the exploitation of fisheries resources) has an impact on the environment, but whether this impact can threaten ecological resilience, because ecological damage will lead to the loss of economic activity. The third section will discuss the blue economy, which has become the MMAF’s slogan since Sakti Wahyu Trenggono was appointed as minister, as the basis for Indonesia’s future fisheries development.
In addition, to analyze the political economy of fisheries development in this paper, the author uses two theoretical approaches; the first is the political economy of environment approach written by Rudel et al. (2011), which explains that political economy emphasizes how political decisions provide options for economic production and how practices that occur will absolutely contribute to environmental damage. Rudel et al. (2011) also explained that there are two theories of thought in the political economy of environment; the first political economy focuses on production orientation, where industries will continue to produce goods to meet the needs of the human population, which has an impact on environmental damage. The second thought follows the first but is accompanied by countermeasures and prevention of environmental damage accommodated by the state and society. This theory becomes rational to be used in analyzing the political economy of fisheries because it is strengthened by the argument of Campling et al. (2012), which stated that environmental changes would have an impact on the political economy of fisheries. The second approach is related to fisheries governance. Spikers et al. (2022) divide fisheries governance, especially in terms of overfishing which causes a decline in fish stocks, into two clusters. The first cluster is fisheries governance which prioritizes strict attitudes or regulations on access to fisheries resource utilization. Second, fisheries governance which emphasizes the collection of accurate information and data to monitor the stock of fisheries resources.

The data used in this study includes primary and secondary data. Primary data were obtained from the reflection of interview notes from various key informants (central and local government, experts, non-governmental organizations, fisheries actors), FGD, and field observations that the authors had carried out during fieldwork in several regions (Maluku, North Maluku, North Sulawesi, North Kalimantan, Riau Islands, West Java, East Java, and Jakarta) in 2019-2022. Primary data covered various perspectives from key informants proportionally and were analyzed using a descriptive approach. Secondary data were obtained through a literature review and news media.

**Historical Overview: The Pathway to The Development of Marine Fisheries**

Marine fisheries or capture fisheries in Indonesia are dominated by traditional fishing boats or small fishing boats under 5 Gross Tonnage (GT). This circumstance has not only occurred recently but has occurred since the post-independence era in the 1950s. Even long before independence, fishing activities at sea had been carried out by Indonesian fishermen using only small canoes and sailboats (Comitini & Hardjolukito, 1983). Almost all fishermen in the 1950s caught fish using simple equipment such as fish traps and fishing lines (Krisnandhi, 1969). According to data from the Central Bureau Statistics and the Directorate General of Fisheries (Krisnandhi, 1969), in 1951, there were 315,000 fishermen with a total of 80,400 fishing boats of which 80,300 were fishing boats without motors or engines (sampans or sailboats).
In the 1950s, there were successful experiments conducted by the Directorate General of Fisheries regarding trawl fishing in the Madura Strait and Java Sea. However, fishers in Java chose not to use these trawlers because it was very difficult to obtain engines or spare parts for boats at that time (Butcher, 2004). This is understandable, as economic conditions during the post-independence period (old order regime) were very unstable (Leirissa et al., 2012). Therefore, Indonesian fishermen during the 1950s only caught fish near the coast (Krisnandhi, 1969). Difficult economic conditions as well as rely on traditional fishing gear, only made fishermen catch fish to fulfill their daily needs at that time.

The political economy of marine fisheries began to change and came into a new phase after 1957 when there was a historical event called the Djuanda Declaration 1957. The declaration changed the territory of Indonesian waters, where the sea area around the Indonesian islands is one unitary territory of Indonesia, including the 12-mile territorial sea measured from the baseline of the Indonesian archipelago (Purwaka, 2014). Prior to this declaration, the seas within the Indonesian archipelago, such as the Sulawesi, Banda and Arafura seas were international waters. Indonesia still adheres to the 1957 Djuanda Declaration, Although the declaration has yet to be fully recognized by the international community through the Law of the Sea Conference.

After 1960, a new chapter in Indonesia’s fisheries political economy related to foreign cooperation and investment began. In 1968, the dispute between Japan and Indonesia resulted from the ban on Japanese fishing vessels operating in the Indonesian Sea met a solution. According to Djalal (1983), in 1968, Indonesia signed an “Interim Arrangement” with Representatives of the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives of Japan and the Federation of Japanese Tuna Fishermen Cooperative Association allowed Japanese fishing vessels to catch tuna in the Banda Sea area. The agreement was renewed five times from 1968 to 1975 and provided income for the Government of Indonesia of approximately 10 million USD. Cooperation between Indonesia and Japan in the Banda Sea was known as the Banda Sea Agreement (Sunoko & Huang, 2014).

Indonesia’s political conditions under the New Order regime were in contrast to the Old Order. The new order formulated Indonesia’s development with the Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita) policy. Comitini and Hardjolukito (1983) assessed that during the first Repelita period from 1969 to 1974, fisheries development focused on developing small-scale fisheries and stimulating fisheries commercialization. The development of small-scale fisheries was mainly carried out on the development of supporting infrastructure such as fish landing sites, markets, and auction sites. The impact of the development of small-scale fisheries was the increase of small fishing vessels using motors or engines. Initially, only 1.9% of fishing vessels using motors in 1969 and increased to 4.9% in 1974 of the total number of fishing vessels in Indonesia (annual statistical data of the Directorate General of Fisheries in Bailey, 1988).
Meanwhile, the stimulus for the commercialization of fisheries in the first Repelita was carried out with three main policies. First, encouraging foreign investment through Law No. 1/1967 regarding Foreign Investment. Second, through domestic investment through Law No. 6/1968 regarding Domestic Investment. Third, entering into agreements for capital loans both bilaterally and multilaterally, such as with the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, the Government of Japan, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank. The results were in 1969-1973, Indonesia created 10 Joint Ventures with a total investment of 18.7 million USD. In addition, the government also emphasized that joint ventures should be conducted by cooperating with local companies and should not interfere with fishing operations carried out by local fishermen (Comitini & Hardjolukito, 1983).

By relying on foreign investment and international loans, fisheries development did not always benefit all fishers. In 1980, Bailey (1988) explained that the total fish catch from large-scale fishing vessels, especially those using trawlers and purse seines, was 23% of Indonesia’s total capture fisheries production. At the same time, trawl and purse seine vessels amounted to only 2% of the total fishing vessels in Indonesia. Trawlers and purse seiners operated primarily along the North Coast of Java and the Malacca Strait (East Coast of Sumatra Island). The condition made small-scale fishers, which number approximately 266,000 and have been operated on the North Coast of Java and the Malacca Strait for decades faced severe problems. For instance, the depletion of fish stocks decreases small-scale fishers’ catches.

After the Indonesian government ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea through Law No. 17/1985, Indonesia’s territory has an exclusive economic zone, making its water area very large; up to 2/3 of Indonesia’s total area is the water. However, Indonesia has yet to fully utilize the fish resources in the Indonesia Exclusive Economic Zone (IEEZ). Therefore, to utilize its fisheries resources, Indonesia needs foreign fishing vessels with a license scheme or chartering fishing vessel approach (Sunoko & Huang, 2014). In general, the scheme was carried out by allowing foreign fishing vessels to catch fish in Indonesia with various cooperation and requirements, such as having to land their catch in Indonesia, using part of the fishing crew member from Indonesia, and also using a joint venture scheme. Between 1985 and 1988, 15 foreign fishing vessels were licensed to catch tuna fish in the IEEZ from Taiwan, Honduras, Korea and the US (McElroy, 1989). Meanwhile, joint venture and vessel charter schemes allowed 945 sizeable foreign fishing vessels to operate in the IEEZ by 1993 (Sunoko & Huang, 2014).

Indonesia’s schemes to optimize the utilization of fish resources in the IEEZ have not always gone smoothly. For example, the case between Indonesia and the Philippines. In 2001, Indonesia signed the “Bilateral Arrangement Between the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Indonesia and the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Philippines on the utilization of part of the total allowable catch in the Indonesian Exclusive
Economic Zone”. The bilateral agreement provides a license scheme for fishing vessels from the Philippines to operate in the IEEZ, particularly in the Sulawesi Sea. However, in 2005, Indonesia sent a diplomatic note regarding the termination of the bilateral agreement because it was detrimental to Indonesia with the outbreak of illegal fishing activities by Philippine fishing vessels (Oktari, 2014). In addition, from 2001-2005, Philippine fishing vessels violated the agreement by frequently landing fish caught in the IEEZ directly in the Philippines, which should have been landed in Indonesia (Putri, 2016). In 2006, the Indonesian government took a stand by eliminating the license scheme and focusing on developing a joint venture scheme into an integrated capture fisheries business (Sunoko & Huang, 2014).

Capture fisheries in Indonesia are dominated by small-scale fishing vessels. Investments in fisheries development during the New Order regime and early reform periods in Indonesia were more focused on developing large-scale capture fisheries, which in some cases harmed small-scale capture fisheries. Before investing in large-scale capture fisheries, it should prioritize developing small-scale fisheries to establish equitable development (Nasution, 2023).

The Dilemma Between Exploitation and Sustainability of Fisheries Resources

On October 28, 2014, President Jokowi appointed Susi Pudjiastuti as Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MAF) in the first period of his presidency (2014-2019). Under Susi’s leadership, MMAF implemented three pillars as its mission to develop the marine and fisheries sector: sovereignty, sustainability, and prosperity. After completing his first period, President Jokowi replaced Susi with Edhy Prabowo, who came from a political party. Edhy did not clearly explain his vision in MMAF. He only stated that the Minister has no vision and mission, only the vision of the president and vice president. Edhy held the position for about a year because he was arrested in a corruption case at the end of 2020. His position was replaced by Sakti Wahyu Trenggono, who was inaugurated at the end of December 2020. Prior to serving as Minister of MAF, Sakti was the Deputy Minister of Defense with a background as a businessman in the telecommunications sector.

Every Minister of MAF is constantly faced with two considerations in determining fisheries development policies, exploiting and gaining economic value or maintaining sustainable fisheries resources for the future. Within these two considerations, every policy which will be taken always tries to find a balance, although there will still be pros and cons. This part will focus more on the dynamics and polemics of political policies related to fisheries development in 2014-2023 and significantly influence fisheries’ political economy. The discussion of this part will be divided into three points to make it easier to understand.
1. Moratorium on ex-foreign fishing vessels and transhipment

At the beginning of Susi Pudjiastuti’s leadership as Minister of MAF immediately made a policy breakthrough that changed the direction of fisheries development. Susi issued two decrees of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, No. 56/2014 and 57/2014, related to the temporary suspension (moratorium) of ex-foreign fishing vessels and banned fish transhipment in the middle of the sea. As explained in the previous chapter, before the Jokowi administration, the MMAF was oriented towards utilizing fisheries resources. Ex-foreign large fishing vessels which exploited fish resources in Indonesian seas have committed much illegal fishing (Sedayu, 2015). Minister Decree of MAF No.56/2014 and 57/2014 were also the beginning of MMAF’s policy to improve the governance of capture fisheries sector development (Rahmayanti et al., 2017). In addition, Indonesia, which was initially dependent on foreign investment in exploiting its fisheries resources, changed to include investment in the capture fisheries sector into the negative list of foreign investments when Susi was minister of MMAF (Saragih, 2017).

Susi’s breakthrough in developing the capture fisheries sector met resistance. It led to the emergence of an anti-Susi coalition consisting of domestic and foreign fish companies, legislative members, academics, politicians, and fisheries associations (Scarpello, 2020b). The resistance was reasonable because Indonesia’s fisheries resources before Susi took office were still controlled by an oligarchic system dominating Indonesia’s political economy in the fisheries sector (Nasution, 2020a; Scarpello, 2020b). Before Susi took office, Indonesia faced severe issues like the rampant practice of illegal fishing, which harmed Indonesia’s economy and the sustainability of fisheries resources (Dharmasaputra, 2017). Ex-foreign fishing vessels operated in Indonesian seas are suspected of fishing without a clear license, such as duplicating permits, performing transhipment of fish in the middle of the sea, and not landing their catch result in Indonesia (Hikmayani, 2015).

Despite facing much resistance, the moratorium policy and the ban on transhipment carried out by the MMAF at that time had positive results by decreasing illegal fishing activities in Indonesian territory (Sianturi et al., 2016; Cabral et al., 2018). Like most policies in general, they have not only positive things but also negative impacts, such as on the large-scale fishing industry. The impact of MMAF’s strict policy made tuna production and exports in East Java decline during the first year of the moratorium policy (Syahrani, 2017). The same thing also happened in Bitung City, famous for its tuna fishing industry. Since the moratorium and transhipment policies took effect, fish exports have decreased by more than 50% in Bitung (Rahmayanti, 2017). In addition, the negative impact was also felt by fish processing units that experienced a decrease in income and a lack of fish supply (Nurlaili et al., 2016).

In addition, the MMAF’s policy also directly impacts the community, such as the loss of livelihoods for some people who depend on the fishing industry, especially for Indonesian fishing crew members who work on ex-foreign fishing vessels (Riskiyanti, 2015).
on an interview conducted by the author in Natuna in 2021 with a fishing crew member from North Sulawesi who had worked on an ex-foreign fishing vessel, he admitted that he had been unemployed for almost a year because the vessel could no longer operate. In the end, this crew member applied to become a crew member on a foreign-owned fishing vessel through the help of an agent. However, his fate was unlucky, the foreign ship he worked on was detained by a ship of the Indonesian Navy while carrying out illegal fishing activities in the Natuna sea in early 2021.

Regardless of the negative impacts of the moratorium policy and the ban on transhipment, MMAF prioritized small-scale fishers who were often marginalized by the presence of sizeable ex-foreign fishing vessels. The moratorium policy has increased fish production from small-scale fishers, made fishing grounds closer because they did not have to compete with large fishing vessels and increased fish stocks at sea (Nurlaili et al., 2016; Khan et al., 2018; Kasim & Widagdo, 2019; Sari et al., 2019). The efforts of MMAF at the time seemed to be anti-foreign investment was not entirely true because the priority for MMAF was providing justice for small-scale fishers. According to Susi, foreign investment in fishing operations was prohibited at the time. However, it would be allowed and facilitated if foreign investment came into the fisheries management sector, such as manufacturing ice factories and fish processing units (Kaha, 2016). In addition, investment in ice factories and fish processing units is necessary to develop small-scale fisheries even today (Nasution, 2023).

The firm policies issued by MMAF at that time, Ministerial Decree of MMAF No. 56/2014 and 57/2014, included cluster one in fisheries governance described by Spijkers et al. (2022). Minister Susi chose to prioritize strict policies in order to protect the sustainability of fisheries resources.

2. Polemics over Lobster Seed and Cantrang License

The management of lobster fisheries became a widespread discourse in Indonesia in 2020. It happened because Edhy Prabowo, who then served as Minister of MAF, issued a policy on legalizing the capture and export of lobster seed called *benur* through the ministerial decree of MAF No.12/2020; the capture of *benur* was once again legalized. The ministerial decree has drawn many polemics and resistance from academics, activists, fisheries practitioners, and the general public. It was feared that this regulation impacted the sustainability of *benur* in nature. In addition, it could also cause problems for lobster farmers in obtaining seed stock from nature because the seed stock has already been sold for export.

One of the issues in the *benur* export policy was the discourse related to the generated economic value. Some argued that exporting *benur* was economically profitable faster but detrimental to lobster farmers because *benur* became scarce and expensive. While others argued that lobster farming was more profitable even though it took longer because the
adding value for the export of adult lobster commodities is very high. Initially, the activity of capturing *benur* and cultivating lobster was continuous; for example, in the Lombok region, in the 1990s, fishermen who captured *benur* always sold their results to lobster farmers (Priyambodo & Sarifin, 2008). The capture of *benur* was initially considered a side activity to support the cultivation activities by lobster farmers (Erlania et al., 2014). However, when the export demand between 2011-2014 for several countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia became very high, capturing *benur* activities became the main livelihood (Erlania et al., 2017). This condition caused the productivity of lobster farming declined because farmers found it difficult to get a supply of *benur* (Witomo & Nuralili, 2015). In the end, the capture of *benur* that was previously used for supply for farmers turned into an export commodity.

The polemic on lobster fisheries management in Indonesia was not only on exploiting *benur* in nature, which is feared to disrupt the sustainability of lobster resources. In addition, it was also the monopoly of shipping cargo for export, affecting the selling price of seeds at the fishers’ level. The research results by Erliana et al. (2016) showed that the value chain of *benur* from fishers to the export destination countries could be relatively long, not to mention the monopoly of the cargo for the export of *benur*, which made the value chain even longer and ineffective in business competition (Nasution, 2020b).

When Susi Pudjiastuti served as Minister of MAF, the capture and export of *benur* were officially banned by the ministerial decree of MAF No. 1/2015 and No. 56/2016. However, since it was allowed to capture and export *benur* (Minister Decree of MAF No. 12/2020), the same problem has recurred, with the lobster farmer claiming difficulty obtaining *benur* to be cultivated. From various media sources that the author has collected, lobster farmers found it difficult to obtain *benur* because most fishers sold their *benur* for export; whilst some fishers sold *benur* to farmers, the price was relatively high and often not the leading quality. The polemics over *benur* export in 2020 led to the arrest of Edhy Prabowo, who served as Minister at the time. Edhy was suspected of corruption related to *benur* exports. The corruption case that ensnared Edhy Prabowo could be an example of an oligarchic system of actors with political and economic power to monopolize and control fisheries resources (Nasution, 2020b). After Sakti Wahyu Trenggono replaced Edhy Prabowo as a minister, the export of *benur* was again banned through a ministerial decree of MMAF No. 17/2021.

Similar to the *benur* polemic, trawl fishing gear, banned during Susi Pudjiastuti’s era, was allowed during Edhy Prabowo’s era and again banned during Sakti Wahyu Trenggono’s era. Minister Susi issued Ministerial Decree No. 2/2015 on the prohibition of the use of trawl (*cantrang*). This policy experienced much resistance from fishermen but also received much positive support from environmentalists (Arafat et al., 2018). As discussed in the previous chapter, trawl was banned in 1980 because it was not environmentally friendly. Its massive utilization would adversely impact the sustainability of fisheries resources,
which could lead to conflict. It cannot be denied that the impact of the trawl ban will also result in a loss of income for trawl fishers, which results in a welfare decrease (Hasbullah, 2019). When banning *cantrang*, Minister Susi also provided solutions for *cantrang* fishers. For example, providing replacement fishing gear that was more environmentally friendly for *cantrang* fishers who used fishing boats under 10 Gross Tonnage (GT) and business capital from the government and private banks for *cantrang* fishing boat size 10-30 GT (Sukmana, 2017).

The *cantrang* ban policy during Susi’s era was deadlocked due to solid resistance among *cantrang* fishers, especially in Java. Furthermore, political pressure cornered the MMAF in this matter. In the end, Susi issued a Letter of the Minister of MAF No. 72/2016, which limited the use of trawl in Indonesia as a relaxation of resistance to the *cantrang* ban (Karim, 2020). This relaxation continued until June 2017 through the Letter of the Director General of Capture Fisheries of MMAF No. B.664/DJPT/PI.220/VI/2017 culminated in DJPT issuing Circular Letter No.B.743/DJPT/PI.220/VII/2017 concerning assistance in switching trawl fishing gear until December 2017 (Salsabila., et al. 2021). *Cantrang* or trawl was officially banned in early January 2018.

After the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries changed from Susi to Edhy, the problem of *cantrang* occurred again. At the end of 2020, MMAF allowed the use of trawl fishing gear through Ministerial Decree of MAF No. 59/2020. Although in this decree, the use of *cantrang* could not be used in all Fisheries Management Areas of the Republic of Indonesia (WPP-NRI). The regulation did not last long and was revoked when Minister Sakti Wahyu Trenggono led MMAF with ministerial decree MMAF No. 18/2021 concerning “Placement of Fishing Gear and Fishing aggregating devices (FADs) in the WPP-NRI and the High Seas; and Arrangement of Temporary Fishing (Andons)” which prohibits the use of *cantrang*. Sakti argued that the economy and ecology were reluctant to be debated but must be regulated to run in balance.

The condition of the political economy of fisheries in the management of lobster seeds (*benur*) and *cantrang* shows that Indonesia under the Jokowi Government uses the second thought of environmental political economy as described by Rudel et al. (2011). Indonesia tries to optimise fisheries production by utilising fisheries resources but still taking actions or regulations that prevent ecological damage. In the case of *benur* and *cantrang*, the Indonesian government prefers to avoid activities that generate instant economic value, which can disrupt the sustainability of fisheries resources.

### 3. Job Creation Law and Regulation On Measured Fishing

On October 5th, 2020, the Government and the DPR passed the draft of Job Creation Law. The Job Creation Draft then became Law Number 11/2020 regarding Job Creation (JB). This law obtained much rejection from academics and the community because the contents were not in accordance with the community, regional authority was drawn into the
central authority, and alignment to investors and foreign investment (Handriana & Nurdin, 2023). The Constitutional Court declared the JB Law conditionally unconstitutional on November 25th, 2021, through decision No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020, because it contradicted the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945) and must be reviewed and corrected within two years. Instead of reviewing and correcting the regulation, on December 30th, 2022, the Government sought an alternative shortcut by replacing Law No. 11/2020 with Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2022 on Job Creation (Chandra et al., 2023).

The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs stated several reasons for issuing the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2022, including strengthening geopolitical conditions and improving the Indonesian economy from global economic changes, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, economic acceleration could occur by opening and accelerating domestic and foreign investment channels in the forestry, agriculture and fisheries sectors (Achmad, 2023). In line with the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, the Minister of MAF also stated that JB Law developed Indonesia’s fisheries and marine sectors. MMAF, through the Directorate General of Capture Fisherie held a socialisation of JB Law in the field of capture fisheries on January 30, 2023. Some things that have changed are only technical writing and editorial, and the rules still favour small-scale fishers and broaden business opportunities (Wire, 2023).

Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2022, or previously JB Law, embraced a concept called Omnibus Law. This concept can change the previous law system and replace several contents in just one Law (Prabowo et al., 2020). In the fisheries and marine sector, the NGO Coalition for Sustainable Fisheries and Ocean or called KORAL (2023), analysed several articles that changed from the previous law, including:

1. Removing the vessel size scale in the definition of small-scale fishers. Previously, the definition of small-scale fishers used fishing vessels with a maximum size of five gross tonnages (GT) found in Article 1 paragraph (11) of Law No. 45/2009 on Fisheries. Eliminating this vessel size scale will be biased in accessing the specific facilities mandated for small-scale fishers. In addition, the elimination of the size scale when can also open a gap for fishermen who should not be included in small fishermen to avoid the obligation to fulfil the administration of business licensing and its monitoring system.

2. Eliminating the licensing terms, namely SIUP (Fisheries Business License), SIPI (Fishing License) and SIKPI (Fish Carrying Vessel License), which were previously contained in Article 1 paragraph (16), paragraph (17) and paragraph (18) of the Fisheries Law. The license is replaced with the term “Business License. This Business License will apply to every person who owns and/or operates an Indonesian-flagged fishing vessel used to conduct Fishing in the WPP-NRI.
3. Withdrawing the authority of the local government becomes the obligation of the central government in facilitating business licensing related to utilisation at sea. Furthermore, the central government can change the status of the core zone in the national park area. It can be seen in article 18 of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2022. Previously, Law No. 27/2007 in conjunction with Law No. 1 of 2014 on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands, stated that in preparing plans by involving the community based on norms, standards, and guidelines through improved services, empowerment, and meaningful participation that should benefit the development of the area.

Several critical notes were issued to firmly reject the presence of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2022, including the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (WALHI) and the People’s Coalition for Fisheries Justice (KIARA). WALHI stated that Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2022 was firmly rejected by various layers of society, including traditional fishermen, fisherwomen, salt cultivators, and coastal indigenous peoples. Meanwhile, according to KIARA, the regulation significantly impacts environmental degradation through loopholes and easy licenses given to foreign corporations that want to operate activities in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This regulation threatens not only the environment but also the future of generations (Ambari, 2023; WALHI, 2023). In other words, the presence of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2022, which should provide many benefits and conveniences, can significantly negatively impact various layers of society and damage small islands and injustice for small-scale fishermen.

In line with the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2022, in 2021, MMAF launched a regulation on measured fishing (RMF), which was expected to build good governance of the fisheries sector (Ambari, 2023). After almost two years, the measured fishing regulation was finally formalized through Government Regulation No. 11/2023. This regulation was made to “ensure the sustainability of fish resources and provide fishermen’s welfare, expand employment opportunities, increase added value and competitiveness of fishery products, business certainty, contribution to the business sector, and for the state.” This regulation also refers to Law Number 31 of 2004 concerning Fisheries as amended several times through JB Law.

The RMF was intended to boost non-tax state revenues (PNBP) from fisheries levies, which previously used a pre-production system to a post-production system. PNBP’s target for fisheries is IDR 12 trillion by 2024, which previously reached 1.2 trillion in 2022. In the grand design, fishing zones previously contained in 11 Fisheries Management Areas of the Republic of Indonesia (WPP-NRI) were grouped into six zones and divided into industrial zones, local fishermen zones, and limited fishing zones. In MMAF’s presentation to the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment stated that the division of the measured fishing zone can be seen in Figure 1.
Critical point that can be analyzed in RMF were more fishing zones intended for domestic and foreign investors, compared to limited fishing zones and nursery grounds or fish spawning areas. The presence of the RMF opens opportunities for domestic and foreign investors to develop fisheries businesses in the WPP-NRI. This regulation is estimated to exacerbate the fisheries’ resources if destructive foreign fishing vessels are allowed to operate in Indonesia (Grahadyarini, 2023). This policy was not a new concept and was socialized in 2009 as a fisheries cluster system. The cluster system was firmly resisted by national fisheries business actors, who were not pro toward small-scale fishermen (Suhana, 2021). The presence of RMF and Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2022 will legitimize privatization in the fisheries sector. It is feared that this privatization will impact environmental damage, depletion of fish stocks, and erode the local values of fishing/indigenous communities (Karim, 2023).

**Blue Economy As A New Base for Fisheries Development**

In 2009, the concept of the Blue Economy was first introduced by a Belgian economist named Gunter Pauli in his book entitled “The Blue Economy, 10 Years, 100 Innovations, 100 Million Jobs”. This concept emerged as an enrichment of the red and green economies, which only focused on exploitation and alternative energy. Blue Economy is a concept that can be used to improve economic conditions that are considered unfavourable and
create more activities in the form of a sustainable model. This concept was developed to answer the challenges of the world economic system, which tends to be exploitative and environmentally harmful (Wahyudin et al., 2022; Ilma, 2014). According to Gunter Pauli, the blue economy includes the blue ocean and blue sky, producing economic growth and people’s welfare but still keeping the blue of the sea and sky.

Thus, in 2017, the World Bank introduced its concept of Blue Economy, with the definition: “The sustainable use of marine resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and jobs while maintaining the health of marine ecosystems.” The World Bank’s version of the blue economy focuses more on optimizing marine fisheries resources to increase economic growth. The blue economy consists of sectors related to “renewable” resources from the ocean, such as fisheries and other non-living resources, as well as “non-renewable” resources, including extractive industries, such as dredging, seabed mining, and offshore oil and gas. Furthermore, the World Bank Group (WBG) offers to provide the capital, services and technical assistance to unlock the potential of sustainably managed aquatic ecosystems and develop the blue economy (World Bank, 2017).

As the largest archipelagic state, the blue economy concept aligns with Indonesia’s desire to develop the domestic marine and fisheries sector in a way that supports sustainable development programs. In the presentation “Reflection 2022 and Outlook 2023 of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries”, the Minister of MAF, Saki Wahyu Trenggono, said that the policy direction of marine and fisheries development 2021-2024 was based on the blue economy. The five pillars of the blue economy launched by MMAF were (1) Expansion of marine conservation areas; (2) Regulation on Measured Fishing (RMF) based on quotas and fishing zones; (3) Development of sustainable marine, land, and coastal aquaculture; (4) Supervision and control of coastal and small islands; and (5) Cleaning up plastic waste in the sea (Purnomo, 2023).

Previously, Law No. 32/2014 regarding Marine Affairs Article 14 paragraph 1 also stated: “The National Government and Regional Governments with their authority carry out Marine Management for the greatest prosperity of the people through the utilization and exploitation of marine resources using the principles of Blue Economy”. What blue economy means in this Law is an approach to improve sustainable marine management and conservation of marine and coastal resources to realize economic growth with the principles of community involvement, resource efficiency, waste minimization, and multiple added values.

One of the blue economy programs pushed by MMAF is the regulation on measured fishing (RMF), which has been enacted as Government Regulation (PP) No. 11/2023. This regulation marks a new era of openness in fishing activities in Indonesia by the domestic fishing industry through domestic and foreign investments. On the other hand, the government seems to give privileges to foreign investment in 4 fishing zones and 8 WPPs. The openness for foreign investment is feared to open up over-exploitation,
given the condition of fish stocks that continue to decline. It can be counterproductive to Gunter Pauli’s original purpose of the blue economy, which was to harmonize economic development with environmental sustainability.

Based on Satria’s blue revolution model approach (2015), the RMF uses the technopopulist blue revolution model. RMF focuses on increasing production and capital-intensive by facilitating quotas for the large-scale fishing industry from foreign and domestic investment in the Indonesian fishing zone. However, industry quotas are granted if the operation exceeds 12 nautical miles. At the same time, areas under 12 nautical miles are facilitated for fishing quotas for local fishermen, including small fishermen. The division is to protect small-scale fishermen from the competition with industrial or large-scale fishermen. In addition, small fishermen are also exempt from fisheries levies in the form of non-tax or retribution state revenue.

Implementation of the blue economy must start from governance improvement, not just construction. The blue economy is not only related to the economy, the most important thing is achieving a balance between the empowerment of marine and coastal areas with aspects of the sustainability of marine ecosystems and resources, and can contribute to the welfare of society and the state. If the blue economy still focuses on the perspective of marine exploitation for economic interests, this regulation will certainly lead to ocean grabbing (Bennett et al., 2015)

The term ocean grabbing is used to highlight important processes and dynamics that negatively impact the sustainability of marine resources, as well as the sustainability of communities, cultural identity, and livelihoods that depend on small-scale fisheries. There are three main components that represent ocean grabbing, namely: (1) it deprives communities of control and access to coastal and marine resources; (2) it is conducted through inappropriate governance processes; and (3) it is carried out by public institutions, private institutions, or business entities. In the end, if the concept of blue economy is not able to make a balance between economy and ecology, therefore the main goal of blue economy will not be achieved.

**Conclusion**

The political economy of Indonesia’s marine fisheries development has been facing up and down since post-independence. Economically and politically, the fisheries sector was not favored to boost state revenues at that time. When the regime changed to the New Order (after 1969), fisheries development depended on foreign investment and international aid because the country’s economic conditions did not allow the fisheries sector to become a national development priority. In the Post-reform era (after 1999), fisheries development should be forceful and more consistent because it has been established as
its own department or ministry, namely, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF). However, the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries changed from 2000-2014, and there was no consistent planning for fisheries development, as can be seen from the fact that with every turnover of the Minister, the direction of fisheries development policy also switched. Even if we look at it from a political point of view, MMAF was not a popular ministry at that time.

Since Jokowi’s first term of administration in 2014, the MMAF has been transformed into a crucial ministry with economic and political power. This is inseparable from President Jokowi’s vision of building Indonesia into a maritime country. Under Susi Pudjiastuti, whom Jokowi appointed as minister in MMAF, the direction of fisheries development began to be reformed. Susi tried to reform the fisheries sector’s development, which had faced many problems at that time through populist policies. Susi issued strict policies to reform the fisheries sector, which also resulted in resistance from the community and political elites. Fisheries development faced a difficult choice between exploiting or maintaining the sustainability of fisheries resources. The MMAF under Susi chose to implement strict fisheries governance to meet the equity of fisheries development. One is by restructuring Indonesia’s capture fisheries system, which has been riddled with illegal fishing activities that harm the country economically and fisheries resources. Therefore, the political economy approach taken by the Jokowi administration in fisheries development focused more on balance between fisheries production and sustainability of fisheries resources. However, the political-economy approach is yet to be fully optimized.

The political economy of fisheries development during Jokowi’s second term (after Susi was replaced) ran into inconsistencies because some existing development policies were changed in a contradictory manner. Ultimately, the first Minister of MAF (Edhy Prabowo) in Jokowi’s second term had to be replaced because he was arrested in a corruption case. Starting in 2021, the MMAF under Sakti Wahyu Trenggono made the blue economy a development agenda for the fisheries sector, especially with the regulation on measured fishing (RMF), which has now been formalized through Government Regulation No. 11/2023. According to the MMAF, this policy will ensure the sustainability of fish resources, provide fishermen welfare, and increase state revenue. The RMF regulation acquired tenacious resistance from the public during its planning, as it was feared that there would be a strong dominance of large-scale fisheries supported by foreign investment. Indonesia has experienced economically detrimental and depleted fish stocks due to massive large-scale fisheries supported by foreign investments that were not adequately regulated. Not to mention, small-scale fishers, the main actors of Indonesian capture fisheries, will also be marginalized again because they cannot compete with large fishing vessels. The government must prove that the blue economy, which is implemented through RMF, is not just a slogan but an answer to the development of sustainable marine fisheries and the welfare of fishermen.
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